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Abstract
This thesis investigates how the formal modeling and verification techniques of computer
science can be used for the analysis of hybrid systems [7,14,22,37] - systems involving both
discrete and continuous behavior. The motivation behind such research lies in the inherent
similarity of the hierarchical and decentralized control strategies of hybrid systems and the
communication and operation protocols used for distributed systems in computer science.
As a case study, the thesis focuses on the development of techniques that use hybrid I/O
automata [29,30] to model and analyze automated vehicle transportation systems and, in
particular, their various protection subsystems - control systems that are used to ensure
that the physical plant at hand does not violate its various safety requirements.
The thesis is split into two major parts. In the first part, we develop an abstract model of a
physical plant and its various protection subsystems - also referred to as protectors. The
specialization of this abstract model results in the specification of a particular automated
transportation system. Moreover, the proof of correctness of the abstract model leads to
simple correctness proofs of the protector implementations for particular specializations
of the abstract model. In this framework, the composition of independent protectors is
straightforward - their composition guarantees the conjunction of the safety properties
guaranteed by the individual protectors. In fact, it is shown that under certain conditions
composition holds for dependent protectors also.
In the second part, we specialize the aforementioned abstract model to simplified versions
of the personal rapid transit system (PRT 2 00 0TM) under development at Raytheon Cor-
poration. We examine overspeed and collision protection for a set of vehicles traveling on
straight tracks, on binary merges, and on a directed graph of tracks involving binary merges
and diverges. In each case, the protectors sample the state of the physical plant and take
protective actions to guarantee that the physical plant does not reach hazardous states. The
proofs of correctness of such protectors involve specializing the abstract protector to the
physical plant at hand and proving that the suggested protector implementations are cor-
rect. This is done by defining simulations among the states of the protector implementations
and their abstract counterparts.
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Acronyms
ATO Automatic Train Operation
ATP Automatic Train Protection
AVO Automated Vehicle Operation
AVOS Automated Vehicle Operation System
AVP Automated Vehicle Protection
AVPS Automated Vehicle Protection System
HIOA Hybrid I/O Automaton, or Hybrid I/O Automata
PRT Personal Rapid Transit
Hybrid I/O Automata Notation
(i, t) A superdense time in an execution fragment a = woalwla 2w2 .
(i, t, s) An occurrence of a state s in an execution fragment a = woalwla 2w 2
a A hybrid execution of a HIOA.
a.fstate The first state of a hybrid execution a = woalwla2w2  .
a.lstate The last state of a finite hybrid execution a = woalwl .. anw,.
a.ltime The limit time of a hybrid execution a = woalwla2 w2  .
E The set of all actions of a HIOA.
Eit The set of internal actions of a HIOA.
E n" The set of input actions of a HIOA.
E1oc The set of locally controlled actions of a HIOA.
Eout The set of output actions of a HIOA.
0 The set of initial states of a HIOA.
A A hybrid I/O automaton.
EL
U
V
X
Y
W
h-traces(A)
h-trace(a)
states(A)
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
Latin Abbreviations
cf. confer; Latin for "compare".
e.g. exempli gratia; Latin for "for example".
et al. et alii; Latin for "and others".
etc. et cetera; Latin for "and so forth".
i.e. id est; Latin for "that is".
ib. or ibid. ibidem; Latin for "in the same work/place".
n.b. nota bene; Latin for "take special note of".
op. cit. opere citato; Latin for "in the work/text cited".
v.g. verbi gratia; Latin for "for example".
v.i. vide infra; Latin for "see below".
v.s. vide supra; Latin for "see above".
viz. videlicet; Latin for "that is to say" or "namely".
vs. versus; Latin for "against".
Mathematical Notation
Z The set of valuations of the set of variables Z.
V The universal set of variables.
IXI The cardinality of the set X.
set of external variables of a HIOA.
set of local variables of a HIOA.
set of input variables of a HIOA.
set of all variables of a HIOA.
set of internal variables of a HIOA.
set of output variables of a HIOA.
set of discrete transitions of a HIOA.
set of trajectories of a HIOA.
set of hybrid traces of the HIOA A.
hybrid trace of the hybrid execution a.
set of all states of the HIOA A.
X The complement of the set X.
f I X The projection of the function f to the set X.
f - y The projection of the function f to the element y.
f [X The restriction of the function f to the set X.
f, g, h Functions.
T The time axis, i.e., a compact subgroup of (R, +).
TI  An interval in the time axis, i.e., a non-empty convex subset of T.
w.fstate The first state of a trajectory w, i.e., w(O).
w.lstate The last state of a closed trajectory w, i.e., w(w.ltime).
w.ltime The limit time of a trajectory w, i.e., sup(dom(w)).
X - Y The complement of the set Y in the set X, i.e., X n Y.
X :E Sx  Assignment of an arbitrary element of the set of valuations Sx, where Sx C
X, to the set of variables X.
x :E X Assignment of an arbitrary element of the set of values X, where X C
type(x), to the variable x.
X n Y The intersection of the sets X and Y.
The union of the sets X and Y.
The complement of the set Y in the set X, i.e., X n Y.
The power set of the set X.
The domain of the function f.
The range of the function f.
The collection of all trajectories over the set of variables Z.
The domain over which the variable v ranges.
The empty (or null) set.
The set of positive natural numbers, i.e., the set {1, 2, 3,...}.
The set of natural numbers, i.e., the set {0, 1, 2, 3,... }.
The set of all, non-negative, and positive real numbers.
The set of all, non-negative, and positive integers.
Physical Plant and Protector Notation
AXmax The maximum distance a vehicle can travel if braked after dmax time units.
XUY
x\Y
P(X)
dom(f)
range(f)
trajs(Z)
type(v)
N+
N
R, R>o, R+
Z, Z-o, Z+
Cmax The maximum allowable velocity of any vehicle.
ibrake The braking deceleration of a vehicle that has not collided.
Emax The maximum acceleration of a vehicle that has not collided.
Cmin The minimum acceleration of a vehicle that has not collided.
Ci(t) The section of track claimed by the vehicle i in time t.
Clen The minimum allowable separation between vehicles.
dmax The maximum protector sampling period.
Ei The section of track occupied by the vehicle i, i.e., the extent of the vehicle i.
Oi The section of track owned by the vehicle i.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates how the formal modeling and verification techniques of computer
science can be used for the analysis of hybrid systems [7,14,22,37] - systems involving both
discrete and continuous behavior. The motivation behind such research lies in the inherent
similarity of the hierarchical and decentralized control strategies of hybrid systems and the
communication and operation protocols used for distributed systems in computer science.
As a case study, the thesis focuses on the development of techniques that use hybrid I/O
automata [29,30] to model and analyze automated vehicle transportation systems and, in
particular, their various protection subsystems - control systems that are used to ensure
that the physical plant at hand does not violate its various safety requirements.
The thesis is split into two major parts. In the first part, we develop an abstract model of a
physical plant and its various protection subsystems - also referred to as protectors. The
specialization of this abstract model results in the specification of a particular automated
transportation system. Moreover, the proof of correctness of the abstract model leads to
simple correctness proofs of the protector implementations for particular specializations
of the abstract model. In this framework, the composition of independent protectors is
straightforward - their composition guarantees the conjunction of the safety properties
guaranteed by the individual protectors. In fact, it is shown that under certain conditions
composition holds for dependent protectors also.
In the second part, we specialize the aforementioned abstract model to simplified versions
of the personal rapid transit system (PRT 2 000TM) under development at Raytheon Cor-
poration. We examine overspeed and collision protection for a set of vehicles traveling on
straight tracks, on binary merges, and on a directed graph of tracks involving binary merges
and diverges. In each case, the protectors sample the state of the physical plant and take
protective actions to guarantee that the physical plant does not reach hazardous states. The
proofs of correctness of such protectors involve specializing the abstract protector to the
physical plant at hand and proving that the suggested protector implementations are cor-
rect. This is done by defining simulations among the states of the protector implementations
and their abstract counterparts.
1.1 Hybrid Systems
The trend of system integration and automation has resulted in large and complex systems
involving hierarchical and/or decentralized control structures. The higher levels of control
are based on discrete algorithms and are often modeled using finite automata techniques
from computer science. The lower levels of control address continuous behavior and are
based on well established control theoretic techniques. The inherent complexity of the mix
of continuous and discrete control and the need of a precise and efficient model for hybrid
systems has encouraged research in this field.
The similarity of the hierarchical and/or decentralized control structure of hybrid systems
with the distributed system setting in computer science has nurtured a distributed systems
approach of analyzing hybrid systems. This approach is based on various formal modeling
techniques developed for the verification and the proof of correctness of distributed sys-
tems in computer science. Such techniques use the principles of abstraction and modular
decomposition to provide simple and concise models of complex systems. Once a particular
system is decomposed into succinct parts, various composition theorems are used to prove
that the system is functioning according to its specifications, i.e., the system is correct.
1.1.1 Formal Framework
The formal modeling techniques that are used in this thesis are based on the hybrid I/O
automaton model [29,30]. This model is an extension of the timed I/O automaton model [11,
34] and allows the explicit treatment of continuous behavior. The hybrid I/O automaton
model is inspired by the phase transition models [2,4,35,36].
The hybrid I/O automaton model is a (possibly) infinite state model of a system involving
both discrete and continuous behavior. The states of a hybrid I/O automaton (HIOA) are
the valuations of a set of variables. The discrete behavior of a HIOA is modeled by discrete
jumps in state which are described by labeled transitions. The labels of such transitions
are the actions that carry out the transition from the initial to the final state of the jump.
The continuous behavior of a HIOA is modeled by continuous changes in state which are
described by sets of trajectories. The external interface of a HIOA is dictated by the
partition of its variables and its actions into three categories: input, internal, and output.
The behavior of the system being modeled over time is described by hybrid executions -
finite or infinite alternating sequences of trajectories and actions. The externally visible part
of a hybrid execution is denoted as the hybrid trace of the hybrid execution and involves
the evolution of the input and output variables of the HIOA.
A HIOA A1 implements another HIOA A2 if every external behavior of A1 is allowed by
A2. In this setting A1 and A2 are referred to as the implementation and the specification,
respectively. The notion of an implementation relation is given by inclusion of the sets
of hybrid traces; that is, the set of hybrid traces of A1 is a subset of the set of hybrid
traces of A2 . The composition of two HIOA is defined as their synchronization on shared
input/output variables and input/output actions. Under straightforward and simple con-
ditions, the composition of two HIOA results in a HIOA. Moreover, composition respects
the implementation relation, i.e., supposing B is a HIOA, if the HIOA A1 implements the
HIOA A2, then the composition of A1 with B implements the composition of A2 with B.
Most of the proofs in the HIOA framework use invariant assertions and simulations. In the
case of invariant assertions, the proofs are by induction on the length of a hybrid execution
of the HIOA at hand. Such proofs show that a particular predicate on the state of the
HIOA is satisfied in every state of the execution. A simulation is a mapping between the
states of the two HIOA and is used to prove that one HIOA implements another. The
fact that the mapping is indeed a simulation is again done by induction on the length of a
hybrid execution of the implementation. This induction matches up individual steps in the
implementation with either single steps, or sequences of steps, in the specification.
1.1.2 Related Work
The recent interest in the area of hybrid systems has resulted in a number of techniques to
model and analyze their behavior. In particular, models that are analogous to the timed I/O
automaton model [11,34] are the models of Alur and Dill [6], Lamport [20], and Henzinger,
Manna, and Pnueli [18]. As is the case with the timed I/O automaton model, these models
have also been extended to the hybrid setting; for instance, the timed transition model [18]
has been extended to the phase transition model [35,36]. Phase transition systems are
analogous to hybrid I/O automata - the transitions and the activities of phase transition
systems correspond to the discrete transitions and the trajectories of hybrid I/O automata.
The hybrid system model [2,4] is similar to the phase transition model with the distinction
that, as in the hybrid I/O automaton model, discrete transitions are labeled, thus allowing
the appropriate synchronization of composed automata. The distinction between the hybrid
system model [2,4] and the hybrid I/O automaton model lies in the latter's classification
of the discrete transitions and variables into input, internal, and output.
In the realm of applications, the formal modeling techniques presented above have been used
for the analysis of various problems. The railroad crossing problem [15] and the steam boiler
problem [1,21] comprise two commonly used benchmark problems. The former benchmark
problem considers the control of a railroad gate that prevents cars and pedestrians from
crossing the railroad tracks while the train is in the vicinity of the crossing. This gate must
be lowered prior to the arrival of the train and lifted once the train has passed by. The
latter benchmark problem involves the control of the level of water in a steam boiler.
The success in the modeling, analysis, and controller design for the above benchmark prob-
lems has encouraged the formal modeling of more complex hybrid systems; for example, au-
tomated transportation systems [41,42], industrial and chemical processes [9,40], rail-vehicle
control [39], and complex automotive suspension systems [38]. The motivation behind such
research lies mostly in the safety-critical nature of the systems at hand. In the case of
automated transportation systems, the safety of the passengers has greatly encouraged the
use of formal techniques.
The recent interest in addressing safety concerns related to automated highway systems
and, in particular, the California PATH project [41], has resulted in a surge of hybrid sys-
tem problems. The goal of PATH is to increase vehicle throughput by organizing traffic
into platoons of closely spaced vehicles. Godbole, Lygeros, and Sastry [12,13,23,25,27] at
U.C. Berkeley have studied various problems that arise in the control of the vehicle pla-
toons. Such problems address the control of the leader of a platoon in view of following
the preceding platoon at a safe distance, tracking an optimal cruising velocity, and per-
forming various platoon maneuvers. The platoon maneuvers that have been addressed are
the platoon join, in which two or more adjacent platoons join to form a single platoon, the
platoon split, in which a platoon splits in two, and the platoon lane change. Lygeros [22] and
Lygeros et al. [26,27] used a game theoretic approach to prove that all platoon maneuvers
are safe. Recently, Dolginova and Lynch [8] have used hybrid I/O automata to model and
verify the safety of the platoon join maneuver.
On a similar note, Weinberg [43] has analyzed a deceleration maneuver in which a discrete
controller slows a train down to a target velocity range within a given distance. In further
research, Weinberg et al. [42] have modeled the personal rapid transit system (PRT 2 000 TM)
under development at Raytheon Corporation and verified the correct operation of the emer-
gency control components used to guarantee that the vehicles neither exceed a prespecified
speed limit, nor collide among themselves.
1.2 Automated Transportation Systems
Among the hybrid systems that are being analyzed using formal methods, systems in trans-
portation are particularly common. This is due to the fact that such systems are safety-
critical and, therefore, their correct analysis and verification is of uttermost importance.
An important feature of the design of the various autonomous transportation systems is
Figure 1.1 Separation of system functionality into operation and protection.
their absolute safety requirements. These requirements translate to stringent design crite-
ria and have led to the complete separation of the system functionality into the parallel
components of operation and protection as shown in Figure 1.1. The operation component
is responsible for the "normal" control of the system and can be composed of complex soft-
ware and hardware. The protection component is responsible for the "emergency" control
of the system and is designed to be simple and reliable. In ordinary operation, the protec-
tion component is not supposed to take any action - it merely monitors the system. In
a potentially hazardous situation, however, the protection component must react strongly
enough to guarantee that, regardless of the behavior of the operation component, the safety
requirements are met. In the interest of making the protection component reliable, design-
ers keep it simple; instead of having complex control abilities, the protection component
depends only on the correct execution of a few decisive emergency commands.
The separation of operation and protection functions is a generally recognized engineering
paradigm for the design of safety-critical systems. In the realm of transportation systems,
this structure was initially used in the design of railroad systems. Automatic safety systems
were added to human-controlled railroad systems to protect against human error and me-
chanical malfunctions. As railroad and mass transit systems have evolved to become more
automated, this division of labor has been retained in the form of Automatic Train Op-
eration (ATO) and Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems. This paradigm occurs in
most existing automated train systems, including the Washington Metro, the Miami People
Mover, the O'Hare People Mover, the Detroit People Mover, and systems in Toronto, Van-
couver, and Jacksonville. The use of this split migrated to automated vehicle transportation
systems with the pioneering Morgantown PRT system in the late sixties; this system has
been in continuous active use for over 20 years with no serious accidents.
1.2.1 The PRT 2000TM
Raytheon engineers are currently working on the design and development of a new personal
rapid transit (PRT) system called PRT 2 000TM. This system uses 4-passenger vehicles that
travel on an elevated guideway with Y-shaped merges and diverges. Passengers on this
system board at stations and travel directly to their desired destination stations without
intermediate stops. Compared to conventional transportation systems, the PRT 20 00TM
can provide shorter average trip times and shorter average waiting times with equivalent
passenger throughput. These performance improvements are achieved because the vehicles
are separated on the guideway by only a few seconds, instead of the minutes typical of
a conventional transit system. The vehicles are controlled by a distributed network of
computers, which receive data from sensors on the vehicles and in the tracks.
Once again, the control of the PRT 20 00TM is split into the Automated Vehicle Operation
System (AVOS) and the Automated Vehicle Protection System (AVPS). The AVOS is in
charge of the normal operation of the system and the AVPS is used to protect the system
against hazards.
1.2.2 Formal Modeling of the PRT 2000TM
The safety-critical nature of the PRT 2 000TM has lead to an interest in modeling its pro-
tection system using formal modeling techniques from computer science. The advantage of
using such modeling methods is twofold. First, they formalize the safety concerns addressed
by the protection system and, second, they are used to prove the correctness of the protec-
tion system at hand. The safety properties that are addressed are those of overspeed and
collision avoidance, i.e., either the property that the vehicles comprising the system do not
exceed the speed limit, or the property that they do not collide among themselves. These
are by no means the only safety requirements enforced by the AVPS of the PRT 2 000TM,
but they are among the most important and complex.
The approach to modeling this automated transportation system is based on abstraction
and modular decomposition. Abstraction is used to mask all inessential implementation
details from the model of the system. Modular decomposition is used either to model
each of the safety properties in isolation, or to model a particular safety property as the
conjunction of several less complex safety properties. As shown in Figure 1.2, the protection
system is defined as the composition of a set of simpler modules referred to as protectors.
The composition of all these protectors results in a protection system that enforces the
conjunction of the safety properties enforced by the individual protectors being composed.
For instance, in the case of a protection system that prevents the vehicles from exceeding
the speed limit, each of the protectors would correspond to protection subsystems that
prevent individual vehicles from exceeding the speed limit. However, their composition
would constitute an overspeed protection system for all the vehicles.
This thesis extends the work by Weinberg, Lynch, and Delisle [42] on modeling the AVPS
of the personal rapid transit system (PRT 2 000TM) under development at Raytheon Corpo-
Figure 1.2 Modular decomposition of the AVPS of the PRT 2000TM.
ration. Weinberg et al. [42] model the PRT 20 00TM as a transportation system where:
* vehicles are traveling on a single track,
* vehicle velocities are non-negative,
* vehicles can stop instantaneously, as if they could hit a brick wall,
* collisions among vehicles are pairwise,
* brakes are binary, i.e., the braking of a particular vehicle results in a vehicle deceler-
ation equal to a prespecified value,
* the acceleration is constrained to a particular range of values, and
* the vehicle brakes comprise monotonic system constraints, i.e., the instruction of a
vehicle to brake can never be revoked.
In addition to the above assumptions, the communication among the various subsystems of
the PRT 2000TM is assumed to be reliable, periodic, and timely.
Weinberg et al. [42] verify the correctness of the overspeed and the collision protection
subsystems. First, it is shown that the overspeed protector guarantees that none of the
vehicles exceed the speed limit and that the collision protector prohibits vehicle collisions
provided that none of the vehicles exceed the speed limit. Then using a one-way depen-
dence protector composition theorem it is shown that the composition of the overspeed and
collision protectors guarantees that the vehicles neither exceed the speed limit, nor collide
among themselves. It should be noted that the model of the physical plant is simplified to
the point that abrupt changes of the vehicle velocities, due to collisions for example, are
not modeled. The advantage of this simplification is that the overspeed protector does not
depend on the collision protector and, therefore, the one-way dependence protector com-
position theorem suffices. The disadvantage is that the simplified model might not be a
truthful representation of the real physical plant.
In this thesis, we extend the protector composition results of Weinberg et al. [42] and relax
their modeling assumptions about the PRT 2 00 0TM. Regarding the composition of protec-
tion systems, we present theorems that dictate the conditions under which the composition
of independent, one-way dependent, and even two-way dependent protectors guarantees the
conjunction of the safety properties guaranteed by the individual protectors being com-
posed. Regarding the transportation system model, two of the aforementioned assumptions
are relaxed. First, the constraint on the track topology is gradually relaxed from that
of a single track to that of a general track topology involving a directed graph of tracks
comprised of Y-shaped merges and diverges. Second, the monotonicity constraint on the
instruction of the vehicles to brake is relaxed such that the instruction of a vehicle to brake
may be revoked, provided the vehicle in question is out of risk. Moreover, in an effort to
truthfully model the transportation system, we extend the model of the physical plant to
allow vehicle collisions that can adversely affect the velocity and the acceleration of the
vehicles involved in a collision. Thus, since collisions may cause instantaneous jumps in
vehicle velocities, the overspeed protector must require that no collisions ever occur in the
physical plant; that is, the overspeed and the collision protectors are two-way dependent.
Subsequently, it is shown that the two-way dependence composition conditions are met by
the proposed overspeed and collision protectors and that their composition results in a pro-
tection system that guarantees that the vehicles neither exceed the speed limit, nor collide
among themselves.
1.3 Thesis Overview
In order for this thesis to be self contained, Chapter 2 gives a short and terse treatment of
the hybrid I/O automaton model [30] and describes the conventions used in the specification
of HIOA in this thesis. In order to facilitate the modeling of complex system properties, we
introduce notation to allow the explicit restriction of the states of a hybrid I/O automaton
to sets of states that are comprised of all states satisfying complex state properties of
the HIOA. In Chapter 3, we present an abstract model of a physical plant interacting with
various protection systems. Both the physical plant and the protection systems are modeled
as hybrid I/O automata. Provided that protectors are independent, they can be composed
and their composition guarantees the conjunction of the safety properties guaranteed by
the individual protectors being composed. Under certain conditions, the same applies for
the composition of protectors that rely on the correct operation of each other. The abstract
protector is defined as the composition of a sensor automaton and a discrete controller
automaton. The sensor samples the state of the physical plant at regular intervals of time
and the discrete controller issues protective actions so as to guarantee that the physical
plant exhibits a particular safety property.
In subsequent chapters, we present a simple model of the PRT 20 00TM and introduce over-
speed and collision protectors. This is done for increasingly complicated track topologies.
First we consider a single track, then a Y-shaped merge, and, finally, a general track topol-
ogy comprised of Y-shaped merges and diverges. Chapter 4 defines a system of n vehicles
traveling on a single track and Chapters 5 and 6 define its overspeed and collision protectors.
Chapter 7 extends the model of the physical plant to involve a Y-shaped merge and defines
a collision protector for the new model. Chapter 8 augments the model of the physical
plant to involve a general track topology comprised of Y-shaped merges and diverges and
defines a collision protector for the new model. In Chapter 9, we prove that the overspeed
and collision protectors of the various track topologies can be composed so as to guarantee
that the vehicles neither exceed the speed limit, nor collide among themselves. Finally, in
Chapter 10 we give a summary of the thesis, an evaluation of the research presented, and
directions in which such research could be extended or continued.

Chapter 2
Hybrid I/O Automata
The hybrid I/O automaton (HIOA) model [29,30] is based on the timed I/O automaton
model [10,11,33,34], but includes explicit treatment of continuous behavior. To make this
thesis self contained, this chapter gives a complete but terse treatment of the HIOA model
with an emphasis on those aspects used in subsequent chapters. The presentation follows
precisely that of Lynch, Segala, Vaandrager, and Weinberg [30].
The chapter is organized as follows. We begin by defining auxiliary concepts and notation
pertaining to functions, time, variables, valuations, and trajectories. We proceed to define
hybrid I/O automata, hybrid executions, and hybrid traces. Next, we define a simulation re-
lation between a pair of HIOA and the notion of HIOA composition. Finally, we describe the
conventions used in the specification of HIOA in this thesis. In particular, we describe how
states, discrete transitions, and trajectories of a HIOA are specified and how to explicitly
restrict the states of a HIOA in view of enforcing complex state properties.
2.1 Preliminary Mathematical Notation
This section defines various auxiliary concepts and notation that are used in the definition
of the hybrid I/O automaton model.
Functions
With dom(f) and range(f) we denote the domain and the range, respectively, of the function
f. If f is a function and X a set, then we write f[X for the restriction of f to X, i.e.,
the function g with dom(g) = dom(f) n X satisfying g(x) = f(x), for all x E dom(g). We
say that two functions f and g are compatible if f [dom(g) = g [dom(f). If f and g are
compatible functions, then we write fUg for the function h with dom(h) = dom(f)Udom(g)
such that h(z) = f(z), if x E dom(f), and h(x) = g(x), otherwise, for all x E dom(h). More
generally, if F is a set of pairwise compatible functions then we write Uf E F f for the
unique function g with dom(g) = Uf E F dom(f) such that g(x) = f(x), for all f E F and
x E dom(f). If f is a function whose range consists of a set of functions and X is a set,
then the projection f I X is the restriction of the functions in range(f) to the set X, i.e.,
the function g with dom(g) = dom(f) defined by g(x) = f(x)[X, for all x E dom(g). The
projection operator I extends to sets of functions by pointwise extension. Also, if f is a
function whose range consists of a set of functions that all have an element y in their domain,
then the projection f I y is the function with domain dom(f) defined by f I y(x) A f(x)(y),
for all x E dom(f).
Time
Throughout this thesis, we fix the time axis T to be a compact subgroup of (R, +), i.e.,
the real numbers with addition. Henceforth, we exclusively use the set of real numbers R
as the time axis. An interval TI is a non-empty convex subset of T. As usual, intervals
are denoted by [tl,t 2] = {t E T I tjl t < t2}, etc. An interval TI is right-open (left-
open), if it does not have a maximum (minimum) element, and right-closed (left-closed),
otherwise. We write max(Ti) and min(TI) for the maximum and the minimum elements,
respectively, of the interval T, (if they exist), and sup(T1 ) and inf(T1 ) for the supremum
and infimum, respectively, of the interval T, in T U {-oo, oo}. For T' C T and t E T, we
define T' + t A {t' + t I t' E T'}. Thus, for a function f with domain T', we define f + t to
be the function with domain T' + t satisfying f + t(t') = f(t' - t), for all t' E T' + t.
Variables and Valuations
We assume a universal set V of variables. Variables in V are typed, where the type of a
variable, such as reals, integers, etc. is given by type(v); that is, type(v) is the domain over
which the variable v ranges. Letting V C V, a valuation of V is a function that associates
to each variable v of V a value in type(v). We adopt the convention that the set of all
valuations of a set of variables V is denoted by V. Often, valuations of a set of variables V
are referred to as states.
Letting v E V and S, C type(v), we use the notation v :E S, to denote the assignment of an
arbitrary element of the set S, to the variable v. Similarly, letting V C V and S y C V, we
use the notation V :E S V to denote the assignment of an element of the set type(v) to the
variable v, for each v in V, such that the resulting valuation of V is an arbitrary element
of the set Sy .
Let Z be a set of variables, z be a state of Z, and Z' be a subset of Z, i.e., Z C V, z E Z,
and Z' C Z. The restriction of the state z to the set of variables Z', denoted by z[Z', is
defined to be the valuation z' of the variables of Z' in z. Letting X C Z, we say that X
is Z'-determinable if for all x E X and z E Z, such that x Z' = zrZ', it is the case that
z E X. Intuitively, if X is Z'-determinable then, for any state z in Z, the information
provided by the restriction of the state z to the set of variables Z' is sufficient to determine
whether the state z is a member of the set X. In other words, the information provided by
the restriction of the state z to the set of variables Z - Z' is irrelevant in the determination
of whether the state z is a member of the set X. Moreover, if X is Z'-determinable and
Z/ E Z , we use the notation z' E X to denote that there exists a state x E X such that
x [Z' = z'. In fact, since X is Z'-determinable, the existence of a state x E X such that
x[Z' = z' implies that for all states z E Z such that z[Z' = z' it is the case that z E X.
Trajectories
A trajectory over a set of variables Z is a function w : T, --+ Z, where T, is a left-closed
interval of T with left endpoint equal to 0. A trajectory represents the evolution of the
valuations of the variables in Z within a T, interval. With dom(w) we denote the domain
of w and with trajs(Z) the collection of all trajectories over Z. A trajectory w with domain
TI is often referred to as a Tl-trajectory.
A trajectory w is closed, if its domain is a (finite) right-closed interval, and full, if its
domain equals T 0o. For W a set of trajectories, Closed(W) and Full(W) denote the subsets
of closed and full trajectories in W, respectively. If w is a trajectory, then the limit time of
w, denoted by w.ltime, is defined to be the supremum of dom(w). A trajectory w is finite
if w.ltime 0 0c. We define the first state of a trajectory w, denoted by w.fstate, to be the
state w(0). Moreover, if the domain of a trajectory w is right-closed, then we define the last
state of w, denoted by w.lstate, to be the state w(w.ltime). A trajectory with domain [0, 0]
is called a point trajectory. If s is a state, then we define p(s) to be the point trajectory
that maps 0 to s.
For a trajectory w and t E T 0o, we define w <li w [[0, t] and wo t i w r [0, t). It is
important to note that w <1 0 is not a trajectory. By convention, w oo A w <i 00 -- w.
Similarly, if w is a trajectory and T, is a left-closed interval with min(T1 ) E dom(w), then we
define the curtailment of w to TI, denoted by w t Ti, to be the trajectory (w rTl) - min(Ti),
or equivalently the trajectory w' with domain (TI n dom(w)) - min(Tl) defined by w'(t') =
w(t' + min(TI)), for all t' E dom(w').
If w is a trajectory over Z and Z' C Z, then the projection w 4 Z' is the trajectory over Z'
with domain dom(w) defined by w I Z' (t)(z') A w(t)(z'), for all z' E Z'. The projection
operation is extended to sets of trajectories by pointwise extension. Also, if w is a trajectory
over Z and z E Z, then the projection w I z is the function from dom(w) to the domain of
z defined by w I z (t) = w(t)(z).
If w is a finite trajectory with domain TI, w' is a trajectory with domain TI, and w.lstate =
w'.fstate if w is closed, then we define the concatenation of w and w' to be the trajectory
w , w' A w U (w' + w.ltime). We extend the concatenation operator to an infinite sequence
of finite trajectories wowlw 2 ..*. If wi.lstate = Wi+ 1.fstate, for each trajectory pair wi
and wi+l, for i E N, in which the trajectory wi is closed, then we define the infinite
concatenation of the infinite sequence of finite trajectories wOWlW 2 ... to be the trajectory
wo ^ wl w^ 2. . Ui,j 6 N(wi + j<i wj.ltime).
A trajectory w is a prefix of a trajectory w', denoted by w < w', if w = w' [dom(w); that
is, either w = w', or w' = w ^ w", for some trajectory w". With Pref(W) we denote the
prefix-closure of W: Pref(W) - {w I 3 w' E W : w < w'}. A set W is prefix closed if
W = Pref(W). A trajectory in W is maximal if it is not a prefix of any other trajectory in
W. We write Max(W) for the subset of maximal trajectories in W.
2.2 The Hybrid I/O Automaton Model
A hybrid I/O automaton A = (U, X, Y, Ei,, i"t, out , 0, , W) consists of the following
components:
* Three disjoint sets U, X, and Y of variables, called input, internal, and output vari-
ables, respectively.
Variables in E A U U Y are called external, and variables in L A X U Y are called local.
We write V A U U L and let s, u, and w range over V, U, and trajs(V), respectively.
* Three disjoint sets Ein, E int, and >Eout of actions, called input, internal, and output
actions, respectively.
We assume that E in contains a special element e, the environment action, which rep-
resents the occurrence of a discrete transition outside the system that is unobservable,
except (possibly) through its effect on the input variables. Actions in >ext & EinU E out
are called external, and actions in E0loc -A int U Eout are called locally controlled. We
write E A•Ein U E>oc and let a range over E.
* A non-empty set 0 C_ V of initial states satisfying:
Init (initial states closed under change of input variables)
sEO == 3 s' E 0 : (s'r[U = u) A (s'rY = s rY)
* A set C_ V x E x V of discrete transitions satisfying:
D1 (input action enabling)
a E Ein 2 1 3 s' E V : s -- A 8
D2 (environment actions that do not change inputs do not affect the state)
(S e-A ') A (s [U = s'[U) ==. (s = s')
D3 (discrete transitions do not depend on input variable changes)
(sa)A s') == 3 s" E V : (s -)As") A (s"[rU =u) A (s"rY = s rY)
For any discrete transition (s, a, s') of the automaton A, i.e., (s, a, s') E V, the states s
and s' are referred to as the pre-state and post-state, respectively, of the discrete
transition (s, a, s'). Moreover, as in the above treatment, we often use the notation
s -•A A' to denote that (s, a, s') is a discrete transition of the automaton A, i.e.,
(s, a, s')E D.
* A set W of trajectories over V satisfying:
T1 (existence of point trajectories)
P(s) E W
T2 (closure under subintervals)
w E W A (T I left-closed subinterval of dom(w)) ==- w t TI, W
T3 (completeness)
(V t E To : w t [0, t] E W) =- w E W
The intuition captured by Axioms Init and D1-D3 is that a HIOA is responsible for per-
forming locally controlled actions and for modifying the values of its local variables, whereas
the environment of a HIOA is responsible for performing input actions and modifying the
values of the input variables.
Axiom Init says that a system may not constrain the initial values of its input variables.
Thus, if we change the input variables of an initial state, then there is a way to change
the internal variables as well (while leaving the output variables unchanged) so that the
resulting state is an initial state also.
Axiom D1, which is simply the hybrid extension of the input enabling axiom from the
(untimed) I/O automaton model [11,32,34], says that a HIOA should accept all input
actions in all states. Axiom D2 postulates that an environment action that does not affect
the input variables can not be "detected" by the automaton and, therefore, leaves the state
unchanged. Axiom D3 states that there is no functional dependence between the input
and the output variables of a HIOA during a transition; that is, a HIOA can not react
instantaneously to an input variable change. If there is an a-step from a state s to a state
s', then, for any valuation u of the input variables, there also exists an a-step from s to a
state s" with an input part u and an output part equal to that of s'. The internal variables of
s' and s" need not have the same values, since otherwise it would not be possible for a HIOA
to record all the discrete changes in its input variables. The technical use of Axiom D3 is
to avoid cyclic constraints during the interaction of two systems. In this way, we can show
that the composition of two HIOA is still input enabled and that the environment can never
block the output actions of a system.
Axioms D2 and D3 imply that the environment action e can never affect the output vari-
ables of a HIOA. Consider any transition (s,e,s') E D and suppose that s'[Y 5 8sY.
Letting u = s [U, Axiom D3 implies that there exists s" E V such that (s,e,s") E V,
s" U = s[U, and s" [Y = s'[Y. Since s"[U = s[U and s"[Y s [Y, Axiom D2 is violated.
Therefore, it follows that there does not exist (s, e, s') E ) such that s'[Y $ s [Y.
Axioms T1-T3 state some natural conditions on the set of trajectories needed to set up
our theory: existence of point trajectories, closure under subintervals, and the fact that a
full trajectory is in W if and only if all its prefixes are in W.
The Axiom Init and the Axioms D1-D3 that are presented here are slightly different from
the respective axioms introduced in the preliminary version of the HIOA model [29]. The
new axioms allow a HIOA to change the values of its internal variables if the environment
modifies the input variables of the HIOA.
Notation Let A be a HIOA as described above. If s E V and 1 E L, then we write
s -A 1 if and only if there exists an s' E V such that s "-A s/ and s'[L = 1. Henceforth,
the components of a HIOA A will be denoted by VA, UA, EA, OA, etc. Moreover, the
components of a HIOA Ai will also be denoted by Vi, Ui, Ei, Oi, etc.
2.3 Hybrid Executions
A hybrid execution fragment a of a HIOA A is a finite or infinite alternating sequence
a = woalwla2w2 *'' , where:
1. Each wi is a trajectory in WA and each ai is an action in EA.
2. If a is a finite sequence then it ends with a trajectory.
3. If wi is not the last trajectory in a then its domain is a right-closed interval and it is
the case that wi.lstate -*A wi+ .fstate.
An execution fragment records all the discrete changes that occur in the evolution of a
system, plus the "continuous" state changes that take place in between. The third item
says that the discrete actions in a span between successive trajectories. We write h-frags(A)
for the set of all hybrid execution fragments of A.
If a = woalwla 2w 2 ... is a hybrid execution fragment, then we define the limit time of a,
denoted by a.ltime, to be Ei N wi. time. Further, we define the first state of a, denoted
by a.fstate, to be wo.fstate.
We distinguish several sorts of hybrid execution fragments. A hybrid execution fragment a
is defined to be
* an execution if the first state of a is an initial state, i.e., a.fstate E OA,
* finite if a is a finite sequence and the domain of its final trajectory is a right-closed
interval,
* admissible if a.ltime = oo,
* Zeno if a is neither finite nor admissible, and
* a sentence if a is a finite execution that ends with a point trajectory.
If a = woavwl ... anwn is a finite hybrid execution fragment then we define the last state
of a, denoted by a.lstate, to be wn.1state. A state of A is defined to be reachable if it is the
last state of some finite hybrid execution of A.
A finite hybrid execution fragment a = woalwla 2w2 ... aw, and a hybrid execution frag-
ment a' = w - •awua'2W * .. of A can be concatenated if w," w' is defined and is a trajectory
of A. In this case, the concatenation a ^ a' is the hybrid execution fragment defined by
-" -- woalwla2w2 "an(Wn . , "
a a woaw1a2W2...• an(Wn - IwO)alwla2w2 ...
Let a and a' be hybrid execution fragments of a HIOA A. We say that a' is a prefix of a',
denoted by a' < a, if either a' = a, or there exists some execution fragment a" of A such
that a' ^ a" = a.
A variable v of a HIOA A is called continuous if v is not modified by any discrete steps of
A and for all trajectories w of A, w I v is a continuous function. Let a = woalwla2 w2 ...
be a hybrid execution fragment of A. Then we define a I v as follows:
a -1 = (wo 1v)- (•) • l 1 ') (2 1 V)*...
Theorem 2.3.1 If v is a continuous variable of a HIOA A and a is an execution fragment
of A, then a 1 v is a continuous function.
If a = woalwla 2w2 ... is a hybrid execution fragment of a HIOA A and Z C V then a I Z
is defined to be the sequence (wo I Z)al(wl I Z)a2(w2 1 Z)....
A superdense time in an execution fragment a = woalwla2 w2 ... of a HIOA A is a pair
(i, t), where t < wi.ltime. We totally order superdense times in the execution fragment a
lexicographically.
An occurrence of a state s in an execution fragment a = woalwla 2w 2 ... of a HIOA A
is a triple (i, t, s) such that (i, t) is a superdense time in a and s = wi(t). We order state
occurrences in a according to the order of their superdense times.
If S is a set of states and a is an execution fragment, then past(S, a) is the set of state
occurrences (i, t, s) in a such that either s E S or there is a previous state occurrence
(i', t', s') in a with s' E S.
2.4 Hybrid Traces
Suppose a = woalwla 2w 2 ... is a hybrid execution fragment of A. In order to define the
hybrid trace of a, let
7 = (wo I EA)vis(al)(w1 1 EA)vis(a2)(W2 I EA) ' ,
where, for any action a of A, vis(a) is defined equal to r if a is an internal action or an
environment action e, and equal to a otherwise. Here r is a special symbol which, as in the
theory of process algebra, plays the role of the "generic" invisible action. An occurrence of
r in 7 is called inert if the final state of the trajectory that precedes the r equals the first
state of the trajectory that follows it (after hiding of the internal variables). The hybrid
trace of a, denoted by h-trace(a), is defined to be the sequence obtained from 7 by removing
all inert r's and concatenating the surrounding trajectories.
The hybrid traces of A are the hybrid traces that arise from all the finite and admissible
hybrid executions of A. We write h-traces(A) for the set of hybrid traces of A.
The HIOA A 1 and A 2 are comparable if they have the same external interface, i.e., U1 = U2,
Y1 = Y2, E" = n, and EC"t = EU• t . If A1 and A 2 are comparable, then A 1 _ A 2 is
defined to mean that the hybrid traces of A1 are included in those of A 2 ; that is, A 1 _
A 2 a h-traces(Al) C h-traces(A2). If A1 5 A2 , then we say that A, implements A 2.
2.5 Auxiliary HIOA Definitions
Given a HIOA A, we use the notation states(A) to denote the state space of the automaton
A, i.e., states(A) = VA. If R is a subset of the set of states states(A) of the automaton A
and s, S' E R, then we say that s' is R-reachable from s, denoted by s "R s', provided that
there is a hybrid execution fragment of A that starts in s, ends in s', and all of whose states
are in the set R. We say that s' is reachable from s, denoted by s " s', provided that s' is
R-reachable from s, where R is the set of all states of the automaton A, i.e., R = states(A).
When analyzing a HIOA A, it is often useful to define derived variables for A. Such variables
are functionally dependent on the variables of the automaton A and, although useful in the
analysis of A, are not essential in its definition.
If s is a state of a HIOA A and z is a variable of A, i.e., s E states(A) and z E VA, then
s.z denotes the value of the variable z in the state s. In terms of valuations, s.z is the
restriction of the valuation s to the element z, i.e., s.z = s[z.
If f is a function to states of a HIOA A and Z is a subset of the variables of A, i.e.,
range(f) = states(A) and Z C VA, then f t Z is the projection of f onto the variables in
Z, i.e., the function g with domain dom(f) and range equal to the set of valuations of Z,
defined by: g(s)(z) = f(s)(z), for all s E dom(f) and z E Z. In the special case where Z is
a singleton set {z}, i.e., Z = {z}, we write f I z as shorthand for f t Z.
2.6 Simulation Relations
Let A and B be comparable HIOA. A simulation from A to B is a relation R C VA X VB
satisfying the following conditions, for all states r and s of A and B, respectively:
1. If r E 0 A, then there exists s E OB such that r R s.
2. If r -A r' and r R s, then B has a finite execution fragment a with s = a.fstate,
h-trace(p(r) a p(r')) = h-trace(a), and r' R a.lstate.
3. If r R s and w is a closed trajectory of A with r = w.fstate, then B has a finite exe-
cution fragment a with s = a.fstate, h-trace(w) = h-trace(a), and w.lstate R a.lstate.
Theorem 2.6.1 If A and B are comparable HIOA and there is a simulation from A to B,
then A < B.
2.7 Composition
We say that the HIOA A1 and A 2 are compatible if, for i,j E {1, 2}, i 5 j,
X n v = Y n Y i = •int = E" n Eout = 0.
If A1 and A 2 are compatible then their composition A1 x A 2 is defined to be the tuple
A =(U, X, Y, Ein, Eint, Eout, 0, D, W) given by
* U=(U1 UU2)-(Y 1 UY 2),X=X1 UX 2,Y=YIUY 2
* in = (i. u in) - ( out U out), yint = Eint u Eint, rout = t U Eout
S0 = {s V S [Vi E 01 A S[V2 E 02)
* Define, for i E {1,2}, projection function Ai E --+ Ei by rA,(a) = a, if a E iE, and
'rA,(a) ' e, otherwise. Then D is the subset of V x E x V given by
Al(a) )rA2 [)(s, a, s'81 ) 6D - sV ----[V Al / [Vi As [V2 A2 2 V
* W is the set of trajectories over V given by
w EW e- wt V1 EW1 A w V2 EW2
Notation We extend the projection notation 7rA,, for i E {1,2}, to states, trajectories,
discrete actions, hybrid executions, and hybrid traces in the obvious way. If s, w, and a
are a state, a trajectory, and a discrete action of the automaton A = A 1 x A 2 , then the
respective projections 7rAi, for i E {1,2}, are defined as WrA,(S) = s[VA, 7rAi(W) = w I VA,
and 7rA,(a) = a if a E EA and 7rAi(a) = e otherwise. Also, if a = woa1 wla2 ... is a hybrid
execution of the automaton A = A1 x A 2, then the projection rAi, for i E {1, 2}, is defined
as 7rA,(a) = rA, (wo)rAi(al)rAi (Wl)rA, (a2) . Moreover, if 7 is the hybrid trace of a, then
rAi,(7) is the sequence obtained from (wo t EAi)visAi(al)(wl 1 EAi)visAi(a2)(w2 1 EAi)'''
by removing all inert T's and concatenating the surrounding trajectories.
Proposition 2.7.1 If A1 and A 2 are compatible HIOA, then their composition A1 x A2 is
a HIOA.
Lemma 2.7.2 Let A = A1 x A 2, and let a be a hybrid execution of A. Then it is the case
that 7rAi(h-trace(a)) = h-trace(7rA,(a)), for i E {1,2}.
Lemma 2.7.3 Let A = A, x A 2 . Then it is the case that h-traces(A) = {7 A,(7) E
h-traces(Ai), for i E {1,2}}.
Theorem 2.7.4 Suppose A 1, A 2, and B are HIOA with A1 < A 2, and each of A1 and A 2
is compatible with B. Then A1 x B < A 2 x B.
2.8 HIOA Specification Conventions
In this section we describe the conventions used in the specification of a HIOA A in this
thesis. In particular, we describe how the states, the discrete transitions, and the trajectories
of A are specified and introduce notational shorthand used to specify concisely complex state
properties of A.
2.8.1 State Specification
Since the states of A are the set of valuations of its variable set VA, the states of A are
specified by simply defining the domain over which each variable in VA ranges. Thus, the
states of A are specified by a list of all input, internal, and output variables together with
the domain over which each respective variable ranges. Similarly, the set of start states of
A is specified by stating the set of values that each variable in VA can initially assume. It is
important to note that, by Axiom Init of the HIOA model, each input variable u of A may
initially assume any value in type(u); that is, the set of values that each input variable u of
A can initially assume is the set type(u).
2.8.2 Discrete Transition Specification
The set of discrete transitions of A is specified by collectively describing all discrete transi-
tions involving each action a in EA in precondition-effect format. This format is comprised
of a label, a precondition, and an effect clause. The label corresponds to the label of the
action a. The precondition is a predicate over the variables of A and specifies the conditions
under which the action a is enabled; that is, the precondition defines the set of states in
which the action a may be scheduled. It is important to note that an action a in EA is not
necessarily scheduled whenever it is enabled. The effect clause specifies the pseudo-code
that must be applied to the pre-state of a discrete transition involving the action a so as
to yield the post-state of the discrete transition. It follows that, in order for (s, a, s') to
be a discrete transition of A, the precondition in the specification of the action a must be
satisfied by the pre-state s. Moreover, the application of the pseudo-code in the effect clause
of the specification of the action a to the pre-state s must yield the post-state s'.
The convention used in this thesis is that for any particular discrete transition (s, a, s') of
A, the statements in the pseudo-code of the effect clause of the specification of a are applied
sequentially to the state of A starting from the pre-state s. However, the effect clause in
the specification of any action a of A is assumed to be executed indivisibly. Therefore, the
execution of the action a in the state s represents a single transition from the pre-state s
to the post-state s'. In order to be able to write effect clause pseudo-code involving the
valuation of the variables of A in the pre-state, we adopt the convention that the value of a
particular variable v of A in the pre-state s may be referred to as vp,,. Similarly, the value
of the variable v in the post-state s' may be referred to as v,,,t.
Throughout this thesis, we adopt the convention that if the effect clause in the specification
of an action a of A does not affect a local variable v, for any v E LA, the value of v in the
post-state of any discrete transition involving the action a is equal to its value in the pre-
state, i.e., v,,Pt = vpre. Moreover, in order to conform to Axiom D3 of the HIOA model, we
adopt the convention that the effect clause in the specification of each action a of A must
assign to each input variable u of A an arbitrary value in type(u); that is, the effect clause
in the specification of the action a must include the assignment statement u :E type(u). In
fact, we adopt the convention that such assignments precede any other statements in the
effect clause of the specification of the action a. Obviously, if the automaton A has no input
variables, i.e., UA = 0, no such assignments are specified.
Axiom D1 of the HIOA model defines HIOA to be input-enabled; that is, a HIOA is not
capable of blocking the scheduling of its input actions. It follows that, each input action a of
A is enabled in each state a of A. A consequence of this characteristic is that the precondition
in the specification of each input action a of A is the trivial predicate True. Throughout
this thesis, we adopt the convention that the precondition clause in the specification of any
input action a of A is omitted; that is, the specification of each input action a of A is only
comprised of the label and the effect clause of the action a.
The environment action e, which is considered an input action, allows the occurrence of a
discrete transition in the external environment that is unobservable by A except (possibly)
through its effect on the input variables of A. Environment actions are considered input
actions because HIOA have no control over their external environment and, therefore, envi-
ronment actions are enabled in all states. Thus, following the convention for input actions,
the precondition clause in the specification of the environment action e is omitted. More-
over, according to Axioms D2 and D3 of the HIOA model, a discrete transition involving
the environment action e can only affect the input and the internal variables of A. In fact,
according to Axioms D2 of the HIOA model, a discrete transition involving the environ-
ment action e can affect the internal variables of A only if the input variables are also
affected. Therefore, the effect clause in the specification of the environment action e must
be such that the internal variables are affected only if the valuation of the input variables
in the post-state differs from their valuation in the pre-state; that is, for all (s, e, s') E 2D,
it is the case that if a [XA $ s' [XA then s[UA $ s'[UA. If the automaton A has no input
variables, then the environment action e cannot affect its state; that is, if UA = 0 then for
all (s, e, a') E D it is the case that s = s'. In such cases, the environment action e is referred
to as stuttering and the effect clause in its specification is comprised of the single statement
"None". Often, when the environment action e does not affect the internal variables of a
HIOA, or when the environment action e is stuttering, its specification is omitted. Thus,
if the environment action e is omitted from the specification of a HIOA A, then it follows
that the environment action e assigns arbitrary values to the input variables of A and does
not affect the internal variables of A. Obviously, when the HIOA A has no input variables,
the environment action e omitted in the specification of A is stuttering.
2.8.3 Trajectory Specification
The set of trajectories of A is specified by pseudo-code which describes the properties that
any trajectory w involving the variables in the variable set of A must satisfy in order to be
a trajectory of A. Thus, the trajectory pseudo-code consists of a collection of predicates all
of which must be satisfied throughout any trajectory w of A. Since HIOA have no control
over their input variables, the trajectory specification of A must not constrain its input
variables. Thus, we adopt the convention that the trajectory specification of A includes a
clause for each input variable u of A stating that the input variable u assumes arbitrary
values in type(u) throughout each trajectory w of A. Obviously, if the automaton A has no
input variables, i.e., UA = 0, no such clauses are specified. In contrast to the convention
used in the specification of actions, if a particular local variable v of A is not constrained
in the trajectory specification of A, then its value may assume arbitrary values in type(v).
Therefore, in order to specify that the value of the local variable v of A remains constant
throughout each trajectory w of A, an explicit statement stating so must be used.
2.8.4 State Restriction
In the specification of a HIOA, it is often unwieldy to explicitly enforce complex state prop-
erties. In view of this specification inefficacy, we allow the enforcement of state properties
through the restriction of the states of a HIOA to property sets. A property set P of A is
a set of states of A that is comprised of all the states of A that satisfy a particular state
property. The state property described by the property set P may be enforced through the
use of "subject to P" clauses in the specification of either the initial states, the actions, or
the trajectories of A. In the specification of the initial states of A, a "subject to P" clause
signifies that all of the initial states of A are in the set P. In the specification of the actions
of A, a "subject to P" clause in the effect clause of an action a signifies that the post-state
of each discrete transition involving the action a is in the set P. Finally, in the specification
of the trajectories of A, a "subject to P" clause signifies that all the states involved in each
trajectory of A are in the set P. In the case of trajectories, such a clause may be interpreted
as choosing the local variables of A that are unconstrained by the trajectory specification
so that the states involved in the trajectory are in the set P.
Often, we collectively specify all complex state properties of a HIOA A using a single
property set. This property set is distinct for each HIOA and is referred to as the set VALID
for the particular HIOA at hand.

Chapter 3
Abstract Physical Plant and
Protector Models
This chapter is split into two parts. In the first part, we define an abstract model of a physical
system that is comprised of a physical plant and a protection system. The protection system
is modeled as a set of protectors that are communicating with the physical plant through
distinct communication channels, or ports. These channels are used to sample and to control
the state of the physical plant. Both the physical plant and the protectors are modeled as
HIOA. It is shown that under certain conditions protectors can be composed such that
their composition ensures the safety properties guaranteed by the individual protectors
being composed. In the second part, we give an abstract model of a protector. The model
is parameterized by the physical plant and various sets of states of the physical plant which
describe the properties assumed and guaranteed by the abstract protector. The protector is
defined as the composition of a sensor automaton and a discrete controller automaton. The
sensor automaton samples the output state of the physical plant at a given sampling rate.
The discrete controller automaton determines which protective action must be scheduled in
order to ensure the safety of the physical plant up to the next sampling point. To conclude,
the proposed abstract protector is shown to be correct.
3.1 Protected Plant Systems
In this section, we present an abstract model of a system consisting of a physical plant and
a set of protectors. The model is abstract in that it does not specify any of the details
of the physical plant - for instance, it does not specify that the plant includes vehicles
and tracks. We also define what it means for a protector responsible for guaranteeing a
particular property, i.e., a protector used to avoid a particular mishap, to be correct.
3.1.1 Physical Plant Automata
Let J be a set of ports. A physical plant automaton PP for J is defined to be a hybrid I/O
automaton (HIOA) in which:
1. The input action set E"p is partitioned into subsets E•p, one for each port j.
2. The output action set Eot is partitioned into subsets E , one for each port j.
3. The input variable set Upp is partitioned into subsets Upp3 , one for each port j.
We use the letter p to denote a state of PP and P to denote a set of states of PP.
3.1.2 Protector Automata
Let PP be a physical plant automaton with port set J, and let K C J. A protector
automaton A for the physical plant PP and the port set K is a HIOA that is compatible
with PP, and that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Its output actions are exactly the input actions of PP on ports in K.
2. Its output variables are exactly the input variables of PP on ports in K.
3. All its input actions and input variables are outputs of PP.
Lemma 3.1.1 Suppose that A1 and A 2 are protectors for PP, with respective port sets K,
and K 2, where K 1 n K2 = 0. If A 1 and A 2 are compatible then their composition A1 x A 2
is a protector for PP with port set K 1 U K 2-
Proof: Since A1 and A 2 are compatible, Proposition 2.7.1 implies that A1 x A 2 is a HIOA.
Moreover, since A1 and A 2 are compatible with PP it follows that A1 x A 2 is compatible
with PP also. Therefore, it remains to be shown that the HIOA A1 x A 2 satisfies the three
protector conditions presented above.
To begin, since the protectors A1 and A 2 communicate with the plant PP through the port
sets K 1 and K 2, respectively, their composition A1 x A 2 communicates with the plant PP
through the port set K 1 U K 2. Therefore, there are three conditions to check:
1. The output actions of A1 x A 2 are exactly the input actions of PP on ports in K 1 U K 2.
Since, the HIOA A1 and A 2 are protectors, it is the case that their output actions are
exactly the input actions of PP on the port sets K1 and K 2, respectively. However,
from the composition of the protectors A1 and A2 , it is the case that E~ A2•
E't U "t. Therefore, it trivially follows that the output actions of A 1 x A 2 are
exactly the input actions of PP on ports in KI U K 2.
2. The output variables of A1 x A 2 are exactly the input variables of PP on ports in
K 1 U K 2.
Since, the HIOA A1 and A 2 are protectors, it is the case that their output variables are
exactly the input variables of PP on the port sets K 1 and K 2, respectively. However,
from the composition of the protectors A1 and A2, it is the case that Yvt A2
Yout U Ygut. Therefore, it trivially follows that the output variables of A1 x A 2 are
exactly the input variables of PP on ports in K 1 U K 2.
3. All the input actions and input variables of A 1 x A 2 are outputs of PP.
From the composition of the protectors A1 and A 2 , it is the case that n A2
(E U ) J-(t UI U t ) and UA xA2 = (UA1 UUA2)- (YA, UYA). However, since
the HIOA A1 and A 2 are protectors, their output actions and output variables are
inputs to the PP automaton. Therefore, it is the case that Ein xA 2 Ein U Ein and
UA1 xA 2 = UA, U UA2 . It trivially follows that the input actions and input variables of
A1 x A 2 are outputs of PP.
3.1.3 Protected Plant Systems
A protected plant system is the composition of a physical plant automaton PP and a set
of protector automata. If s is a state of a protected plant system and P is a subset of the
states of PP, we often write s E P as shorthand for s [PP E P. That is, we extend the
definition of the set P to include states of the protected plant system that project to give
PP states in P.
3.1.4 Substitutive and Compositional Correctness
Let S, R, and G be particular sets of states of PP. We say that a protector automaton A for
PP and ports K guarantees G in PP from S given R provided that every finite execution
of the composition PP x A starting in a state in S that only involves states in R ends in a
state in G. It is important to note that the first state of every such finite execution is in
the set OPPxA n S. In the special case where R is the set of all states of PP, we sometimes
omit explicit mention of R. Moreover, we often omit mention of PP when the physical plant
automaton is clear from context.
It is important to note that the definition of "guarantees" includes consideration of finite
executions in which arbitrary inputs can arrive at PP on ports other than those in K. The
protector definition infers that regardless of what inputs occur on those ports, the protector
A still guarantees G in PP starting from S given R.
The following substitutivity theorem states that an implementation of a correct protector is
itself a correct protector.
Theorem 3.1.2 Let A 1 and A 2 be two protector automata for the same port set K, and
suppose that A1 < A 2. If A 2 guarantees G in PP from S given R, then A1 guarantees G in
PP from S given R.
Proof: Let aPPxA1 be any finite execution of the automaton PPx A1 that starts in a state in
the set S and is restricted to states in the set R. We must show that 7pp(OPPxA1 .lstate) E G.
Let app be the projection of aPPXA' to the PP automaton and aA 2 be a finite execution of
A 2 such that h-trace(aA2 ) = h-trace(rA1 (ppxA 1 )). Adding environment actions appropri-
ately to app and aA2 , we obtain two new finite executions a'pp = PP o PP  P  PPw,
and 'A2  - wA2 Awl2 A A2 A2 .. . of PP and A 2 , respectively, such that wFPP.time =
wA2 .ltime, for all i E N, and either afP P = 2 r = e or aA  = e, for all i E N+ .
The addition of environment actions to app and aA 2 is intended to generate two new finite
executions !a'p and 'A2 of PP and A 2, respectively, in which the limit times of the trajec-
tories in ',p and aA2 are equal, the actions in app and 0 A2 shared by PP and A 2 appear
in both hybrid executions ap and a' 2 ,the internal actions of PP and the input actionspp A2'
of PP on ports other than port j appear as environment actions in ' and the internal
actions of A 2 appear as environment actions in a'pp. Also, it is important to note that all
the environment actions added to a~pp and OA 2 to obtain o'p and a' 2 , respectively, corre-
spond to inert T's and do not appear in the hybrid traces h-trace(a'pp) and h-trace(aA2),
i.e., h-trace(a'pp) = h-trace(rpp(aPPxA )) and h-trace(a'A2 ) = h-trace(Arl(PPxA1 ))
Let ai = woalwa 2w 2 ... aiwi, for some i E N, be a finite hybrid execution comprised of
a collection wo, W, w 2,. , wi of trajectories of PP x A2 and a collection al, a2, ... , ai of
actions of PP x A 2, such that:
1. ai = woal wla 2w 2 ... aiwi is a hybrid execution of PP x A 2,
2. 7rpp(ai) PP PP 1P P aP P 2PP  aPP P P , and
0o a1 1 2 w2 % Ii
3. A; 2 A2 A2 A2 A2  A .. 2 A23. 7rA 2(ai) = W a w1 a2 w2 a• w
By induction on the length i of the finite execution ai, we show the existence of a,, for all
i E N, and, moreover, the existence of a finite execution a = woalwla2 w2 .. * of PP x A 2
comprised of a collection wo, w 1, w 2,... of trajectories of PP x A 2 and a collection al, a2,...
of actions of PP x A 2, such that 7rpp(a) = ap'p and IrA2(a) = a'A2
For the base case, consider the finite execution ao = wo of length 0. Since h-trace(ap) =
h-trace(rpp(appxAl )), h-trace(a•2 ) = h-trace(7A (aPPxAl)), and woPP.Iti2e = A .ltime,
it follows that wPoP(t)(z) = wA2(t)(z), for all z E Epp n EA2 and t E [0, wPP.ltime]. Thus,
the valuations of w2oP and w0A2 are compatible, for all t E [0, wPoP.ltime], and the trajectory
w0 with domain [0, wPo.Itime] can be defined as wo = woPp U wA 2.By the definition of w0 ,
it follows that rpp(wo) = oPP and 'A1 (wo) = w A 2.Moreover, these two conditions imply
that wo is a hybrid execution of PP x A 2.
For the inductive step, assuming that the finite execution ak satisfies the Properties 1, 2,
and 3, for i = k, we must show that there exists a finite execution ak+1 that satisfies the
PP if P  A2 oth-
Properties 1, 2, and 3, for i = k + 1. Let ak+1 = a+1 if a+1 e, and ak+1 = Al+1 oth-
erwise. Since h-trace(a'pP) = h-trace(rpp(QPPxAl)), h-trace(aA2) = h-trace(A 1 (OppxA, )),
and wPP.ltime = w2.time, for all i' E N, it follows that (w PPWPP 1P  PP PP PP
p(wPP Afstate))'.I A2 A2 A2 A2 .fstate)).2time and w.PP (t)(z) -
ak+ w0 1 1 ak k k+1 V(Wk+l.fs a _
W+l( )(z), for z E Epp n EA 2 and t E [0, wkp+1 .ltime]. Thus, the valuations of wk+p
and w are compatible, for all t E [0, w+ 1 .ltime], and the trajectory wk+1 with domain
[0 k+1 PP .time] can be defined as wk+ = k+P1 U wk+1. By the definition of ak+1 and wk+1
it follows that 7rpp(p(wk.lstate)ak+lWk+l) = k(WPP .lstate)aPP w1+  and 7rA2 (p(wk.lstate)
ak+lWk+l) = P(wA2.lstate) A+ Aw1 . Thus, from the induction hypothesis it follows that
the finite hybrid execution ak+1 = wal wl1 a2w 2 .' "ak(wk'P(Wk.lstate))ak+lWk+l = w0alw1
a2w 2 • ak+lWk+l satisfies the conditions rPP(ak+l) = P P P w 1 P P . akP P Wk+P  and
A (k+l) =w0 A 2 A2 wA 2  2  A2  Moreover, these two conditions imply that the hy-
brid execution ak+1 is a hybrid execution of PP x A 2, as needed.
From the above induction, it follows that there exists a hybrid execution a of PP x A 2
such that rpp(a) = agp and irA 2 (a) = a' However, recall that the execution a'P
of PP is derived from the execution 7rpp(aPPxAl) by adding environment actions which
correspond to inert r's and do not appear in the hybrid trace of aPp. Therefore, the
execution 'PP of PP starts in a state in S and is restricted to states is R and, moreover,
a'pp.lstate = rpp(appXA .lstate). Finally, since A 2 guarantees G in PP from S given R it
follows that ca'p.lstate E G. Moreover, since af'.lstate = rpp(aPPxA .1state), it is the case
that Wrpp(aPPxAl.lstate) E G, as needed. U
We end this section with several compositional theorems for protectors. The first two the-
orems consider the composition of two or more independent protectors. The third theorem
considers the composition of two protectors, one of which depends on the other; that is,
a one-way protector dependency. The fourth and fifth theorems consider the composition
of two or more protectors that depend on each other; that is, two-way and multiple-way
protector dependencies.
Theorem 3.1.3 Suppose that A1 and A 2 are protector automata for PP, with respective
port sets K 1 and K 2 , where K 1 n K 2 = 0. Suppose that A1 guarantees G1 from S1 given
R 1 and A 2 guarantees G 2 from S2 given R 2 . If the protectors A1 and A 2 are compatible,
then their composition A1 x A 2 is a protector that guarantees G1 n G 2 from S n S2 given
Rin R 2.
Proof: Let a be any finite execution of the HIOA PP x A1 x A 2 that starts in a state
in S, n S2 and whose states are restricted to the set R 1 n R 2. Moreover, let OA 1 be the
projection of a to the HIOA PP x A 1 , i.e., aA1 = 7rPPxA, (a). Since the execution a starts
in a state in Si n S2 and is restricted to the states in R 1 n R 2 , the same applies to the
projected execution a Al. However, since A 1 guarantees G1 from S1 given R 1, S1 n S2 C SI,
and R 1 n R 2 C R 1, it follows that all reachable states of PP in aA1 are in G1. Since aA1 is
the projection of a to the automaton PP x A 1, it follows that all reachable states of PP in
a are in G1 also.
Taking a similar projection of the execution a to the automaton PP x A 2 , the desired result
follows. U
Theorem 3.1.4 Suppose that A 1, A 2,... , Ak are protector automata for PP, with respec-
tive port sets K 1, K2,... , Kk, where Ki n Ki, = 0, for all i,i' E {1,... , k}, i ý i'. Suppose
that each of the protectors Ai, for all i E {1,... , k}, guarantees Gi from Si given Ri. If
the protectors A 1 , A 2 ,... , Ak are compatible, then their composition i e{1,...,k} Ai is a
protector that guarantees i n {1,...,k} Gi from ni E {1,...,k} Si given i e {1,...,k} Ri.
Proof: Let a be any finite execution of the HIOA PP x i {1,...,k} At that starts in a
state in i f {1,...,k} Si and whose states are restricted to the set if {1,...,k} Ri. Moreover,
let aA,, be the projection of a to the HIOA PP x Ail, for some i' E {1,... ,k}, i.e.,
aAi, = 7rPPxA, (a). Since the execution a starts in a state in fiE {1,...,k} Si and is restricted
to the states in i E {1,...,k} Ri, the same applies to the projected execution aAi,. However,
since Ai, guarantees Gi, from Sit given Ri,, Ai {1,...,k} Si C Si,, and ni {1,...,k} Ri C Ri',
it follows that all reachable states of PP in aAi, are in Gi,. Since aAi, is the projection of
a to the automaton PP x A.i, it follows that all reachable states of PP in a are in Gi, also.
Taking similar projections of the execution a to each of the automata PP x Ail,, for all
i" E {1,... ,k}, the desired result follows. U
Theorem 3.1.5 Suppose that A1 and A 2 are protector automata for PP, with respective
port sets K 1 and K 2, where K1 n K 2 = 0. Suppose that A 1 guarantees G1 from S1 given R 1
and A 2 guarantees G2 from S2 given R 2 n G1 . If the protectors A1 and A2 are compatible,
then their composition A1 x A2 is a protector that guarantees G1 n G2 from S n S given
R 1 n R 2 .
Proof: Let a be any finite execution of the HIOA PP x A 1 x A2 that starts in a state
in Si n S2 and whose states are restricted to the set R1 n R 2. Moreover, let OA1 be the
projection of a to the HIOA PP x A1, i.e., aA1 = rPPxA, (a). Since the execution a starts
in a state in S1 n S2 and is restricted to the states in R1 n R2 , the same applies to the
projected execution aAl. However, since A1 guarantees G1 from S1 given R1, S1 n S2 S'1,
and R1 n R2 C R 1, it follows that all reachable states of PP in aAl are in G1. Since aA1 is
the projection of a to the automaton PP x A1, it follows that all reachable states of PP in
a are in G1 also.
Now, let aA2 be the projection of the execution a to the automaton PP x A2. Since the
execution a starts in a state in S1 n S2 and is restricted to the states in R1 n R 2, the
same applies to the projected execution aA2. From above however, all reachable states in
a are in G1 and, therefore, it follows that the execution aA2 is restricted to the states in
R 1 n R 2 n G1. However, since A 2 guarantees G2 from S2 given R 2 n G1, S1 n 52 C S2, and
R 1 n R2 n G1 C R2 n G1, it follows that all reachable states of PP in aA2 are in G2. Finally,
since a 4A2 is the projection of a to the automaton PP x A2, it follows that all reachable
states of PP in a are in G2 also. U
The fourth and fifth composition theorems require a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 3.1.6 Suppose that A is a protector automaton for PP, with port set K. Suppose
that A guarantees G from S given R n G'.
Let a be any finite execution of PP x A starting in S and all of whose states are in R.
Letting (i, t, s) be any state occurrence in a, if s € G then (i, t, s) E past(G', a).
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that s 0 G and (i, t, s) . past(G', a). Let al
be the prefix of a ending with (i, t, s). Then, all states of al are in G'. Since A guarantees
G from S given R n G', it follows that all states of al are in G. But this contradicts the
assumption that s 0 G. U
Now we can prove the fourth composition theorem - the one involving a two-way protector
dependency.
Theorem 3.1.7 Suppose that A1 and A2 are protector automata for PP, with respective
port sets K 1 and K 2, where K1 n K 2 = 0. Suppose that the protector A1 guarantees G1 from
S1 given R1 n G2 and the protector A2 guarantees G2 from S2 given R 2 n G1.
Assume that a is any finite execution of the system PP x A1 x A2, starting from a state in
S1 n S2 and all of whose states are in R 1 n R2.
Then, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in G1 n G2.
2. The finite execution a can be written as al ^  a 2, where
(a) all state occurrences in al except possibly the last are in G1 n G2,
(b) the last state occurrence in al is in G1 if and only if it is in G2, and
(c) all state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first are in past(G1, a) npast(G2, ).
Proof: Fix a as in the hypothesis. If every state in a is in G1 n G2 then we are done, so
assume that some state in a is in G1 U G2. Let B 1 and B 2 denote G1 and G2, respectively.
Let wi be the first trajectory in a containing an occurrence of a state in B 1 U B 2, and
suppose that wi is a TI-trajectory. Let TI be the subset of TI consisting of all t such that
(i, t, wi(t)) E past(B1 U B 2,a). Then, TI is a non-empty subinterval of T, that is "upward-
closed", i.e., if t E TI, t' E TI, and t < t' then t' E TI. Since TI is an interval of reals, it has
a left endpoint t, which might or might not itself be in TI. Let s = wi(t).
Then, we claim that splitting a exactly at (i, t, s) yields the needed decomposition into al
and a 2. There are three conditions to check:
1. All state occurrences in ac except possibly the last are in G1 n G2.
This is true by the definitions of past and Ti.
2. s E G1 if and only if s E G2.
Suppose that s E B 1 . Then, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that (i,t,s) E past(B2,a). How-
ever, the definition of TI implies that no state occurrence preceding (i, t, s) is in B 2.
Therefore, it follows that s E B 2.
Similarly, if s E B 2 then s E B 1.
3. All state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first are in past(B1 , a) n past(B2 , a).
Consider any state occurrence (i', t', s') in a 2 other than the first. By definition of
a 2 and past, it must be that (i', t', s') E past(Bi U B 2, a). Suppose, without loss of
generality, that (i', t', s') E past(B1 , a). This means that either (i', t', s') E B 1, or there
is a state occurrence (i", t", s") preceding (i', t', s') in a such that (i", t", s") E B 1 .
In the former case, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that (i', t', s') E past(B2, a). In the latter
case, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that (i", t", s") E past(B2, a). This in turn implies that
(i', t', s') E past(B2, a). This suffices.
In the following theorem, we extend the composition theorem of the two-way protector
dependency case to the multiple-way protector dependency case; that is, the case in which
the operation of each of the protectors within a prespecified set of protectors relies on the
operation of all the other protectors in the set.
Theorem 3.1.8 Suppose that A1 , A2,... , Ak are protector automata for PP, with respec-
tive port sets K 1, K 2,..., Kk, where Ki n Ki, = 0, for all i, i' E {1,..., k},i $ i'. Sup-
pose that each of the protectors Ai, for all i E {1,... ,k}, guarantees Gi from Si given
Assume that a is any finite execution of the system PP x I i E {1,...,k) Ai, starting from a
state in Ai E {1,...,k} Si and all of whose states are in i E {1,...,k} Ri.
Then, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in nil {1,...,k} Gi.
2. The finite execution a can be written as al ^  a2, where
(a) all state occurrences in al except possibly the last are in n i {1,...,k} Gi,
(b) if the last state occurrence in al is in G, for some i E {1,..., k}, then there
exists i' E {1,... , k}, i' $ i, such that the last state occurrence in al is in Gil,
and
(c) all state occurrences in a2 except possibly the first are in fn i i past(i , a), for
some I CI {1,...,k}, where II > 2.
Proof: Fix a as in the hypothesis. If every state in a is in iE {1,...,k} Gi then we are done,
so assume that some state in a is in Ui E{1,...,k} Gi. For all i E {1,... ,k}, let Bi denote
Gi.
Let wj be the first trajectory in a containing an occurrence of a state in Ui {1,...,k} Bi,
and suppose that wj is a TI-trajectory. Let TI be the subset of T, consisting of all t such
that (j, t, wj(t)) E past(Ui E {1,...,k} Bi,a). Then, T1 is a non-empty subinterval of TI that
is "upward-closed", i.e., if t E T1, t' E TI, and t < t' then t' E T1. Since TI is an interval of
reals, it has a left endpoint t, which might or might not itself be in TI. Let s = wj(t).
Then, we claim that splitting a exactly at (j, t, s) yields the needed decomposition into al
and a 2. There are three conditions to check:
1. All state occurrences in al except possibly the last are in n ~E {1,...,k} Gi.
This is true by the definitions of past and T).
2. If the last state occurrence in al is in Gi, for some i E {1,...,k}, then there exists
i' E {1,..., k}, i' 0 i, such that the last occurrence in al is in Gi,.
Suppose that s E Bi, for some i E {1,... ,k}. Then, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that
(j,t,s) E past(ni' {1,...,k},i',i Git, a), i.e., (j,t,s) E past(U i, E {1,...,k},i'$i Bi,,a).
The definition of TI implies that no state occurrence preceding (j, t, s) is in the set
U i'E {1,...,k},i'i Bi,. Therefore, it follows that s E Ui, 1E ,...,k),i'#i Bi,. This suffices.
3. All state occurrences in a2 except possibly the first are in N i • past(Gi, a), for some
IC {1,..., k}, where III2 2.
Consider any state occurrence (j, t', s') in a 2 other than the first. By definition of a 2
and past, it must be that (j', t', s') E past(Ui E {1,...,k } Bi, a). Suppose, without loss
of generality, that (j', t', s') E past(Bi, a), for some i E {1,..., k}. This means that
either (j', t', s') E Bi, or there is a state occurrence (j", t", 8") preceding (j', t', s') in
a such that (j", t", s") E Bi.
In the former case, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that the state occurrence (j', t', s') satisfies the
condition (j', t', s') E past(i'E
, 
f {1,...,k},i'#i Gi,, a), which is equivalent to (j', t', s') E
past(Ui, E {,...,k},i' i Bi,, a). In the latter case, Lemma 3.1.6 implies that the state
occurrence (j", t", s") satisfies the condition (j", t", s") E past(c i' E {1,... ,k},i':i Gi,, a),
which is equivalent to (j", t", s") E past(U i, t {1,...,k},i'#i Bit, a). This in turn implies
that (j', t', s') E past(U i' E {1,...,k},i'#i Bi,, a). This suffices.
3.2 An Abstract Protector
In this section, we define an abstract protector that is parameterized in terms of:
* PP, a particular physical plant automaton,
* R, G, and S, sets of states of PP,
* j, a particular port of PP, and
* d, a positive real-valued sampling period.
The PP automaton represents the physical plant being modeled. The set R is the set of
states to which we restrict the states of the PP automaton while considering a particular
protector. This set is usually comprised of states satisfying a particular property of the
physical plant that is required by the protector under consideration. The set G is the set of
"good" states; that is, the set of states to which the protector is designed to constrain the
PP automaton. The set S is a set of states from which the protector under consideration
is said to guarantee G given R; that is, given that the states of the PP automaton are
restricted to the set R, the protector guarantees that every finite execution starting from an
initial state in S ends in a state in G. The protector communicates with the PP automaton
through the port j and has a positive real-valued sampling period d.
The protector is composed of a sensor automaton and a discrete controller automaton as
shown in Figure 3.1. Both the sensor and the discrete controller are described abstractly
in terms of PP, etc. At intervals of d time units, the sensor automaton samples the output
Figure 3.1 Compositional structure of a physical plant and an abstract protector.
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variables of the PP automaton. The discrete controller automaton is rather nondetermin-
istic. Based on the output state information of the PP automaton sampled by the sensor,
the discrete controller issues protective actions so as to guarantee that the PP automaton
stays within the set G starting from S given R.
A particular instantiation of the abstract parameterized protector Abs(PP, S, R, G, j, d) can
be defined by simply specifying the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d. Often, after explicitly
defining the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d, we refer to the particular abstract protector
using only its port index, i.e., Absj. The same applies for the parameterized sensor and
discrete controller automata Sensor( PP, S, R, G, j, d) and DC(PP, S, R, G, j, d), respectively.
In several of the following chapters, we give explicit definitions of protectors for specific
choices of PP, etc. The abstract protector of this section is used to aid in proving correctness
of the later protectors.
3.2.1 Terminology and Assumptions
In this section, we define several functions and sets, which are useful in the definition and
in the proof of correctness of the abstract protector, and present the assumptions made
about the physical plant and the abstract protector automata. It is important to note
that the assumptions presented in this section must be satisfied by any physical plant and
abstract protector automata defined and analyzed using the framework developed in this
thesis. Throughout this section, we also state several lemmas which are used in subsequent
sections and chapters.
We begin by stating two simple assumptions about the physical plant automaton. First,
we assume that the PP automaton has no input variables on port j, for all j E J; that
is, the protectors control the state of the physical plant only through input actions. A
consequence of this assumption is that the environment action of the PP automaton is
stuttering. Second, we assume that the PP automaton has no output actions on port j, for
all j E J. The physical plant is modeled as a passive system in the sense that the protectors
observe the state of the plant only through output variables. These two assumptions are
formally stated by the following two axioms.
Axiom 3.2.1 The PP automaton has no input variables on any of its ports, i.e., Upp = 0,
for all i E J.
Axiom 3.2.2 The PP automaton has no output actions on any of its ports, i.e., Ej@ = 0,
for all j E J.
Next, we define a function, futurepp,R,j, that yields the set of states of PP that are R-
reachable from the given subset of R within an amount of time in the given subset of R>O,
under the constraint that no input actions arrive on port j of the PP automaton.
When either argument of the function futurepp,R,j is a singleton set, we omit the set
brackets, e.g., for any p E R and t E R > o, we write futurepp,R,j(p,t) as shorthand for
futurepp,Rj({p}, {t}). Moreover, it is important to note that the function futurepp,R,j de-
pends on the automaton PP, the set R, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the
automaton PP, the set R, and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is,
we use the notation future instead of futurepp,R,j.
Lemma 3.2.1 For all P, P' C R, T, T' C R >o, and t, t' E R'> , the following are true:
1. If P C P' and T C T' then futurepp,R,j(P,T) C futurepp,R,(P, T').
2. futurepp,R,j(P, t + t') = futurepp,R,j(futurepp,R,j (P, t), t')
3. P C_ futurepp,R,(P, 0).
4. futurepp,R,j(futurepp,R,j(P,T),T') = futurepp,R,j(P,T"), where T" = {7 + '' 7 E
T and r' E TT}.
Proof: Follow directly from the definition of the function future. U
futurepp,1,j : P(R) x P(R >o ) --+ P(R), defined by:
p E futurepp,R,j(P, T), where P C R and T C R >o, if and only if p is R-reachable
from some p' E P via a finite execution fragment a of PP with no input actions on
port j and with a.ltime E T.
Lemma 3.2.2 Suppose that r is any discrete action of PP other than an input action on
port j and that p, p' E R such that p -4•,, p. Then, for any T C R2o, futurepp,R,j(p', T) C
futurePP,R,j(p, T).
Proof: Lemma 3.2.1, part 1, and the fact that p' 1 future(p, 0) imply that future(p', T) C
future(future(p, 0), T). Moreover, Lemma 3.2.1, part 4, implies that future(future(p, 0), T) =
future(p, T). Therefore, it follows that future(p', T) C future(p, T), as needed. U
We define a function, no-opppR,j, which yields, for a given state in R, the set of input
actions on port j of the PP automaton that do not affect the state of the PP automaton,
provided they are executed prior to either time-passage, or other input actions on port j.
Henceforth, for any state p in R, the input actions in the set no-oppp,R,j(p) are referred to
as no-op input actions on port j of PP for the state p.
It is important to note that the above definition of the function no-opPP,R,j conforms to
Axiom D3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2 since, by Axiom 3.2.1, the PP automaton
has no input variables on any of its ports. Moreover, the function no-oppp,R,j depends on
the automaton PP, the set R, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the automaton
PP, the set R, and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is, we use the
notation no-op instead of no-opPP,R,j .
We proceed by stating another assumption about the physical plant automaton PP. We
assume that there exist no-op input actions on port j for every state of the PP automaton
in the set R. This assumption is formally stated by the following axiom.
Axiom 3.2.3 For every p E R, it is the case that no-oppp,R,j(p) $ 0.
Axiom 3.2.3 states that no-op input actions on port j exist for every state p of PP in R. It is
important to realize, however, that Axiom 3.2.3 does not claim that for p E R it is possible
to determine from the valuation y = p[Ypp of the output variables of the PP automaton
which input actions are no-op input actions on port j for the state p. In fact, it is plausible
that the information provided by the output variables Ypp of the PP automaton is not
sufficient to determine which of the input actions D'ip" are no-op input actions on port j
for each state p of the PP automaton in the set R.
Since the PP automaton is assumed to have no input actions on any of its ports (Ax-
iom 3.2.1), input actions of the physical plant are often "idempotent", in the sense that in
no-opPP,R, R - P y•P ), defined by:
r E no-opPP,R,3(p) if and only if r is an input action on port j of PP such that
for all p', p" E R satisfying p' E futurepp,R,j(p, 0) and p' -, p", it is the case that
P" = p'.
any execution of the PP automaton if any particular input action 7r on port j is performed
consecutively multiple times with no other intervening input actions on port j, then all such
input actions r except the first, do not change the state of the PP automaton. For any
physical plant automaton PP in which all input actions are idempotent and any state p of
the PP automaton in the set R, the most recently performed input action on port j is a
no-op input action on port j for the state p.
We define a set, very-safePP,R,G,j
, 
which is comprised of the states of PP that satisfy R and
from which all R-reachable states of PP with no input actions on port j are in G. The set
very-safePP,R,G,j may be interpreted as the set consisting of the states from which the PP
automaton is bound to remain within the set G provided that it remains within the set R
and the protector on port j does not retract or issue additional protective actions.
very-safePP,R,G,j C R, defined by:
p E very-safePP,R,G,j if and only if futurepp,R,j(p, R> O) C G.
It is important to note that the set very-safepp,R,G,j depends on the automaton PP, the
sets R and G, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the automaton PP, the sets R
and G, and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is, we use the notation
very-safe instead of very-safepp,R,G,j.
Lemma 3.2.3
1. very-safePP,R,G,j C G.
2. If p E very-safepp,R,G,j then futurepp,R,j(P,R> -0) C very-safepp,R,G,j.
Proof: Follow directly from the definition of very-safe. U
We define a set, safepp,R,G,j, which is comprised of the states of PP that satisfy R and from
which the protector on port j has a "winning protective strategy". Namely, there exists an
input action on port j of the PP automaton whose immediate execution - its execution
prior to any time-passage with the possibility that its execution follows an arbitrary number
of discrete actions other than input actions on port j - guarantees that all subsequent R-
reachable states of PP with no input actions on port j are in G; that is, the state following
the execution of the particular input action of PP on port j is in the set very-safePP,R,G,j.
SafePP,R,G,j C R, defined by:
p E safepp,R,G,j if and only if both of the following hold:
1. futurepp,R,j(p, 0) C G.
2. There exists an input action 7r on port j, such that for every p', p" E R satisfying
p' E futurepp,R,j(P, 0) and p' -,, p", it is the case that p" E very-safePP,R,G,j
It is important to note that the set safepp,R,G,j depends on the automaton PP, the sets R
and G, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the automaton PP, the sets R and G,
and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is, we use the notation safe
instead of safepp,R,G,.
We overload the notation safePP,R,G,j by defining a function, safepp,R,G,j, which yields the
states of PP that satisfy R and for which the immediate execution of the given input action
on port j - its execution prior to any time-passage with the possibility that its execution
follows an arbitrary number of discrete actions other than input actions on port j - guar-
antees that all subsequent R-reachable states of PP with no input actions on port j are in
G; that is, the state following the execution of the given input action on port j is in the set
very-safePP,R,G,j.
safepp,R,G,j : i  -- P(R), defined by:
p E safepp,R,G,j(7r) if and only if both of the following hold:
1. futurepp,R,j(p, 0) C G.
2. For every p', p" E R such that p' E futurepp,R,j(p, 0) and p' -, p", it is the
case that p" E very-safePP,R,G,j.
It is important to note that the function safePP,R,G,j depends on the automaton PP, the
sets R and G, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the automaton PP, the sets R
and G, and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is, we use the notation
safe(r) instead of safePP,R,G,j(r), for any input action r of PP on port j.
Lemma 3.2.4
1. safePP,R,G,j C G.
2. For any p E R, p E safepp,R,G,j if and only if futureppR,j(p, 0) C safePP,R,G,j.
3. very-safePP,R,G,j P safepP,R,G,j*
Proof:
1. Let p be any state in safe. From the definition of safe it follows that future(p, 0) C G.
Therefore, Lemma 3.2.1, part 3, implies that p E G. It follows that safe 9 G.
2. In the forward direction, let p E safe and p' E future(p, 0). We must show that
p' E safe; that is, we must show that (i) future(p', 0) g G, and (ii) there exists an
input action 7r on port j such that for all p", p"' E R satisfying p" E future(p', 0)
and p" ~--p p"', it is the case that p"' E very-safe. Lemma 3.2.2 implies that
future(p', 0) 9 future(p, 0) and, therefore, the conditions to be shown follow from
the fact that p E safe.
For the converse, let p E R and future(p, 0) _ safe. We must show that p E safe.
From Lemma 3.2.1, part 3, it is the case that p E future(p, 0). Therefore, it follows
that p E safe.
3. Letting p E very-safe, we must show that p E safe; that is, we must show that
(i) future(p, 0) C G, and (ii) there exists an input action r on port j such that for all
p', p" E R satisfying p' E future(p, 0) and p' -+p, p", it is the case that p" E very-safe.
For the first condition, Lemma 3.2.1, part 1, implies that future(p, 0) C future(p, R>o).
However, since p E very-safe it is the case that future(p, R 0o) C G. Therefore, it
follows that future(p, 0) C G, as needed.
For the second condition, since no-op(p) 0 0 by Axiom 3.2.3, let r E no-op(p).
Moreover, let p', p" E R such that p E future(p, 0) and p' --'p,, p". Since p E very-safe,
Lemma 3.2.3, part 2, implies that p' E very-safe. Moreover, since 7r is defined to be a
no-op input action on port j for the state p, it follows that p" = p'. Therefore, it is
the case that p" E very-safe, as needed.
We proceed by stating two more assumptions about the PP automaton. We assume that
membership of a state of the PP automaton in the set safe is determinable from the output
variables of the PP automaton, i.e., the set safe is Ypp-determinable (as defined in Sec-
tion 2.1). Moreover, we assume that for any state in the set safe, an appropriate action to
guarantee safety can be determined from the output variables of the PP automaton, i.e., the
variables in Ypp. These two assumptions are formally stated by the following two axioms.
Axiom 3.2.4 safepp,R,G,j is Ypp-determinable.
For any valuation y of the output variables Ypp of the PP automaton, we use the notation
y E safe to denote the existence of a state p E safe such that p[Ypp = y. In fact, by
Axiom 3.2.4, for any valuation y of the output variables Ypp of the PP automaton, the
existence of a state p E safe such that p[Ypp = y implies that all states p' E R such that
p' [Ypp = y are in the set safe.
Axiom 3.2.5 There exists a function, decision, from valuations of Ypp to E"pj such that
for any y E Ypp and p E R satisfying p[Ypp = y, it is the case that if y E safepp,R,G,j then
p E safeppR,G,j(decision(y)).
We define a function, delay-safePP,R,G,j, which yields the set of states of PP that satisfy R
and for which all states R-reachable within the given amount of time and with no input
actions on port j are in G, and all states R-reachable in exactly the given amount of time
and with no input actions on port j are in safePP,R,G,j.
delay-safepp,R,G,j • RO -4 P(R), defined by:
p E delay-safepp,R,G,j(t) if and only if both of the following hold:
1. futurepp,R,j(p, [0, t]) C G.
2. futurepp,R,j(p, t) c safepp,R,G,j
It is important to note that the function delay-safePP,R,G,j depends on the automaton PP,
the sets R and G, and the port j. Henceforth however, when the automaton PP, the sets R
and G, and the port j are clear from context, they are omitted; that is, we use the notation
delay-safe(t) instead of delay-safePP,R,G,j(t), for any t E R > ° .
Lemma 3.2.5 For any t, t' E R 0o, such that t < t', the following hold:
1. very-safePP,R,G,j 9 delay-safePP,R,G,j(t).
2. safepp,R,G,j = delay-safepp,R,G,j(O).
3. delay-safePP,R,G,j(t') 9 delay-safepp,R,a,j(t).
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of very-safe, safe, and delay-safe(t), for any
t E R 0o, and the Lemmas 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. N
We conclude by stating three assumptions made about the abstract protector automaton.
In particular, we assume that the state information provided by the output variables of the
PP automaton is sufficient to determine membership of any state of the PP automaton in
the sets R and G, i.e., the sets R and G are Ypp-determinable (as defined in Section 2.1).
Moreover, we assume that the set of start states S is a subset of the set safe. These
assumptions are formally stated by the following three axioms.
Axiom 3.2.6 R is Ypp-determinable.
Axiom 3.2.7 G is Ypp-determinable.
Axiom 3.2.8 S C safepp,R,aG,.
As noted above, all assumptions described by Axioms 3.2.1-3.2.8 must be satisfied by the
physical plant and abstract protector automata defined and analyzed using the framework
developed in this thesis.
3.2.2 Sensor Automata
The sensor automaton Sensorj, defined in Figure 3.2, behaves as follows: at time 0 and every
d time units thereafter, it outputs the valuation y of the output variables Ypp of the PP
Figure 3.2 Sensorj automaton definition.
Actions: Input: e, the environment action
Output: snapshot(y)j, for each valuation y of Ypp, i.e., for all y E Ypp
Variables: Input: u E type(u), for all u E Ypp, initially u E type(u), for each u E Ypp
Internal: nowj E R>o, initially 0
next-snapj E Ro> , initially 0
Discrete Transitions:
e snapshot(y)j
Eff: Ypp :E Ypp Pre: next-snapj = nowj
y is current valuation of Ypp
Eff: Ypp :E Ypp
next-snapi := nowj + d
Trajectories:
for all u E Ypp
u assumes arbitrary values in type(u) throughout w
next-snapj is constant throughout w
for all t E T,
w(t).nowj = w(O).nowj + t
w(t).nowj < w(t).next-snapj
automaton using a snapshot(y)j output action. The Sensorj automaton keeps track of the
appropriate times for scheduling each snapshot(y)j action, for y E Ypp, using the internal
variables nowj and next-snapj. The variable nowj stores the time that has elapsed from the
beginning of the particular execution of the Sensorj automaton. The variable next-snapj
stores the next point in time in which the output variables Ypp of the PP automaton must
be sampled.
The discrete actions of the Sensorj automaton are the input action e and the output actions
snapshot(y)j, for all y E Ypp. The environment action e allows for arbitrary changes to the
input variables Ypp as a consequence of discrete transitions outside the Sensorj automaton
but does not affect the local variables of the Sensorj automaton. Each snapshot(y)j action,
for y E Ypp, outputs the valuation y of the output variables Ypp of the PP automaton. In
order to conform to Axiom D3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2, each input variable u of
the Sensorj automaton, for u E Ypp, is assigned an arbitrary value in the set type(u). It
can easily be seen that the Sensorj automaton satisfies the Axioms D1-D3 of the HIOA
model of Section 2.2.
The trajectory specification for the Sensorj automaton gives restrictions on a trajectory
w with domain TI . Since the Sensorj automaton has no control over its input variables,
the input variables of the Sensorj automaton are allowed to change arbitrarily throughout
a trajectory w. It is important to note that the Sensorj automaton does not allow time-
passage unless the condition nowj < next-snapi is satisfied. As a result, in order for time
to proceed when nowj = next-snapj, a snapshot(y)j output action, for some y E Ypp,
is eventually scheduled. It can easily be seen that the Sensorj automaton satisfies the
Axioms T1-T3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2.
Finally, since each input variable u of the Sensorj automaton, for u E Ypp, can initially
assume an arbitrary value in the set type(u), the Sensorj automaton satisfies Axiom Init
of the HIOA model of Section 2.2. Since the Sensorj automaton satisfies the Axioms Init,
D1-D3, and T1-T3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2, it follows that it is a HIOA.
3.2.3 Discrete Controller Automata
The discrete controller automaton DCj, defined in Figure 3.3, uses the valuation of the
output variables of the PP automaton, which is sampled by the Sensorj automaton, to
determine which protective action must be scheduled so as to guarantee that (i) the PP
automaton remains within the set G up to the next sampling point, and (ii) the state of
the PP automaton at the next sampling point is in the set safe.
The discrete actions of the DCj automaton are the input action e, the input actions
snapshot(y)j, for all y E Ypp, and the output actions r, for all 7r E Eip . The envi-
ronment action e allows the scheduling of discrete transitions outside the DCj automaton.
Since the DCj automaton has no input variables, the environment action e is stuttering;
that is, the execution of the environment action e does not affect the state of the DCj au-
tomaton. Each snapshot(y)j action, for y E Ypp, determines which output action r in the
set E "i should be scheduled and stores it in the internal variable sendj. In a subsequent
step, prior to any time-passage but with the possibility of intervening discrete actions, the
DCj automaton schedules the output action r that is stored in the internal variable sendj.
It is important to note that time-passage is not enabled while any of the actions 7r in CEp is
enabled. As a result, in order for time to proceed, the action r that is stored in the internal
variable sendj is eventually scheduled. It can easily be seen that the Sensorj automaton
satisfies the Axioms D1-D3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2.
The trajectory specification of the DCj automaton is trivial. It simply states that the
internal variable sendj , which comprises the state of the DCj automaton, remains unchanged
and equal to null throughout any trajectory of the DCj automaton. It can easily be seen
that the DCj automaton satisfies the Axioms T1-T3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2.
Finally, since the DCj automaton has no input variables, Axiom Init of the HIOA model
Figure 3.3 DCj automaton definition.
Actions: Input: e, the environment action (stuttering)
snapshot(y)j, for each valuation y of Ypp, i.e., for all y E Ypp
Output: r, for all r Eippj, i.e., all the input actions on port j of PP
Variables: Internal: sendj E E PP U {null}, initially null
Discrete Transitions:
e
Eff: None
snapshot(y)j
Eff: if y E safepp,R,G,j then
sendj :E {q E pp I V p,p',p" E R such that
p[Ypp = y, p' E futureppR,(p, 0), and p' _,2 pp",
it is the case that p" E delay-safepp,R,G,j(d)}
else
sendj :E Einp.
Pre: sendj = 7r
Eff: sendj := null
Trajectories:
w.send = null
of Section 2.2 it trivially satisfied. Since the DCj automaton satisfies the Axioms Init,
D1-D3, and T1-T3 of the HIOA model of Section 2.2, it follows that it is a HIOA.
The DCj automaton's decision as to which output action to enable and subsequently sched-
ule is made nondeterministically. Let y be any valuation of the output variables Ypp of the
PP automaton, i.e., y E Ypp.
On one hand, if y E safe, then an output action q in Einp is allowed only if for all p, p', p E R
such that p[Ypp = y, p' E future(p, 0), and p' ---pp p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d).
Let 4 be the set of all output actions 0 in Ei2p allowed by the DCj automaton in this case.
In order for an implementation of a particular instantiation of the DCj automaton to exist,
it is imperative that the set of output actions 1 be non-empty and that at least one of
the actions in D can be determined from the valuation y of Ypp. In fact, since y E safe,
an output action r in E=pi that is allowed by the DCj automaton is guaranteed to exist,
i.e., 4• 0. Axiom 3.2.4 implies that for all p E R such that p[Ypp = y it is the case
that p E safe, i.e., for all p E R such that p[Ypp = y, there exists an action 7r in Ellp
such that for all p', p" E R satisfying p' E future(p, 0) and p' -,, p", it is the case that
p" E very-safe. Therefore, from Lemma 3.2.5, part 1, it follows that p" E delay-safe(d), as
needed. Moreover, by Axiom 3.2.5, an output action 7r in E•p that is allowed by the DCj
automaton can be determined from the valuation y of Ypp; that is, there exists a function,
decision, from valuations of Ypp to pi Pj, such that for any y E Ypp and p E R satisfying
p[Ypp = y, it is the case that p E safe(decision(y)).
On the other hand, if y . safe, then any output action r of the DCj automaton is allowed by
default. However, as shown in the following section, this default case never occurs in states
that are R-reachable by a finite execution of the composed system PP x Sensorj x DCj
starting in an initial state in the set S.
The nondeterminism in the description of the DCj automaton allows the freedom to choose
any response that satisfies the given conditions - however, in any discrete controller au-
tomaton implementation, a response that least restricts the future states of the physical
plant automaton PP would be preferred because it would represent a weaker protective
action.
Henceforth, let the "abstract protector" automaton Absj be the composition of the Sensorj
and DCj automata, i.e., Absj = Sensorj x DCj. Proposition 2.7.1, implies that the au-
tomaton Absj is a HIOA.
3.2.4 Correctness of the Abstract Protector
In this section, we prove that the abstract protector Absj guarantees G in the physical
plant PP from S given R.
Lemma 3.2.6 For any reachable state s of Abs(PP, S, R, G, j, d), if s.next-snapj = s.nowj,
then s.sendj = null.
Proof: Follows directly from the definition of the Sensorj and the DCj automata. U
The following lemma considers the composition PP x Absj of the physical plant automa-
ton PP and the abstract protector automaton Absj. Let s be any state of the composed
system and let s.ppstate be the restriction of s onto the state space of the PP automaton,
i.e., s.ppstate = s [Vpp.
Lemma 3.2.7 The following are true in any state s of PP x Abs(PP, S,R,G,j,d), that
is reachable from an initial state in safepp,R,G,j
, 
via an execution that only involves states
in R.
1. If s.sendj = null, then s.ppstate E delay-safepp,R,G,j(s.next-snapj - s.nowj).
2. If s.sendj = 0, for some q E zip , then
(a) futurepp,Rj(s.ppstate, 0) C G, and
(b) For every p', p" E R such that p' E futurepp,Rj,(s.ppstate, 0) and p' ,, p", it
is the case that p" E delay-safePP,R,G,j(d).
Proof: In an initial state of PPx Absj it is the case that s.sendj = null. Therefore, since the
first clause of the invariant applies, we must show that s.ppstate E delay-safe(s.next-snapj -
s.nowj). However, in an initial state PPx Absj it is the case that s.next-snapj = s.nowj = 0.
Therefore, we must show that s.ppstate E delay-safe(0), which by Lemma 3.2.5, part 2, is
equivalent to s.ppstate E safe. But this is true by our assumption about the start states of
the executions considered in this lemma.
We now show that the invariant is preserved by every discrete transition s -5+ s' of PPx Absj,
for s, s' E states(PP x Absj) such that s.ppstate, s'.ppstate E R and ir E FPPxAbsj. We
consider cases:
1. r = snapshot(y)j.
From the effects of the snapshot(y)j action, it follows that s'.sendj E E`p• . Therefore,
we must show the second clause of the invariant for the state s'; that is, we must
show that (a) future(s'.ppstate, 0) C G, and (b) for every p',p" E R such that p' E
future(s'.ppstate, 0) and p' s.aedj p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d).
Lemma 3.2.6 and the precondition of the snapshot(y)j action imply that s.sendj =
null. Therefore, the invariant for s implies that s.ppstate E delay-safe(s.next-snap3 -
s.nowj). Since the precondition of the snapshot(y)j action implies that s.next-snapj =
s.nowj, it follows that s.ppstate E delay-safe(0). Therefore, Lemma 3.2.5, part 2, im-
plies that s.ppstate E safe.
For condition (a), since s.ppstate E safe, it is the case that future(s.ppstate, 0) g G.
Since the snapshot(y)j action affects only the sendj of the DCj automaton and the
PP automaton has no input variables on any of its ports, it is the case that s'.ppstate =
s.ppstate. Therefore, it follows that future(s'.ppstate, 0) C G, as needed.
For condition (b), since s.ppstate E safe, the "then clause" of the determination of
s'.sendj is used. Therefore, the discrete step s -- s' sets the variable s'.sendj to some
4 in Ep,. with the property that for every p',p" E R such that p' E future(s'.ppstate, 0)
and p -+ P", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d), as needed.
2. 7r E Pin
The precondition implies that s.sendj = 7r null. Therefore, the invariant for the
state s implies that future(s.ppstate, 0) C G and that for every p', p" E R such that
p' E future(s.ppstate, 0) and p'--, ppp", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d). As a
result of the step, it is the case that s'.sendi = null and s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj = d.
Moreover, the invariant for the state s implies that s'.ppstate E delay-safe(d). Since
s'.nezt-snapj - s'.nowj = d and s'.ppstate E delay-safe(d), it follows that s'.ppstate E
delay-safe(s'.nezt-snapj - s'.nowj), as needed.
3. r E Epp - E'"p. (r is a discrete action of PP other than an input action on port j).
For any discrete action r of the PP automaton other than an input action on port j, it
is the case that s.sendj = s'.sendj, s.nowj = s'.nowj, and s.next-snapj = s'.next-snapj.
If s.sendj = null, then the invariant for s implies that s.ppstate E delay-safe(t), where
t = s.next-snapi -s.nowj; that is, future(s.ppstate, [0, t]) _ G and future(s.ppstate, t) C
safe. However, Lemma 3.2.2 implies that future(s'.ppstate, t) C future(s.ppstate, t),
for all t E R ->O. Since s.next-snapi - s.nowj = s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj, it follows that
future(s'.ppstate, [0, t]) C G and future(s'.ppstate, t) C safe, where t = s'.next-snapi -
s'.nowj. These two conditions imply that s'.ppstate E delay-safe(s'.next-snapj -
s'.nowj). This yields the invariant.
A similar argument holds if s.sendj = €, for some 0 E Ei•np. In this case, the invariant
for s implies that future(s.ppstate, 0) C G and that for every p',,p" E R such that p' E
future(s.ppstate, 0) and p' -,,. p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d). However,
Lemma 3.2.2 implies that future(s'.ppstate, 0) C future(s.ppstate, 0). Therefore, it
follows that future(s'.ppstate, 0) C G and that for every p, p" E R such that p' E
future(s'.ppstate, 0) and p' ---, p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe(d). This yields
the invariant.
4. r = e (r is the environment action).
Since the input variables of the Sensorj automaton are the output variables of the PP
automaton, the DCj automaton has no input variables, and the PP automaton has
no input variables on any of its ports, it follows that the composition PP x Absj has
no input variables. Therefore, the action 7 is the stuttering environment action, i.e.,
s' = s, and the invariant for the state s implies the invariant for the state s'.
Finally, we show that the invariant is preserved by any non-trivial closed trajectory w in
WPPx Abs . Suppose that the states s and s', for some s, s' E states(PP x Absj) such that
s.ppstate, s'.ppstate E R, are the first and last states of the trajectory w, respectively. Since
time-passage is enabled, it is the case that sendj = null throughout the trajectory w. There-
fore, the invariant for the state s implies that s.ppstate E delay-safe(s.next-snapj - s.nowj);
that is, future(s.ppstate, [0, s.next-snapi - s.nowj]) 9 G and future(s.ppstate, s.next-snapj -
s.nowj) C safe. We must show that s'.ppstate E delay-safe(s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj); that
is, future(s'.ppstate, [0, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj]) C G and future(s'.ppstate, s'.next-snapj -
s'.nowj) C safe. It suffices to show that future(s'.ppstate, [0, s'.nezt-snapj - s'.nowj]) C
future(s.ppstate, [0, s.next-snapj - s.nowj]) and future(s'.ppstate, s'.next-snapi - s'.nowj) C
future(s.ppstate, s.next-snapj - s.nowj).
From the fact that s'.ppstate E future(s.ppstate, w.ltime) and Lemma 3.2.1, part 1, it fol-
lows that future(s'.ppstate, [0, s'.next-snapj- s'.nowj]) C future(future(s.ppstate, w.ltime),[0,
s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj]). But Lemma 3.2.1, part 4, implies that future(future(s.ppstate,
w.ltime), [0, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj]) = future(s.ppstate, [w.ltime, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj +
w.ltime]). Moreover, from Lemma 3.2.1, part 1, it follows that future(s.ppstate, [w.ltime,
s'.nezt-snapi - s'.nowj + w.Itime]) C future(s.ppstate, [0, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj + w.ltime]).
Finally, since s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj + w.ltime = s.next-snapi - s.nowj it follows that
future(s'.ppstate, [0, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj]) C_ future(s.ppstate, [0, s.next-snapj - s.nowj]),
as needed.
Using similar arguments, it can be shown that future(s'.ppstate, s'.next-snapj - s'.nowj) _
future(s.ppstate, s.next-snapj - s.nowj). i
Lemma 3.2.8 For any state s of PP x Abs(PP, S,R,G,j,d) that is reachable from an
initial state in safepp,R,G,j via an execution that only involves states in R, it is the case that
s.ppstate E G.
Proof: If s.sendj = null then Lemma 3.2.7 implies that the state s.ppstate is in the set
delay-safe(s.next-snapj - s.nowj), which implies that future(s.ppstate, 0) C G. On the other
hand, if s.sendj 0 null, then Lemma 3.2.7 implies that future(s.ppstate, 0) C G. Thus, in
either case it is the case that future(s.ppstate, 0) 9 G. Finally, Lemma 3.2.1, part 3, implies
that s.ppstate E G. U
Theorem 3.2.9 Abs(PP, S, R, G,j, d) guarantees G in PP from safepp,R,G,j given R.
Proof: Let s be any state of the composed system PP x Absj that is reachable from an
initial state in safe via an execution that only involves states in R. Then, Lemma 3.2.8
implies that s.ppstate E G, as needed. U
Corollary 3.2.10 Abs(PP, S, R, G, j, d) guarantees G in PP from S given R.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 3.2.9 and Axiom 3.2.8. U
Chapter 4
Modeling a System of n Vehicles
In this chapter, we present a model for a simplified version of the PRT 2 00 0TM system
under development at Raytheon Corporation. The physical plant model involves n vehicles
traveling on a single track. Since this thesis is only concerned with safety, the details of the
operation of the physical plant and the aspects of the system geared towards performance
are omitted.
The model, called VEHICLES, is a HIOA and conforms to the restrictions on the PP au-
tomaton of Section 3.1 and the assumptions about the PP automaton of Section 3.2. We
describe in detail the aspects of the physical plant model that were only abstract in Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2. These include: the state variables, the initial states, the discrete actions,
and the trajectories of the PP automaton. Moreover, we define several auxiliary derived
variables and sets that are used extensively by the protector automata presented in the
following chapters.
The state variables of the VEHICLES automaton include the position, the velocity, and the
acceleration of each vehicle and several other variables that record whether the vehicles of
each of the vehicle pairs have collided into each other, whether each vehicle is braking, and
whether each protector is requesting each vehicle to brake. The set of initial states is the
set of states of the VEHICLES automaton that satisfy the physical properties of the system.
The input actions are used by the protectors to instruct the vehicles to apply or release
their "emergency" brakes, and the internal actions model the possibility that vehicles stop
suddenly or collide among themselves. The trajectories model the motion of the vehicles
with time, within their physical constraints.
4.1 Physical Plant: VEHICLES
In this section we describe the automaton VEHICLES, which models a set of n vehicles
traveling on a single track. For simplicity, all the vehicles are assumed to have identical di-
mensions and acceleration/deceleration capabilities. The formal definition of the automaton
VEHICLES and the formal definition of the derived variables and sets used in its definition
are given in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1, respectively. Their informal definitions follow.
The set I is the set of vehicles being modeled in the VEHICLES automaton. Each vehicle is
identified by an element of this set. As described in Section 3.1, the set J is the set of ports
that are used by the VEHICLES automaton to interact with the various protectors. In this
setting, each of the protectors uses a single port to interact with the VEHICLES automaton.
Therefore, the port index is often used to specify the protector itself.
The output variables of the VEHICLES automaton are the variables zi, for i E I, the vari-
ables ii, for i E I, and the variables collided(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i' $ i. Each of the variables zi,
for i E I, is the position of the vehicle i. The position of each vehicle i, for i E I, is repre-
sented by a single point on the real line, i.e., xi e R, for i E I, and specifies the position of
the rear of the vehicle i on the track. The section of the track occupied by each vehicle i,
for i E I, often referred to as the extent of the vehicle i, is defined to be the section of track
ranging from the position of the rear of the vehicle i to the point on the track that is a
distance of e,, downstream of the rear of the vehicle i. The distance cen is the minimum
allowable separation between vehicles; that is, the length of the vehicle plus any desired ex-
tra margin specified by the system designer. The extent of each vehicle i, for i E I, is given
by the derived variable Ej; that is, Ej = [xi, Xz + c•le], for i E I. Each of the variables *i,
for i E I, is the velocity of the vehicle i. The vehicles are only allowed to move forward on
the track and, therefore, their velocities are restricted to be non-negative, i.e., ii E R >O, for
all i E I. Once a vehicle in the VEHICLES automaton has collided, its velocity is assumed
to be arbitrary.
Each output variable collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' $ i, denotes whether the vehicle i has
ever collided into the vehicle i'. For shorthand, each of the derived variables collided(i, *),
for i E I, denotes whether the vehicle i has ever collided into any of the other vehicles,
i.e., collided(i, *) = V E ~ ,i',i collided(i, i'), and each of the derived variables collided(*, i),
for i E I, denotes whether any of the other vehicles have ever collided into the vehi-
cle i, i.e., collided(*,i) = Vi~'Ei,ii collided(i',i). Moreover, each of the derived vari-
ables collided(*, i, *), for i E I, denotes whether the vehicle i has ever been involved in
a collision; that is, either whether the vehicle i has ever collided into any other vehi-
cle, or whether any other vehicle has ever collided into the vehicle i. In logical terms,
collided(*, i, *) = collided(*, i) V collided(i, *). Finally, the derived variable collided de-
notes whether any of the vehicles have ever collided among themselves, i.e., collided =
Figure 4.1 The VEHICLES automaton.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action (stuttering)
brake(i)j, for all i E I, j E J
unbrake(i)Q, for all i E I, j E J
Internal:
colliding-pair(i, i'), for all i, i' E I, i' $ i
collision-effects(i), for all i E I
brick-wall(i), for all i E I
Discrete Transitions:
brake(i)j
Eft: brake-req(i,j) := True
if -'brake(i) then
brake(i) := True
if i = 0then ~i:=0
else ii := brake
unbrake(i)j
Eft: brake-req(i, j) := False
if brake(i) A (-' Vk 6 J brake-reg(i, k)) then
brake(i) := False
ii :E [6~ming iýmaxl
Variables
Internal:
ii E R, for all i E I, initially ii E R
brake(i) E Bool, for all i E I,
initially False
brake-req(i, j) E Bool, for all i E I, j E J,
initially False
Output:
xi E R, for all i E I, initially zi E R
ii E R, for all i E I, initially ki E R
collided(i, i') E Bool, for all i, i' E I, i' # i,
initially False
subject to VALID
colliding-pair(i, i')
Pre: -collided(i, i')
A(Ei n Ei, # 0)
A(xi < min(E, n Ei,))
Eft: collided(i, i') := True
collision-effects(i)
Pre: collided(*, i, *)
Ef: ii :E R >O
ii :E R
brick-vall(i)
Pre: True
Eft: ii := 0
if brake(i) then ii := 0
else i :E [0, 4ma]
Trajectories:
for all i, i' E I, i i', collided(i, i') is constant throughout w
for all i E I and j E J, brake(i) and brake-req(i, j) are constant throughout w
for all i, i' E I, i i'
the function w.i, is integrable
for all t E TI
w(t).ii = w(O).ii + fJ, w(s).hi ds
w(t).xi = w(O).xi + f' w(s).i: ds
if -iw.collided(i, i')
A(w(t).Ei n w(t).Ei, # 0)
A(w(t).xi < min(w(t).E, n w(t).E,,))
then
t = w.ltime
subject to VALID
Vi , I collided(i, *) = Vi,it E I,4ii' collided(i, i').
The internal variables of the VEHICLES automaton are the variables ii, for i E I, the
Table 4.1 Derived variables and sets used in the definition of the VEHICLES automaton.
Ei E P(RI), defined by
Ei = [xi, xi + cien]
collided(i, *) E Bool, for i E I, defined by
collided(i,) = V collided(i, i')
P' E I,i'•i
collided(*, i) E Bool, for i E I, defined by
collided(*, i) = V collided(i', i)
i' E I,i'•i
collided(*, i, *) E Bool, for i E I, defined by
collided(*, i, *) = collided(*, i) V collided(i, *)
VALID C states(VEHICLEs), defined by
VALID ={p E states(VEHICLES)
1. $ i, i' E I, i J i' such that the set p.Ei n p.Ei, is a positive length closed
interval of R.
2. p.di Ž 0, for all i E I.
3. If -,p.collided(*, i, *) then p. i E [Emin, imaz], for all i E I.
4. If -'p.collided(*, i, *) A p.brake(i) then if p.ai = 0 then p.£i = 0 else p.ii =
Cbrake, for all i E I. I
variables brake(i), for i E I, and the variables brake-req(i, j), for i E I and j E J. Each of
the variables ;i, for i E I, is the acceleration of the vehicle i. If no vehicle collisions involving
a particular vehicle i have occurred, then (i) the acceleration of the vehicle i is bounded
above and below as follows: ii E [Emin, max], where min, Emax E R and imin < 0 < EmaS,
and (ii) if the vehicle i is braking, its acceleration is given by hi = brake,, where cbrake E R
and Emin < Cbrake < 0. The difference between the minimum acceleration and the braking
acceleration reflects a conservative estimate of the effect of a vehicle's braking system.
Once a vehicle in the VEHICLES automaton has collided, its acceleration is assumed to be
arbitrary and its braking system is assumed to be malfunctioning. Each of the boolean
variables brake(i), for i E I, denotes whether the vehicle i is braking. Each of the boolean
variables brake-req(i, j), for i E I and j E J, denotes whether the protector j is requesting
the vehicle i to brake. It is assumed that each vehicle applies its "emergency" brake while
any of the protectors is requesting it, i.e., brake(i) = Vj E j brake-req(i,j), for all i E I.
I
The input actions of the VEHICLES automaton are the environment action e and the actions
brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j, for i E I and j E J. Since the VEHICLES automaton has no
input variables, the environment action e is stuttering and its specification is omitted from
the definition of the VEHICLES automaton. Each of the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j,
for i E I and j E J, correspond to actions performed by the protector j instructing the
vehicle i to apply or release its "emergency" brake, respectively. It is important to note that
the acceleration of the vehicle i is not set by the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j unless
the variable brake(i) gets toggled by the action being performed. Therefore, the brake(i)j
and unbrake(i)j actions do not affect the acceleration of the vehicle i when brake(i) = True
and -ibrake(i) V (V j'Ejj'i brake-req(i,j')) = True, respectively.
For simplicity, the set of input actions of the VEHICLES automaton includes the actions
brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j, for i E I and j E J; that is, the VEHICLES automaton allows
each protector j, for j E J, to brake each vehicle i, for i E I. However, it is often the
case that a protector j, for some j E J, need not schedule but a subset of the actions
brake(i)j and unbrake(i)i, for i E I. In such cases, the protector j is specified as having
only the output actions that it is capable of scheduling and the remaining input actions of
the VEHICLES automaton on port j are ignored.
The discrete actions brick-wall(i), for i E I, colliding-pair(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 0 i', and
collision-effects(i), for i E I, are the internal actions of the VEHICLES automaton. Each
brick-wall(i) action, for i E I, models the instantaneous stopping of the vehicle i - as if
it hit a brick wall. Thereafter however, the vehicle i is allowed to reinitiate forward motion.
The effects of the brick-wall(i) action are to set the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and
the acceleration of the vehicle i to an arbitrary non-negative value within the prespecified
acceleration bounds. It is important to note that if the vehicle i was braking prior to the
execution of the brick-wall(i) action, the brick-wall(i) action sets the acceleration of
the vehicle i to zero. Each colliding-pair(i, i') action, for i, i' E I, i $ i', records the fact
that the vehicle i has collided into the vehicle i'. The colliding-pair(i, i') action sets the
boolean variable collided(i, i') to True. A collision between two vehicles is assumed to take
place when the vehicles have overlapping extents. However, since the trailing vehicle is the
only vehicle that can prevent the collision through braking, the collision is recorded only by
the trailing vehicle as if the trailing vehicle were the only vehicle liable for the particular
collision. Following a collision, the velocity and the acceleration of the vehicles involved
in the collision are unconstrained and each vehicle's braking system is assumed to be mal-
functioning. Each collision-effects(i) action, for i E I, models the adverse effects of a
collision involving the vehicle i and may be executed, even repeatedly, at any instant of time
following the first collision involving the vehicle i. The collision-effects(i) action sets
the velocity and the acceleration of the vehicle i to arbitrary values. The system is modeled
such that a collision allows but does not dictate immediate effects on the velocity and the
acceleration of the vehicles involved in the collision; that is, collision-effects(i) and
collision-effects(i') actions do not necessarily follow a colliding-pair(i, i') action.
All discrete actions of the VEHICLES automaton, except the collision-effects actions,
model the behavior of the vehicle as if no collisions had ever occurred. Once a vehicle has
been involved in a collision, it is unknown whether the vehicle has incurred any damage
and, therefore, its operation is uncertain. If the vehicle has not been damaged then its
operation is modeled as if the vehicle had not collided. On the other hand, if the vehicle
has been damaged, the malfunctioning vehicle apparatus is modeled by succeeding each of
the discrete actions with a collision-effects action for the malfunctioning vehicle.
The definition of the VEHICLES automaton restricts the initial states and the trajectory
states to the set VALID. The formal definition of the set VALID is given below and is
included for reference in Table 4.1.
The restriction of the states of the VEHICLES automaton to the set VALID enforces some of
the physical properties of the system. The first two conditions restrict the vehicle extents to
be non-overlapping and the vehicle velocities to be non-negative. The vehicles are, however,
allowed to "touch", i.e., their extents are allowed to intersect at a single point. The final
two properties only apply for vehicles that have not been involved in a collision. The
third condition specifies the range of allowable vehicle acceleration and the fourth condition
specifies the correct acceleration for a vehicle that is braking. Recall that once a vehicle has
collided, its velocity and acceleration are assumed to be arbitrary and its braking system is
assumed to be malfunctioning.
The trajectories of the VEHICLES automaton only affect the position, the velocity, and the
acceleration of the vehicles of the VEHICLES automaton - the remaining variables of the
VEHICLES automaton remain constant throughout the trajectories. The position and the
velocity are assumed to be the integrals of the velocity and the acceleration, respectively.
The acceleration is assumed to be changing arbitrarily throughout a trajectory with the
restriction that all states of the trajectory remain within the set VALID. Finally, if a
vehicle i collides into a vehicle i' for the first time, the trajectory is stopped so that the
collision can be recorded by a colliding-pair(i, i') action.
The VEHICLES automaton complies with the assumptions made about the PP automaton
VALID C states(VEHICLES), defined as the set of states of the VEHICLES automaton that
satisfy the following conditions:
1. ý i, i' E I, i $ i', such that the set Ei n Ei, is a positive length closed interval
of R.
2. ii > 0, for all i E I.
3. If -collided(*, i, *) then ii E [Emin,, Emax], for all i E I.
4. If -collided(*, i, *) A brake(i) then if ii = 0 then ii = 0 else Si = brake, for all
i E I.
in Section 3.2.1. The VEHICLES automaton has neither input variables, nor output actions,
on any of its ports (Axioms 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively). Moreover, the actions brake(i)j
and unbrake(i)j, for each vehicle i E I satisfying the conditions brake-req(i,j) = True and
brake-req(i, j) = False, respectively, are no-op input actions on port j for any R C VALID.
Therefore, the set of no-op input actions on each port j E J and any R C VALID is
non-empty (Axiom 3.2.3).
4.2 Sets of Guarantee and Reliance for the VEHICLES
Automaton
The protectors presented in the following chapters are designed to guarantee that the VEHI-
CLES automaton remains within sets of states that are considered "good". In other words,
the protectors are designed to keep the VEHICLES automaton from reaching states that are
considered "bad" or hazardous. Bad or hazardous states involve vehicles that are either
above the speed limit, or that have collided with each other. Sets of states that are con-
sidered "good" are informally referred to as sets of guarantee. Moreover, it is often the
case that protectors rely on the restriction of the states of the VEHICLES automaton to sets
comprised of states that exhibit particular properties of the VEHICLES automaton. Such
sets of states are informally referred to as sets of reliance.
In the case of exceeding the speed limit, the set Poverspeed(i) is the subset of VALID comprised
of the states in which the vehicle i is above the speed limit. Let the maximum allowable
velocity be given by 6max.
Poverspeed(i) C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Poverspeed(i) = {P E VALID I p.ij > 6max}-
Then the set Poverspeed = Ui E I Poverspeed(i) is the subset of VALID comprised of the states
in which at least one of the vehicles is above the speed limit, and the set Pot-overspeed =
VALID - Poverspeed is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in which none of the
vehicles are above the speed limit.
In the case of vehicle collisions, the set Pcollided(i,i,) is the subset of VALID comprised of the
states in which the vehicle i has collided into the vehicle i'.
Pcollided(i,i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
Pcollided(i,i') = {P E VALID I p.collided(i, i') = True}.
Then the set Pollided(i) = Uil E I,i'#i Pcollided(i,i') is the subset of VALID comprised of the
states in which the vehicle i has collided into at least one of the other vehicles. Moreover, the
set Pcollided = Ui E I Pcollided(i) = U;ii E I,iti' Pcollided(i,i') is the subset of VALID comprised
of the states in which at least two distinct vehicles have collided into each other. Finally,
Table 4.2 Sets of guarantee and reliance for the VEHICLES automaton.
Poverspeed(i) C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Poverspeed(i) = {P E VALID I p.ki > cmax}
Poverspeed C VALID, defined by
Poverspeed = U Poverspeed(i)
iEI
Pnot-overspeed C VALID, defined by
Pnot-overspeed = VALID - Poverspeed
Pcollided(i,i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
Pcollided(i,i') = {p E VALID I p.collided(i, i') = True}
Pcollided(i) C_ VALID, defined by
Pcollided(i) =  U Pcollided(i,i')
i' E I,i'•i
Pcollided C VALID, defined by
Pcollided = U Pcollided(i) = U Pcollided(i,i')
i E I i,iO E I,it-i'
Pnot-collided C- VALID, defined by
Pnot-collided = VALID - Pcollided
the set Pnot-collided = VALID - Pcollided is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in
which none of the vehicles have collided among themselves.
The sets of guarantee and reliance defined in this section comply with the assumptions
made in Section 3.2.1; that is, the sets of guarantee and reliance defined in this section are
YVEHICLES-determinable (Axioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7).
For reference, the formal definitions of the sets of guarantee and reliance defined above
appear in Table 4.2. These sets are extensively used in the definitions of the overspeed and
collision protectors presented in the following chapters.
Table 4.3 Auxiliary derived variables for the VEHICLES automaton.
stop-disti E R!>0 , for all i E I, defined by
'2
stop-disti = - ---2Cbrake
max-rangei(t) E RO, for all i E I and t E IRo, defined by
max-rangei(t) = I
XiAt + C,1maxAt 2 + ,max(t - At),
where At = min (t, ei)
XiAt + ½~brakeAt2 + 6max(t - At),
where At = min (t, C••MaL
if ii < cma,, and
otherwise.
max-veli(t) E R1>o, for all i E I and t E R10!, defined by
max-veli(t) = in(nax, ii + t
max(cmaz, ii + tCbrake)
if ;i < cmax, and
otherwise.
Oi C_ R, for all i E I, defined by
Oi = [zi, xi + stop-disti + cl,,]
Ci(t) C R, for all i E I and t E IR 0, defined by
Ci(t) = [xi,xi + max-rangei(t) - max-veli(t)2 /(2cbrake) + c,en]
4.3 Auxiliary Derived Variables and Auxiliary Sets for the
VEHICLES Automaton
This section presents several auxiliary derived variables and sets for the VEHICLES automa-
ton. These variables and sets are used extensively in the following chapters.
For any state p in VALID, the auxiliary derived variables for any vehicle i E I and time
t E R >-O are defined in Table 4.3. If the vehicle i is abiding by the global speed limit max,,
then the derived variables of Table 4.3 can be interpreted as follows:
stop-distj, for i E I, is the distance required to stop the vehicle i, assuming a braking
deceleration equal to Ebrake.
max-rangei(t), for i E I and t E R > o- , is the maximum distance the vehicle i can travel in t
time units, assuming a maximum acceleration equal to im,x.
max-vel4(t), for i E I and t E R >0 , is the maximum velocity achievable by the vehicle i in t
time units, assuming a maximum acceleration equal to E.max.
Oi, for i E I, is the section of the track that the vehicle i "owns"; that is, the range
extending from the current position of the vehicle i to the point on the track that the
vehicle can reach even if it is braked immediately.
Ci(t), for i E I and t E R 0o, is the section of the track that the vehicle i "claims" within t
time units; that is, the range extending from the current position of the vehicle i to
the point on the track that the vehicle i can reach if it is braked after t time units
and assuming worst-case vehicle behavior up to the point in time when it is braked.
We now define sets of states of the VEHICLES automaton that are used extensively in the
following example protector chapters. While their formal definitions appear in Table 4.4,
their informal interpretations are presented below. It is important to note that the in-
terpretations of the sets disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') and disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t), for
i, i' E I, i i', and t E R >o, are valid provided that all the vehicles of the VEHICLES
automaton are abiding by the global speed limit e•m•x.
disjoint-extents(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 0 i', is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in
which the extents of the vehicles i and i' are disjoint. We use PE to denote the set of
states in which the extents of all the vehicles are disjoint.
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 5 i', is the subset of VALID comprised of the
states in which the sections of the track owned by the vehicles i and i' are disjoint.
We use Po to denote the set of states in which all vehicles own disjoint sections of the
track. If a state of the VEHICLES automaton is not in Po, then it cannot be guaranteed
that the vehicles will not collide in the future; that is, irrespective of any protection
action taken, it is possible for some vehicles to collide.
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i',t), for i, i' E I, i 4 i', and t E R>0 , is the subset of VALID
comprised of the states in which the sections of the track claimed within t time units
by the vehicles i and i' are disjoint. We use Pc(t) to denote the set of states in which
the sections of the track claimed within t time units by all the vehicles are disjoint. If
a state of the VEHICLES automaton is not in Pc(t) and no protective action is taken
for t time units, then it cannot be guaranteed that the vehicles will subsequently not
collide; that is, irrespective of any protection action taken after t time units, it is
possible for some of the vehicles to collide.
Furthermore, let PBij be the subset of VALID comprised of the states in which the protector
communicating with the VEHICLES automaton through the port j is requesting the vehicle i
to brake, i.e., PBij = {p E VALID I p.brake-req(i,j) = True).
Table 4.4 Auxiliary sets for the VEHICLES automaton.
disjoint-extents(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
disjoint-extents(i, i') = {p E VALID I p.Es n p.Ei, = 0}
PE C VALID, defined I
PE='
E~' I,46i'
disjoint-extents(i, i')
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') = {p E VALID I p.Oi n p.Oi, = 0}
Po C_ VALID, defined by
Po = n di
i,iX E I,ifi'
sjoint-owned-tracks(i, i')
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t) C VALID, for i, i' E I, i - i', and t E RŽo- , defined by
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i',t) = {p E VALID I p.Ci(t) np.Ci'(t) = }
Pc(t) C VALID, for t E Rý0 , defined by
Pc(t) = n disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t)
i,i' E I,ifi'
PB*j C VALID, defined by
PBj, = {p E VALID I p.brake-req(i, j) = True}
4.4 Useful Lemmas for the VEHICLES Automaton
In this section we prove several useful lemmas that describe particular properties of the
VEHICLES automaton and its derived variables.
Lemma 4.4.1 For all p E VALID, i E I, and t E Ro0 , the following hold:
1. p.stop-disti > 0.
2. p.max-rangei(t) > 0.
3. p.max-ve4.(t) > 0.
4. If p.ki = 0 then p.stop-disti = 0.
5. p.maz-rangei(0) = 0.
6. p.max-ve4l(0) = p.xi.
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of the auxiliary derived variables stop-disti,
max-rangei(r), and max-ve4l(r), for r E R - O. U
Lemma 4.4.2 For all p E VALID, i E I, and t, t' E R 0o, t < t', the following hold:
1. p.E C_ p.O1 C p.Ci(t).
2. p.xi = min(p.Ei) = min(p.Oi) = min(p.Ci(t)).
3. p.OQ = p.Ci(0).
4. p.C(t) C p.C(t').
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of the derived variables Ei, Oi, and Ci(r), for
7r E R> .
Lemma 4.4.3 If p, p' E VALID, where p' follows from p in a single discrete action, then
the following hold:
1. p'.Oi C p.Oi if and only if p'.i < p.i•i.
2. p'.Ci(t) C p.Ci(t), for any t E RŽo, if and only if p'.id < p.di.
Proof: We prove each of the above statements separately.
1. Recall that Oi = [xi, xi + stop-disti + clen]. Since none of the actions of the VEHICLES
automaton affect the position of a vehicle, it follows that p'.xi = p.xi. Therefore, the
intervals p.Oi and p'.Oi have the same left endpoint, i.e., min(p.0i) = min(p'.Oi).
Moreover, since the variable stop-dist1 is positively correlated with the velocity of the
vehicle i, it follows that p'.stop-disti < p.stop-disti if and only if p'.ii 5 p.di; that is,
max(p'.Oi) 5 max(p.Oi) if and only if p'.ii p.-ii.
Since min(p.Oi) = min(p'.Oi) and max(p'.Oi) < max(p.Oi) if and only if p'.ii 5 P.ii,
it follows that p'.Oi C p.Oi if and only if p'.ii 5 P.-i.
2. Recall that Ci(t) = [zi, zi + max-rangei(t) - max-veli(t)2 /(2ibrake) + clen], for any
t E Ro0 . As shown above, it is the case that p'.xi = p.xi and, therefore, the intervals
p.Ci(t) and p'.Ci(t) have the same left endpoint, i.e., min(p.Ci(t)) = min(p'.Ci(t)).
Now, consider the right endpoints of p.Ci(t) and p'.C,(t). The variables maz-range;
and max-vell are positively correlated with the velocity of the vehicle i and, therefore,
it follows that max(p'.Ci(t)) 5 max(p.Ci(t)) if and only if p'.ii <5 P-i.
Since min(p.Ci(t)) = min(p'.Ci(t)) and max(p'.Ci(t)) 5 max(p.Ci(t)) if and only if
p'.ii • p.ii, for any t E R >o, it follows that p'.Ci(t) C p.Ci(t), for any t E R>O, if and
only if p'.ii _ P.,i.
Lemma 4.4.4 If p, p' E VALID, where p' follows from p in a single trajectory, then the
following hold:
1. If p E PBi3 then p'.Oi C p.Oi.
2. If t E R>o and At E [0, t] is the limit time of the trajectory leading from p to p', then
p'.C2(t - At) g p.Ci(t).
Proof: We prove each of the above statements separately.
1. Let p E PB1, and consider the left and right endpoints of the intervals p.Oi and p'.Oi.
The left endpoints of p.Oi and p'.Oi are p.xi and p'.xi, respectively. Therefore, due to
the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities, it is the case that p.xi < p'.xi;
that is, min(p.Oi) < min(p'.Oi).
Since p E PBij and because the brake-req(i,j) variable remains constant throughout
any trajectory of the VEHICLES automaton, the vehicle i keeps braking throughout
the trajectory from p to p'. From the definition of the variable stop-disti it follows
that p.xi +p.stop-disti = p'.xi + p.stop-disti and, therefore, the right endpoints of p.Oi
and p'.Oi are equal; that is, max(p'.Oi) = max(p.Oi).
Since min(p.0i) 5 min(p'.0i) and max(p'.0i) = max(p.Oi), we can easily conclude
from the definition of Oi that p'.Oi C p.Oi.
2. Let t E R>0 and At E [0, t] be the limit time of the trajectory leading from p to p'
and consider the left and right endpoints of the intervals p.Ci(t) and p'.Ci(t - At).
The left endpoints of p.Ci(t) and p'.Ci(t - At) are p.xi and p'.xi, respectively. There-
fore, due to the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities, it is the case that
p.xi < p'.xi; that is, min(p.Ci(t)) 5 min(p'.Ci(t - At)).
Since the variables max-rangei and max-veli represent the worst case behavior of the
system it is the case that p'.xi < p.xi + p.max-rangei(At) and p'.ii < p.max-veli(At).
Since the variables max-rangei and max-veli are positively correlated with the velocity
of the vehicle i and p'.ii < p.max-ve4l(At), it follows that p'.xi + p'.max-rangei(t -
At) < p.xi + p.max-rangei(t) and p'.max-ve4-(t - At) < p.max-veli(t). Therefore, the
right endpoint of p.Ci(t) is at least as downstream as the right endpoint of p'.Ci(t-At);
that is, max(p.Ci(t - At)) 5 max(p.Ci(t)).
Since min(p.Ci(t)) • min(p'.Ci(t - At)) and max(p'.Ci(t - At)) < max(p.Ci(t)), we
can easily conclude from the definition of Ci(r), for r E R -O, that p'.Ci(t - At) _
p.Ci(t).
Lemma 4.4.5 For all t, t' E R > o, t < t', the following hold:
1. Pc(t) _ Po C PE.
2. Pc(to ) F Pc(t).
Proof: Follow from Lemma 4.4.2 and the definitions of PE, Po, and PC(,), for r E R > ° g
Chapter 5
Example 1:
Overspeed Protection System
In this chapter, we present a protector that prevents the vehicles of the VEHICLES automaton
from exceeding a prespecified speed limit. In an actual system, speed limits may vary from
one region of the track to another; in this thesis, we assume a single global speed limit cmax.
We define a protector, called OS-PROT, that enforces the speed limit on all vehicles, provided
that they do not collide among themselves. This protector is defined as the composition
of n separate copies of another protector called OS-PROT-SOLOi, one copy for each vehicle
i E I. Each of the OS-PROT-SOLOi protectors, for i E I, is an implementation of a particular
instantiation of the abstract protector automaton of Section 3.2 and guarantees that the
vehicle i does not exceed the speed limit.
5.1 Protection System OS-PROT-SOLOi
The OS-PROT-SOLOi automata, for i E I, are vehicle-wise overspeed protectors, each of
which individually guarantees that the vehicle i, for which it is responsible, does not exceed
the speed limit m,,,, provided that no collisions among the vehicles occur. Each of the
OS-PROT-SOLOi protectors, for i E I, is an implementation of the abstract protector of
Section 3.2 specialized to particular definitions of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d.
The physical plant automaton, PP, is defined to be the VEHICLES automaton of Figure 4.1.
The port j and the sampling period d are defined to be the port and sampling period with
which the protector OS-PRoT-SOLOi communicates with the VEHICLES automaton. They
are assumed arbitrary and are fixed for the rest of the chapter. The set R is defined to be
the set Pozt-collided defined in Section 4.2. This definition restricts the reachable states of the
VEHICLES automaton to states in which no collisions among the vehicles have occurred. The
set of "good" states G is defined to be the set of states in which the vehicle i is at or below
the speed limit, i.e., G = VALID - Powerspeed(i). The set of states S is defined to be the set
safepp,R,G,j defined in Section 3.2.1; that is, the set of states of the PP automaton for which
a single input action of PP on port j can guarantee that, provided no new input actions
on port j are allowed, all subsequently R-reachable states will be in G. In Section 3.2.1,
the definition of safe depended on the automaton PP, the sets R and G, and the port j
which, at the time, were arbitrary. Here, they are defined to be the automaton VEHICLES,
the sets Pnot-collided and VALID- Poverpeed(i), and the port j, respectively; that is, we have
specialized the definition of safe for these particular definitions of the automaton PP, the
sets R and G, and the port j. In this chapter, we will use the notation Ri, Gi, and Si to
refer to the above definitions of the sets R, G, and S.
The OS-PROT-SOLOi protector automaton is an implementation of the abstract protector
automaton Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d). As is the case for the abstract protector automa-
ton Absj, we define the OS-PROT-SOLOi automaton to be the composition of a sensor and a
discrete controller automaton. These automata are implementations of their abstract equiv-
alents of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, specialized however, to the above definitions of the parameters
PP, S, R, G, j, and d. The sensor automaton is precisely the specialization of the sensor
automaton of Figure 3.2 to the above definitions of the parameters PP, etc. The discrete
controller automaton is defined in Figure 5.1.
It is important to note that the abstract protector automaton Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d)
complies with the assumptions made about the abstract protector in Section 3.2.1. In partic-
ular, since the vehicle velocity variables are output variables of the VEHICLES automaton, the
set safe is YVEHICLES-determinable and actions that guarantee safety can be determined from
the output variables YVEHICLES of the VEHICLES automaton (Axioms 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, respec-
tively). Moreover, the sets Ri and Gi are YVEHICLES-determinable (Axioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7,
respectively) and the set of start states Si is a subset of the set safe (Axiom 3.2.8), since Si
is defined to be the set safe.
In Section 3.1 it was shown that the abstract protector Absj guarantees that the physical
plant PP remains within G starting from S given R. Similarly, the OS-PROT-SOLOi automa-
ton guarantees that VEHICLES remains within Gi starting from Si given Ri. This is shown
in the following section.
5.2 Correctness of OS-PROT-SOLOi
The main result to be shown is that OS-PRoT-SOLOi <• Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). How-
ever, since both OS-PROT-SOLOi and Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d) involve the composition
of the same sensor automaton with distinct discrete controller automata, Theorem 2.7.4 ap-
plies. Therefore, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi
of Figure 5.1 implements the discrete controller automaton DC(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d) of
Figure 5.1 Discrete controller automaton for the protector OS-PROT-SOLOi.
Actions: Input: e, the environment action (stuttering)
snapshot(y)j, for each valuation y of YVEHICLES
Output: brake(i)j
unbrake(i)j
Variables: Internal: sendj E {brake, unbrake, null}, initially null
Discrete Transitions:
snapshot(y)j
Eff: if (y.di < E:max - dm,,ax) then
sendj := unbrake
else
sendj := brake
brake(i)j unbrake(i)j
Pre: sendj = brake Pre: sendj = unbrake
Eff: sendj := null Eff: sendj := null
Trajectories:
w.sendj - null
Figure 3.3. According to Theorem 2.6.1, this follows by showing that there exists a simula-
tion relation between the states of the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi and
DC(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). We first give some useful set definitions, then prove some
lemmas, and finally show the existence of such a simulation relation.
In this section, we use the notation futurei, safei, very-safei, and delay-safei to denote the
specialization of the function future, the sets safe and very-safe, and the function delay-safe,
which are defined in Section 3.2.1, to the automaton VEHICLES, the sets Ri and Gi, and
the port j of the OS-PROT-SOLOi protector. Moreover, since the environment action of
the VEHICLES automaton is stuttering, its consideration is omitted in all inductive proofs
involving the PP automaton.
We proceed by defining several sets that are used in the correctness proof of the protector
OS-PROT-SOLOi. For reference, their formal definitions appear in Table 5.1.
Let Wi be the set of states of the VEHICLES automaton in which none of the vehicles have
collided and the vehicle i is at or below the speed limit; that is, Wi = Ri n Gi. Let
Vi be the set of states of the VEHICLES automaton in which none of the vehicles have
collided, the vehicle i is at or below the speed limit, and the protector j is requesting the
Table 5.1 Sets used in the correctness proof of OS-PROT-SOLO i .
Wi C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Wi = Ri nGi
Vi _ VALID, for i E I, defined by
Vi = Ri nGi n PBi,
Ti C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Ti = {p E Ri n Gi I p.-i < 6mai - d6max}
vehicle i to brake; that is, Vi = Ri n Gi n PBij. Furthermore, let Ti be the set of states
of the VEHICLES automaton in which none of the vehicles have collided, the vehicle i is
at or below the speed limit, and the condition ii 5 cm,, - d•max is satisfied; that is,
Ti = {p E Ri n Gi p.ii < 6max - dmax}.
In the following lemma, we show that if we restrict the states of the VEHICLES automaton
to the set Ri and consider a state in which the vehicle i is at or below the speed limit and is
being requested to brake by the protector j, then, provided that no new protective actions
are issued by the protector j, the vehicle i remains at or below the speed limit thereafter.
Lemma 5.2.1 futurei(Vi,R >ao) C Gi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLES automaton of n steps and trajec-
tories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Vi, is only comprised of states in Ri, and
involves no input actions on port j. Letting piit and Pfinal be the initial and final states of
a, respectively, we must show that Pfina E Gi. The proof is by induction on the length n of
the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, pfial = Pinit-
Since pinit E Vi and Vi C Gi, it follows that pfinal E Gi.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, then pfi,nl E Gi. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if
p'fina1 is the final state of a', then it is the case that pCnal E Gi. Since the final state of a is
reached from the final state of a' by a single step or trajectory, the inductive step involves
the consideration of all possible steps and trajectories leading from pl to Pfinal-
In the case of a step, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero. Therefore, it
trivially follows that Pfinal E Gi.
3. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' $ i", and collision-eff ects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri; recall that
Ri - Pnot-collided.
4. the actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i'),, for i' E I,j' e J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I, i" 0 i, do not affect the velocity of the vehicle i; that is, pfial.di = P),-al"i.
From the induction hypothesis we have that pal E Gi and, therefore, it follows that
Pfinal E Gi.
In the case of a trajectory, since the execution fragment a starts in a state in Vi C PBi_ and
the only action that can set the brake-req(i, j) variable to False is not enabled throughout
a, all states in a are in PBij; that is, the vehicle i keeps braking throughout the execution
fragment a. Therefore, since the vehicle i in state pal is in Gi, i.e., at or below the speed
limit, and the vehicle i is braking throughout the trajectory from pial to Pfnal, it trivially
follows that the velocity of the vehicle i in Pfinal will be at or below the speed limit; that is,
Pfinal E Gi. N
In the following two lemmas, we use Lemma 5.2.1 to show that V1 C very-safei and Vi C
delay-safei(t), for any t E R °o, respectively.
Lemma 5.2.2 Vi C very-safei .
Proof: From the definition of very-safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that the condition
futurei(Vi, R>0 ) C Gi is satisfied. This follows directly from Lemma 5.2.1. i
Lemma 5.2.3 For any t E R 0o, it is the case that Vi C delay-safe,(t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 5.2.2 and Lemma 3.2.5, part 1. 1
In the following two lemmas and the subsequent corollary, we show that the sets Wi and
safei are equal. First, we show that Wi C safei and safei C Wi. Then the fact that
Wi = safei follows trivially.
Lemma 5.2.4 Wi C safei .
Proof: From the definition of safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that any state p E Wi
satisfies: (i) futurei(p,0) C Gi, and (ii) there exists some action r such that for every
p',p" E Ri satisfying p' E futurei(p, 0) and p' - p", it is the case that p" E very-safei .
For the first condition, let a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLES automaton of n
steps, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Wi, is only comprised of states in Ri, involves
no input actions on port j, and has a limit time equal to zero. Letting pi,,i and Pfinat be
the initial and final states of a, respectively, we must show that Pfinal E Gi.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of no steps and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit Since pinit E Wi,
it follows that Pfi,•a E Gi.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, then Pfinal E Gi. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if p'final is the final
state of a', then it is the case that Pa,,i E Gi. Since the final state of a is reached from the
final state of a' by a single step, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible
steps leading from p't to Pfinal-
To complete the induction, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero. Therefore, it
trivially follows that Pfina E Gi.
3. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' 0 i", and collision-effects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri; recall that
Ri = Pnot-collided.
4. the actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')j,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' / j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I, i"? i, do not affect the velocity of the vehicle i; that is, Pinal.Xi = Pinalt-xi
However, from the induction hypothesis, it is the case that PlI E Gi. Therefore, it
trivially follows that Pfinal E Gi.
For the second condition, consider the action r = brake(i)3 . The effect of this action is
to set the internal variable brake-req(i,j) to True. Therefore, it is the case that p" E PB3j.
From the proof of the first condition, it is the case that p' E Gi, and since the brake(i)j
action does not affect the velocity of the vehicle i, it is also the case that p" E Gi. From the
above conditions and the fact that p" E Ri, it follows that p" E Vi. Finally, Lemma 5.2.2
implies that p" E very-safei, as needed. I
Lemma 5.2.5 safei C Wi.
Proof: From Lemma 3.2.4, part 1, and the definition of safe in Section 3.2.1, it is the case
that safei C Gi and safei C Ri, respectively. It trivially follows that safei C W1 . I
Corollary 5.2.6 Wi = safei.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. U
In the next three lemmas, we show that any state p in the set Ti is in the set delay-safei(d);
that is, any state Ri-reachable from p within an amount of time d through an execution
fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set Gi and any state Ri-reachable
from the state p in exactly an amount of time d through an execution fragment that involves
no input actions on port j, is in the set safei .
Lemma 5.2.7 futurei(Ti, [0, d]) C Gi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLES automaton of n steps and trajec-
tories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Ti, is only comprised of states in Ri, involves
no input actions on port j, and has a limit time t that lies in the interval [0, d]. Letting pinit
and Pfinat be the initial and final states of a, respectively, we must show that Pfinal E Gi.
We use induction on the length n of the execution fragment a and the assertion pfinal-.i <
Pinit-.i + tEmax to show that Pfinar E Gi.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfin,, = Pinit
and Pfia,,l.i = Pinit-ii. Moreover, since t = 0, it is the case that timax = 0. It trivially
follows that pfin,,abi < Pinit.Xi + tCmax.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k+1, for
some k E N, then Pfinal.,i < Pinit.,i + timax. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment
a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves the
assertion that if pinit and p'inal are the initial and final states of a', respectively, and
t' E [0, t] is the limit time of a', then it is the case that p~nat-fi • Pi~n.ki + t'Cmax. Since
the final state of a is reached from the final state of a' by a single step or trajectory, the
inductive step involves the consideration of all possible steps and trajectories leading from
pfnal to pfinal.
In the case of a step, keeping in mind that the limit times of a' and a are equal, i.e., t' = t,
we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)i and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and since all ve-
hicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it follows that Pfiea.ri _< P' inar.i"
Moreover, from the induction hypothesis, we have p i piji + ti'mar. Since
Piait = Plait and t = t', it follows that pfinal-• i < Pinit.-i + timax.
3. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' i", and collision-effects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri; recall that
Ri = Pnot-collided.
4. the actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')j,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I, i" : i, do not affect the velocity of the vehicle i; that is, Pfinal-• i = P'inal.i
Moreover, from the induction hypothesis we have p'nal-i • PAnit.i + t'Emax. Since
Pinit = Pnit and t = t', it follows that Pfnai.Xi < pinit..i + tEmax.
In the case of a trajectory, since the change in velocity is equal to the integral of the
acceleration and the acceleration is bounded from above by the quantity i• ma, it is the case
that piA•i Pa5,,l•i + (t - t')Emax. Moreover, from the induction hypothesis we have
P'in••"i i p .di + tQma. Since pint = p:j, it follows that Pfinal-.i <5 Pinit.i + timax. This
result completes the induction.
Since Pinit E Ti, it is the case that Pinit.ii • 6max - dicmax. Moreover, from the above
induction we have Pfinal.Xi < Pinit-.i + tOimax. Therefore, pfial.i :< cmax - (d - t)=max, and
since d-t > 0 and Emax > 0, it follows that Pfinalt-i •5 Cmax; that is, Pfinal E Gi, as needed. U
Lemma 5.2.8 futurei(Ti,0) C Ti.
Proof: From Lemma 5.2.4 and the definition of Ti it is the case that Ti g safei . Therefore,
from Lemma 3.2.4, part 2, it follows that futurei(Ti, 0) _ safei. Moreover, Lemma 5.2.5
implies that futurei(Ti, 0) C Wi. It remains to be shown that for all p,p' E Ri such that
p E Ti and p' E futurei(p, 0), it is the case that p'.i : 5 •mnax - di•max.
Because of the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities, the only discrete action
that could potentially increase the velocity of the vehicle i is the collision-effects(i)
action. However, the collision-effects(i) action is not enabled because the function
futurei(p, 0) only considers Ri-reachable states. If follows that p'.ii < p..i. Moreover, since
p E Ti, it is the case that p.zii 5 ,max - dEmaz. It trivially follows that p'.ii !< ,max - dma,,,
as needed. I
Lemma 5.2.9 Ti g delay-safei(d).
Proof: We must show that futurei(Ti, [0, d]) C Gi and futurei(Ti, d) C safei. The first condi-
tion follows directly from Lemma 5.2.7. For the second condition, from Lemma 3.2.1, part 1,
we have that futurei(Ti, d) C futurei(Ti, [0, d]). Therefore, from Lemma 5.2.7 it follows that
futurei(Ti, d) C Gi. Moreover, since futurei(Ti, d) restricts the reachable states to the set
Ri, it is the case that futurei(Ti
, d) g Ri. Therefore, it is the case that futurei(Ti, d) C Wi
and from Lemma 5.2.4 it follows that futurei(Ti, d) C safei, as needed. 0
In the following lemma, we show that the OS-PROT-SOLOi protector implements the protec-
tor Abs(vEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). Since the protector automata OS-PROT-SOLOi and Absj
involve the composition of the same sensor automaton with distinct controller automata,
it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of the protector OS-PROT-SOLOi
implements the discrete controller automaton DC(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d).
Lemma 5.2.10 OS-PROT-SOLOi, Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j,d).
Proof: As noted above, both the OS-PROT-SOLOi and the Absj protectors involve the com-
position of the same sensor automaton with distinct controller automata. From Theo-
rem 2.7.4, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi
implements DCj. This is shown by a simulation from the discrete controller automaton of
OS-PROT-SOLOi to DCj.
The mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi
and DCj is almost the identity. In the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi,
the variable sendj is equal to either one of the labels brake and unbrake, or the value null.
In the abstract discrete controller automaton, these valuations simply map to either the
actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j, or the value null, respectively.
The start states for the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi and DCj are the
states in which sendj = null. These are mapped to each other according to the mapping
discussed above.
Furthermore, since the trajectories in both discrete controller automata are identical, we
need only consider their discrete transitions. We analyze the actions of the implementation
by cases, letting p denote any complete state of the VEHICLES automaton that corresponds
to y, i.e., p E VALID and p[YvEHICLES = y.
1. The snapshot(y)j action of the implementation sets sendj to brake, or unbrake. In
order to show that the behavior of the implementation is allowed by the specification,
we must show that the input action snapshot(y)j of the implementation sets the
value of the sendj variable in such a way that the subsequently enabled action r of
the implementation (i) guarantees that for all p', p" E Ri such that p' E futurei(p, 0)
and p' _-- p", it is the case that p" E delay-safei(d), if p E safei , and (ii) is an arbitrary
output action of the implementation, otherwise.
First, consider the case in which p E safei . Since Corollary 5.2.6 implies that p E Wi,
the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi sets the variable sendj according
to whether the state p is in Ti, or not.
On one hand, if p 0 Ti then the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi
sets the variable sendj to brake and the brake(i)j action is enabled. However, since
p E safei, Lemma 3.2.4, part 2, implies that p' E safei and from Corollary 5.2.6 it
follows that p' E Wi. Moreover, since the brake(i)j action sets the brake-req(i,j)
variable to True and affects neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any of the
collided variables, it is the case that p" E Ri n Gi n PBij, i.e., p" E Vi. Finally, from
Lemma 5.2.3, it follows that p" E delay-safei(d), as needed.
On the other hand, if p E Ti then the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi
sets the variable sendj to unbrake and the unbrake(i)j action is enabled. From
Lemma 5.2.8, it follows that p' E Ti. Moreover, since the unbrake(i)j action sets the
brake-req(i,j) variable to False and affects neither the velocity of the vehicle i, nor
any of the collided variables, it is the case that p" E Ti. Finally, from Lemma 5.2.9, it
follows that p" E delay-safei(d), as needed.
Next, consider the case in which p V safe,. In this case, the snapshot(y)i action of
the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi sets the variable sendj to either
brake or unbrake and, subsequently, enables either the action brake(i)j or the action
unbrake(i)j. However, when p .safei, the DCj automaton sets the variable sendj
arbitrarily and, subsequently, enables an arbitrary output action. Therefore, the
behavior of the discrete controller automaton of OS-PROT-SOLOi is allowed by that of
the DCj automaton.
Therefore, the effects of the snapshot(y)j action of the implementation are allowed
by its specification.
2. The brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j actions have identical effects in both discrete controller
automata. When the sendj variable matches the labels brake and unbrake, or the
actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j, the respective action is performed and the send,
variable is set to the value null in both discrete controller automata.
3. The environment action in both discrete controller automata is stuttering. It fol-
lows that the mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of
OS-PROT-SOLOi and the DC i automaton prior to and succeeding the execution of the
environment action remains the same.
Corollary 5.2.11 The protector OS-PROT-SOLOi guarantees Gi in the VEHICLES automa-
ton starting from Si given Ri.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 5.2.10 and Theorem 3.2.9. U
Table 5.2 Formal definitions of OS-PROT, Gos-PROT, SOS-PROT, and ROS-PROT.
OS-PROT fE OS-PROT-SOLOi
iEI
Gos-nPRoT Gi
iEl
SOS-PROT n Si
iEI
Ros-PROT Prot-collided
5.3 Protection System OS-PROT
We now define the overspeed protector OS-PROT. As in the vehicle-wise case, we restrict
the states of the VEHICLES automaton to the set Pnot-collided as defined in Section 4.2, i.e.,
ROS-PROT = Pot-collided. Let Gos-PROT and Sos-PROT be the intersection of the sets Gi and Si,
for all i E I, respectively, and OS-PROT be the composition of the protectors OS-PROT-SOLOi,
for all i E I. The protector OS-PROT guarantees that the VEHICLES automaton remains
within GOS-PROT starting from SOS-PROT given Ros-PROT. For reference, The formal definition
of the OS-PROT automaton and of the sets Gos-PROT, SOS-PROT, and ROS-PROT are shown in
Table 5.2.
Corollary 5.3.1 The protector OS-PROT guarantees GOS-PROT in the VEHICLES automaton
starting from SOS-PROT given ROS-PROT.
Proof: Follows directly from Corollary 5.2.11 and Theorem 3.1.4. U

Chapter 6
Example 2:
Collision Avoidance on a Single
Track
This chapter is similar to Chapter 5; instead of an overspeed protector, here we present
a collision protector for the VEHICLES automaton. We define the protector CL-PROT that
guarantees that none of the vehicles collide, provided that they are all abiding by the
speed limit. The CL-PROT protector is defined as the composition of n separate copies
of another protector called CL-PROT-SOLOi, one copy for each vehicle i E I. Each of the
CL-PROT-SOLOi protectors, for i E I, is an implementation of a particular instantiation of
the abstract protector automaton of Section 3.2 and guarantees that the vehicle i does not
collide into any of the vehicles it trails.
6.1 Protection System CL-PROT-SOLOi
The CL-PROT-SOLOi automata are vehicle-wise collision protectors and individually guar-
antee that the vehicle i does not collide into any of the vehicles it trails, provided that all
vehicles are abiding by the speed limit and that all other vehicles i' E I, i' 5 i, do not collide
into any of the vehicles they respectively trail. Each of the CL-PROT-SOLOi protectors, for
i E I, is an implementation of the abstract protector of Section 3.2 specialized to particular
definitions of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d.
The physical plant automaton, PP, is defined to be the VEHICLES automaton of Figure 4.1.
The port j and the sampling period d are defined to be the port and sampling period with
which the protector CL-PROT-SOLOi communicates with the VEHICLES automaton and are
assumed arbitrary. The set of "good" states G is defined to be the set of states in which the
vehicle i has not collided into any of the other vehicles, i.e., G = VALID- Peollided(i). In this
chapter, we use the notation Gi to refer to this definition of the set G. The set R is defined
to be the set R = Pnot-o,,erspeed f (n i, E I,i'i Gil). This definition restricts the states of the
VEHICLES automaton to states in which all of the vehicles are abiding by the speed limit
and in which each of the remaining vehicles has never collided into any other vehicle. The
set of states S is defined to be the set safe defined in Section 3.2.1; that is, the set of states
of the PP automaton for which a single input action of PP on port j can guarantee that,
provided no new input actions on port j are allowed, all subsequently R-reachable states
will be in G. Once again, the definition of the set safe is specialized to the above definitions
of the automaton PP, the sets R and G, and the port j. In this chapter, we use the notation
Ri and Si to refer to the above definitions of the sets R and S.
The CL-PROT-SOLOi protector automaton is an implementation of the abstract protector
automaton Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri,, G,j, d). More precisely, as is the case for the abstract
protector Absj, we define the CL-PROT-SOLOi automaton to be the composition of a sensor
and a discrete controller automaton. These automata are implementations of their abstract
equivalents of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, specialized however, to the above definitions of the
parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d. The sensor automaton is precisely the specialization of
the sensor automaton of Figure 3.2 to the above definitions of the parameters PP, etc. The
discrete controller automaton is defined in Figure 6.1.
The braking strategy of the CL-PROT-SOLOi protector is as follows. The protector instructs
the vehicle i to brake if it has a d time unit claim overlap with any of the vehicles it
trails; that is, the protector instructs the vehicle i to brake if there exists a vehicle i', for
i' E I, i' 0 i, such that the sections of the track claimed by the vehicles i and i' in time d
overlap and xi < zxi. The rationale behind this braking strategy is that a collision between
two vehicles in the VEHICLES automaton can only be prevented by instructing the trailing
vehicle to brake.
It is important to note that the abstract protector automaton Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d)
complies with the assumptions made about the abstract protector in Section 3.2.1. In partic-
ular, since the vehicle position variables, the vehicle velocity variables, and the collided vari-
ables are output variables of the VEHICLES automaton, the set safe is YVEHICLES-determinable
and actions that guarantee safety can be determined from the output variables YVEHICLES Of
the VEHICLES automaton (Axioms 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, respectively). Moreover, the sets Ri and
Gi are YVEHICLES-determinable (Axioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7, respectively) and the set of start
states Si is a subset of the set safe (Axiom 3.2.8), since Si is defined to be the set safe.
In Section 3.1 it was shown that the abstract protector Absj guarantees that the physical
plant PP remains within G starting from S given R. Similarly, the CL-PROT-SOLOi automa-
ton guarantees that the VEHICLES automaton remains within Gi starting from Si given Ri.
This is shown in the following section.
Figure 6.1 Discrete controller automaton for the protector CL-PROT-SOLOi.
Actions: Input: e, the environment action (stuttering)
snapshot(y)i, for each valuation y of YVEHICLES
Output: brake(i)j
unbrake(i)j
Variables: Internal: sendj E {brake, unbrake, null, initially null
Discrete Transitions:
snapshot(y)j
Eff: if 3 i' E I, i' $ i such that
y ý disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', d) A (y.zi < y.xi,)
then
sendj := brake
else
sendj := unbrake
brake(i)3  unbrake(i)3
Pre: sendj = brake Pre: sendj = unbrake
Eff: sendj := null Eff: sendj := null
Trajectories:
w.sendj =_ null
6.2 Correctness of CL-PROT-SOLOi
The main result to be shown is that CL-PROT-SOLOi _< Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). Since
both CL-PROT-SOLOi and Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d) involve the composition of the same
sensor automaton with distinct discrete controller automata, Theorem 2.7.4 applies. There-
fore, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi of Fig-
ure 6.1 implements the discrete controller automaton DC(VEHIICLES, S;, Ri, Gi, j, d) of Fig-
ure 3.3. According to Theorem 2.6.1, this follows by showing that there exists a simulation
relation between the states of the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi and the
discrete controller automaton DC(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). We first give some useful set
definitions, then prove some lemmas, and finally show the existence of such a simulation
relation. The correctness proof follows the steps of the correctness proof of Section 5.2.
In this section, we use the notation future;, safei, very-safej, and delay-safei to denote the
specialization of the function future, the sets safe and very-safe, and the function delay-safe,
which are defined in Section 3.2.1, to the automaton VEHICLES, the sets Ri and Gi, and
Table 6.1 Sets used in the correctness proof of CL-PROT-SOLOi.
Wi C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Wi = {p E Ri n Gi I ý i' E I, i' 5 i : p.O n p.Oi, 0 A p.zi < p.xi, }
Vi C VALID, for i E I, defined by
Vi = Wi n PB,
Ti(t) C VALID, for i E I, and t E R>O, defined by
Ti(t) = {pE Ri n G I i' E I,i' # i :p.Ci(t) np.Ci,(t) :0 A p.zi < p.xi,}
the port j of the CL-PROT-SOLOi protector. Moreover, since the environment action of
the VEHICLES automaton is stuttering, its consideration is omitted in all inductive proofs
involving the PP automaton.
We proceed by defining several sets that are used in the correctness proof of the protector
CL-PROT-SOLO i . For reference, their formal definitions appear in Table 6.1.
Let Wi be the subset of Ri n Gi comprised of the states in which the section of the track
owned by the vehicle i does not overlap the section of track owned by any of the vehicles
it trails; that is, for every state p in Wi, p E Ri n Gi and there does not exist i' E I, i' : i
such that p.Oi n p.Oi,' 0 and p.xi < p.x,.
Let Vi be the subset of Wi comprised of the states in which the protector j is requesting
the vehicle i to brake; that is, Vi = Wi n PBij.
Let Ti(t), where t E R>0 , be the subset of Ri n Gi comprised of the states in which the
section of the track claimed in time t by the vehicle i does not overlap the section of the
track claimed in time t by any of the vehicles it trails; that is, for every state p in Ti(t),
p E Ri n Gi and there does not exist i' E I, i' : i such that p.Ci(t) n p.Cir(t) # 0 and
p.xi < p.xi.
Lemma 6.2.1 For all t, t' E R 0o, t < t', the following hold:
1. Ti(t) c Wi c G.
2. Vi 9 Wi 9 Gi
3. Ti(t') C Ti(t).
4. Ti (O) = Wi.
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of the sets Gi, Wi, and Ti(r), where r E Ro ,
and Lemma 4.4.2. I
In the following three lemmas, we show that any state Ri-reachable from a state in Vi
through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in Vi. In the
first lemma, we show that if the final state of such an execution fragment is in Gi and the
section of track owned by the vehicle i has not grown since the beginning of the execution
fragment, then the final state of the execution fragment is in V. In the second lemma, we
show that the final state of any such execution fragment is in Gi and the section of track
owned by the vehicle i does not grow throughout the execution fragment. Finally, the third
lemma combines these two results and states formally the desired property.
Lemma 6.2.2 Letp E Vi and p' E future,(p, R>0 ). If p' E Gi and p'.Oi C p.O then p' Vi.
Proof: We need to show that p' E Ri n Gi n PBji and that there does not exist i' E I, i' # i
such that p'.Oi n p'.Oi, 0 and p'.xi < p'.xi,. We consider these conditions by cases:
1. p' E Ri.
This is the case because the function futurei(p, R>o) only considers Ri-reachable states.
2. p' E Gi.
This is true by assumption.
3. p' E PBi".
Since p E PBij, it is the case that p.brake-req(i, j) = True. Moreover, the brake-req(i, j)
variable can only be set to False by an unbrake(i)j action - an action not allowed
by the function futurei(p, R>o). Therefore, it follows that p' E PB, , as needed.
4. $ i' E I, i' 5 i, such that p'.Oi n p'.Oi, $ 0 and p'.xz < p'.zXr.
Because p E Vi we have that for all i' E I, i' i such that p.xi < p.xi, it is the
case that p.Oi n p.Oi, = 0; that is, for all i' E I, i' $ i such that p.xi < p.xil it
is the case that max(p.0i) < min(p.Oi,). However, by assumption it is the case
that p'.Oi C p.Oi. Therefore, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-
negative, it follows that for all i' E I, i' : i such that p'.xi < p'.zx, it is the case that
max(p'.0i) < min(p'.Oi,). This is sufficient to guarantee that there does not exist
i' E I, i' $ i such that p'l.O. n p'.Oi, $ 0 and p'.xi < p'.xi,.
Lemma 6.2.3 For all p E Vi, if p' E future (p, Ro>), then p' E Gi and p'.Oi 9 p.Oi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLES automaton of n steps and trajec-
tories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Vi, is only comprised of states in Ri, and
involves no input actions on port j. Letting Pinit and pfinal be the initial and final states
of a, respectively, we must show that Pf•n,, E Gi and Pfinal.Oi 9 Pinit.Oi. The proof is by
induction on the length n of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit-
From Lemma 6.2.1, part 2, and the fact that Pinit VE , it follows that Pfinal E Gi. Moreover,
the fact that Pfinai.Oi 9 pinit.Oi is trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, then Pfinal E Gi and Pfna,,l.Oi Pinit.Oi. Let a' be the part of the execution
fragment a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves
the assertion that if pini and 'final are the initial and final states of a', respectively, then
it is the case that p•',l E Gi and p•;na.Oi Pit.Oi. Moreover, from Lemma 6.2.2 it follows
that P,•al E Vi. Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of a' by a single
step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible steps and
trajectories leading from pnal to Pfinal.
In the case of a step, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and does not affect
the variables collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' 5 i.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that Pnal E Gi. Therefore, since the
internal action brick-wall(i) does not affect the variables collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' V
i, it follows that pfinal E Gi.
Moreover, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case
that pfijnal.i < p' in.li. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that Pfinat.Oi C p1nal.Oi.
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that pnal.Oi 9 pl~it.Oi. There-
fore, since pi,it = Pi:it, it follows that Pfinal.Oi 9 Pinit.Oi, as needed.
3. the actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')ji, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I, i" : i, affect neither the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the variables
collided(i, i"'), for i"' E I, i"' $ i.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that pal E Gi. Therefore, since the
actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')i,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' f j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" f i, do not affect the variables collided(i, i"'), for i"' e I, i"' $ i, it follows
that Pfinal E Gi.
Moreover, since the input actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')j, for i' E I, j' E J,j' $ j,
and the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I, i" ý i, do not affect the velocity of
the vehicle i, it is the case that Pfi,,t.xi = P•,~"lii. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows
that Pfinal.Oi p',,·a.Oi. However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that
pý,nal.Oi C PAit.Oi. Therefore, since Pinit = Pnit, it follows that pfinl.Oi 9 Pini,.Oi, as
needed.
4. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' $ i", and collision-effects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri and P,,nal E Vi.
In the case of a trajectory, since p' E Vi and Vi C PBij, Lemma 4.4.4, part 1, implies that
PJinalOi _ p,,nal.Oi. However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that p'na.Oi• C
pini.Oi. Therefore, since Piit = Piit, it follows that Pfi~,•aOi _ pinit.Oi. Moreover, since
Pnal E Gi and the variables collided(i, i'), for all i' E I, i' 5 i, remain constant throughout
the trajectory, it follows that pfint, E Gi, as needed. I
Lemma 6.2.4 futurei(Vi
, 
R>O) C Vi.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. U
In the following two lemmas, we use Lemma 6.2.4 to show that Vi g very-safei and Vi C
delay-safei(t), for any t E Ro> , respectively.
Lemma 6.2.5 Vi C very-safei .
Proof: From the definition of very-safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that the condition
futurei(Vi, R 0o) C Gi is satisfied. This follows directly from Lemma 6.2.4 and Lemma 6.2.1,
part 2. •
Lemma 6.2.6 For any t E Ro0 , it is the case that Vi C delay-safei(t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 6.2.5 and Lemma 3.2.5, part 1. I
In the next three lemmas and the subsequent corollary, we show that the sets Wi and safei
are equal. First, we show that any state that is Ri-reachable from a state p in Wi through
an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j and has a limit time equal
to zero, is in the set Wi. Then, we show that Wi C safei and safei; Wi. Finally, the
subsequent corollary states that Wi = safei.
Lemma 6.2.7 futurei(Wi, 0) C Wi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLES automaton of n steps, where n E N,
that: starts in a state in Wi, is only comprised of states in Ri, involves no input actions on
port j, and has a limit time equal to zero. Moreover, let Piit and Pfn,al be the initial and
final states of a, respectively. By induction on the length n of the execution fragment a,
we show that Pfinal E Wi.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of no steps and, therefore, Pfinal = Piit. Since pi,it E Wi,
it follows that Pfinal E Wi.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, then Pfi,al E Wi. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if pinal is the final
state of a', then it is the case that Pinal E Wi. Since the final state of a is reached from the
final state of a' by a single step, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible
steps leading from PInal to Pfinal.
To complete the induction, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the actions brake(i')3 ,, unbrake(i')j,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' 5 j, affect neither the
velocity of any of the vehicles, nor the variables collided(i, i"), for i" E I, i" $ i.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p'al E Wi. Since the actions
brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')ji, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j, do not affect the variables
collided(i, i"), for i" E I, i" 5 i, it follows that Pf,,al E Gi.
Moreover, the actions brake(i')3 , and unbrake(i')3 ,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' # j, do not
affect the velocity of any of the vehicles, i.e., Pfinali,, = p,,nal2Ci", for all i" E I. From
Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that the section of the track owned by each of the
vehicles does not grow, i.e., Pfinal,.Oi C_ pina·.Oit,, for all i" E I. Since p•,, E Wi, the
sections of track owned in state P2•, by the vehicle i does not overlap the sections of
track owned by any of the vehicles it trails. From above however, Pfinal.Oi" C p•,inalOi",
for all i" E I, and, therefore, the same applies for the state Pfinal.
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set Ri, it follows that
PfAnal E Wi.
3. the brick-wall(i') actions, for i' E I, set the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and
affect neither the variables collided(i, i"), for i" E I, i" 0 i, nor the velocity of any of
the other vehicles, i.e., Pfinal-•."' = Plýalfi.'i , for all i"' E I, i"' # i'.
Without loss of generality, consider a particular brick-wall(i') action, for some i' E I.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that P',nal E Wi. Since the brick-wall(i')
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action does not affect the variables collided(i, i"), for i" E I, i" i, it follows that
Pfinal E Gi.
The brick-vall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero. Therefore, since
the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that pfinal.i, <_
p~ l..xi,. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that Pfnal.Oil C_ p' ,,.Oi,. Moreover,
since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the velocity of any of the other vehicles,
it is the case that P$fial2.i", = p rnalii, for all i" E I, i" $ i'. Again, from Lemma 4.4.3,
part 1, it follows that the section of the track owned by any of the vehicles other than
i' does not grow, i.e., Pfinal.Oi" C P1 nal.Oi", for all i" E I, i" $ i'.
Since 'P•Ial E Wi, the sections of track owned in state p;il by the vehicle i does
not overlap the sections of track owned by any of the vehicles it trails. From above
however, pfi,,.Oi,, p, a1.Oin, for all i" E I, and, therefore, the same applies for the
state Pfiial.
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set Ri, it follows that
Pfinal E Wi.
4. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' $ i", and collision-effects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri and 'P~ý E Wi.
Lemma 6.2.8 Wi C safei.
Proof: From the definition of safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that any state p E Wi
satisfies: (i) future(p, 0) C Gi, and (ii) there exists some action ?r such that for every
p', p" E Ri satisfying p' E futurei(p, 0) and p' --4 p", it is the case that p" E very-safei.
(i) The first condition follows from Lemma 6.2.7, Lemma 6.2.1, part 1, and the fact that
pe Wi.
(ii) For the second condition, consider the state p" that follows from p' after a brake(i)j
action is executed, i.e., let r = brake(i)j. Since the brake(i)j action does not affect the
velocity of the vehicle i, it is the case that p".Oi = p'.Oi. However, from Lemma 6.2.7 and
the fact that p E Wi it follows that p' E Wi. Since (i) p' E Wi, (ii) the execution fragment
a is restricted to the set Ri, and (iii) the brake(i)j action affects neither the variables
collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' 0 i, nor the velocity of any of the vehicles (and, therefore, nor
the section of the track owned by any of the vehicles), it follows that p" E Wi. Moreover,
since p" follows from p' after a brake(i)j action, it is the case that p" E PBj. From the
above conditions, it follows that p" E Vi. Finally, Lemma 6.2.5 implies that p" E very-safei ,
as needed. U
Lemma 6.2.9 For any p E Ri, if p E safei then p E Wi.
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Proof: We show the contrapositive; that is, for any p E Ri, if p ý Wi then p ý safei . Since
Wi = {p E Ri n Gi I i' E I,i' i : p.O n p.Oi, 5 0 A p.xi < p.xi,) and pE Ri, we
consider the condition p ý Gi and the condition that there exists i' E I, i' $ i, such that
p.Oi n p.Oi, # 0 and p.xi < p.xii.
1. P 0Gi.
From Lemma 3.2.4, part 1, it is the case that safei C_ Gi. Since p g Gi, it follows that
p 0 safei.
2. 3 i' E I, i' $ i, such that p.Oi n p.Oi, 0 and p.xi < p.xi,.
Without loss of generality, let i' E I, i' # i, be the vehicle that satisfies the conditions
p.Oi n p.O0, 0 0 and p.xi < p.xir. Since p E VALID, it is the case that the vehicles in
state p have no positive length extent overlap and, therefore, there is only one vehicle
i', for i' E I, i' 5 i, satisfying the conditions p.O n p.0i, $ 0 and p.xi < p.xi,.
We must show that p 0 safei . However, p E safei implies that there exists some
input action r on port j such that for every p', p" E Ri satisfying p' E futurei(p, 0)
and p' -L- p", it is the case that p" E very-safei . Therefore, it suffices to show that
for any input action ir on port j, there exist p',p" E Ri satisfying p' E futurei(p,0)
and p' -- ) p", such that p" 0 very-safei . We consider each input action r on port j
separately.
(a) r = brake(i)j.
Consider the state p' E Ri that is reached from the state p through the execution
of the action brick-wall(i') and satisfies the condition p'.ii, = 0; that is, p' E Ri
such that p'.i, = 0 and p'.ii, = 0.
Since the actions brick-wall(i') and brake(i)j affect neither the position, nor
the velocity of the vehicle i, it is the case that p".xi = p'.xi = p.xi and p".ii =
p'.ii = p.ix. Therefore, since the section of track owned by the vehicle i depends
only on the position and the velocity of the vehicle i, it is the case that p".O, =
p'.Oi = p.Oi. Similarly, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the
position of the vehicle i' but sets its velocity to zero and the brake(i)j action
affects neither the position, nor the velocity of the vehicle i', it follows that
p".xI = p'.xz, = p.xir and p".i,' = p'.i,' = 0. Therefore, since p.O n p.Oi, 0,
p".Oi = p.Oi, and p".xi, = p.xi,, it is the case that p".xi, E p".Oi.
Now, consider the evolution of the VEHICLES automaton following the state p"
in which the vehicle i' remains stationary. Since p".xi, E p".Oi, it follows that
at some state of such an evolution the action colliding-pair(i, i') is enabled
and, subsequently, executed. The state of the VEHICLES automaton following the
execution of the action colliding-pair(i, i') would, therefore, not be in G,. It
follows that p" 0 very-safei which implies that p 0 safei .
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(b) Tr = unbrake(i)j.
Consider the state p' E Ri that is reached from the state p through the execution
of the actions brick-wall(i') and unbrake(i)j,, for all j' E J,j' 5 j, and satisfies
the condition p'.ii, = 0; that is, p' E Ri such that p'.ii, = 0, p'.SiY = 0, and
p'.brake-req(i, j') = False, for all j' E J,j' $ j.
Since the actions brick-wall(i') and unbrake(i)ji, for all j' E J, affect neither
the position, nor the velocity of the vehicle i, it follows that p".xi = p'.xi = p.xi
and p".di = P'.+i = p.ij. Therefore, since the section of track owned by the
vehicle i depends only on the position and the velocity of the vehicle i, it is
the case that p".Oi = p'.Oi = p.Oi. Similarly, since the action brick-wall(i')
does not affect the position of the vehicle i' but sets its velocity to zero and the
actions unbrake(i)i,, for all j' E J, affect neither the position, nor the velocity
of the vehicle i', it follows that p".xi, = p'.x,i = p.xi, and p".j, = p'.4is = 0.
Therefore, since p.O n p.Oi, # 0, p".Oi = p.Oi, and p".xz, = p.zia, it is the case
that p".xi, E p".Oi.
Now, consider the evolution of the VEHICLES automaton following the state p"
in which the vehicle i moves forward and the vehicle i' remains stationary. Since
p".xi, E p".Oi, it follows that at some state of such an evolution the action
colliding-pair(i, i') is enabled and, subsequently, executed. The state of the
VEHICLES automaton following the execution of the action colliding-pair(i, i')
would, therefore, not be in Gi. It follows that p" 0 very-safei which implies that
p € safe,.
Thus, for any input action r on port j, there exist p', p" E Ri satisfying p' E
futurei(p, 0) and p' --' p", such that p" 0 very-safei . It follows that p 0 safei, as
needed.
Corollary 6.2.10 Wi = safei.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 6.2.8 and 6.2.9. •
In the next few lemmas, we show that any state p in the set Ti(t), for any t E RZo, is in the
set delay-safei(t); that is, any state Ri-reachable from p within an amount of time t through
an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set Gi and any
state Ri-reachable from the state p in exactly an amount of time t through an execution
fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set safei .
Lemma 6.2.11 Let p E Ti(r), where r E R °0 , and p' E futurei(p, t), where t E [0, r]. If
p' E Gi and p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r), then p' E Ti(r - t).
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Proof: We need to show that p' E Ri n Gi and that there does not exist i' E I, i' 0 i such
that p'.Ci(7 - t) n p'.Ci,(r - t) $ 0 and p'.xi < p'.xi. We consider the conditions by cases:
1. p' E Ri.
This is the case because the function futurei(p, t) only considers Ri-reachable states.
2. p' E Gi.
This is true by assumption.
3. 4 i' E I, i' 0 i, such that p'.Ci(r - t) n p'.Ci,(r - t) # 0 and p'.xi < p'.xit.
Because p E Ti(r) we have that for all i' E I,i' 0 i, such that p.xi < p.zi,, it is the
case that p.Ci(r) n p.Ci,(r) = 0; that is, for all i' E I, i' 5 i, such that p.xi < p.xi', it
is the case that max(p.Ci(r)) < min(p.Ci,(r)). However, by assumption it is the case
that p'.Ci(r - t) g p.Ci(r). Therefore, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be
non-negative, it follows that for all i' E I, i' Z i, such that p'.xi < p'.zi,, it is the case
that max(p'.Ci(r - t)) < min(p'.Ci,(r - t)). This is sufficient to guarantee that there
does not exist i' E I, i' i, such that p'.Ci(r - t) n p'.Ci,(r - t) # 0 and p'.xi < p'.xi'.
Lemma 6.2.12 For all p E Ti(r), where r E R >0 , and p' E futurei(p, t), where t E [0, r], it
is the case that p' E Gi and p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(T).
Proof: Let r E R• 0 and a be an execution fragment of the VEHICLEs automaton of n steps
and trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Ti(r), is only comprised of states
in Ri, involves no input actions on port j, and has a limit time t that lies in the interval
[0, r]. Letting pi,;, and Pfinal be the initial and final states of a, respectively, we must show
that Pfinal E Gi and pfinal.C(r - t) C pinit.Ci(r). The proof is by induction on the length n
of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, pfital = Pinit
and a.ltime = 0, i.e., t = 0. From Lemma 6.2.1, part 1, and the fact that pinit E Ti(r), it
follows that Pfinal C Gi. Moreover, since t = 0, the fact that pfinal.Ci(r - t) C Pinit-Ci(r) is
trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, with a.ltime = t, where t E [0, r], then pfinal E Gi and pfi,.alCi(r - t) c
Pinit.Ci(r). Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised of the first k steps
and trajectories and let a'.ltime = t', where t' E [0, t]. The induction hypothesis involves
the assertion that if pAit and Pfinal are the initial and final states of a', respectively, then it
is the case that pfunal E Gi and p'.nal.Ci(r - t') p nit.Ci(r). Moreover, from Lemma 6.2.11
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it follows that pi,,al E Ti(r - t'). Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of
a' by a single step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible
steps and trajectories leading from p•,l to Pfi,ua.
In the case of a step, keeping in mind that the limit times of a' and a are equal, i.e., t' = t,
we consider all possible actions by cases:
1. the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j are not enabled because a involves no input
actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and does not affect
the variables collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' # i.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that Pnal E Gi. Therefore, since the
internal action brick-wall(i) does not affect the variables collided(i, i'), for i' E I, i' #
i, it follows that fi,nal E Gi.
Moreover, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case
that Pfinal-i : P1na.i<i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, it follows that Pfinal-Ci(T -
t) C pa.Ci(r - t'). However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that
Pýinal.Ci(r - t') C p1, it.Ci(r). Therefore, since pinit = Pinit, it follows that PfinaCi(T -
t) _ Pinit.Ci(r), as needed.
3. the actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')j,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I, i" 0 i, affect neither the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the variables
collided(i, i"'), for i"' E I, i"' $ i.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that P'lal E Gi. Therefore, since the
actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')ji, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" $ i, do not affect the variables collided(i, i"'), for i"' E I, i"' 5 i, it follows
that Pfinal E Gi.
Moreover, since the input actions brake(i')j,, unbrake(i')j,, for i' E I,j' E J,j' $ j,
and the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I, i" : i, do not affect the velocity
of the vehicle i, it is the case that pfi,,nal.i = P4/~ali. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, it
follows that Pfinal•Ci(r- t) 0C P~inal•Ci(r - t'). However, from the induction hypothesis
it is the case that p'al.Ci(r - t') C pnic.Ci(r). Therefore, since Pinit = pnit, it follows
that PfinalCi(r - t) 9 pinit-Ci(r), as needed.
4. the actions colliding-pair(i', i"), for i', i" E I, i' $ i", and collision-effects(i"'),
for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only comprised of states in Ri and Pfnal E
Ti(r - t').
In the case of a trajectory, Lemma 4.4.4, part 2, implies that pfinal.Ci(r-t) C P••ial.Ci(r-t').
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that pfal.Ci(r - t') C pitcCi(7)-
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Therefore, since piit = pý,t, it follows that PfJnal•Ci(r - t) C Pinit-Ci(r). Moreover, since
p,•nl E Gi and the variables collided(i, i'), for all i' E I, i' : i, remain constant throughout
the trajectory, it follows that Pf,nal E Gi, as needed. U
Lemma 6.2.13 For 7 E R >o and t E [0, r], it is the case that futurei(Ti(r), t) 9 Ti(r - t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 6.2.11 and 6.2.12. U
Lemma 6.2.14 For all t E Rý> , it is the case that Ti(t) C delay-safei(t).
Proof: We need to show that future (Ti(t), [0, t]) _ Gi and futurei(Ti(t), t) C safe,. The
first condition follows directly from Lemma 6.2.13 and Lemma 6.2.1, part 1. For the second
condition, from Lemma 6.2.13 and Lemma 6.2.1, part 3, it is the case that future,(Ti(t), t) C
Wi. Therefore, Lemma 6.2.8, implies that futurei(Ti(t), t) C safei, as needed. U
In the following lemma, we show that the CL-PROT-SOLOi protector implements the pro-
tector Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi,j, d). Since the protector automata CL-PROT-SOLOi and
Absj involve the composition of the same sensor automaton with distinct discrete con-
troller automata, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of the protector
CL-PROT-SOLOi implements the DC(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d) automaton.
Lemma 6.2.15 CL-PROT-SOLOi _< Abs(VEHICLES, Si, Ri, Gi, j, d).
Proof: Both the CL-PPROT-SOLOi and the Absj protectors involve the composition of the
same sensor automaton with distinct discrete controller automata. From Theorem 2.7.4, it
suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi implements DCj.
This is shown by a simulation from the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi to
DCj.
As in the overspeed case, the mapping between the states of the discrete controller automa-
ton of CL-PROT-SOLOi and DCj is almost the identity. In the discrete controller automaton
of CL-PROT-SOLOi, the variable send3 is equal to either one of the labels brake and unbrake,
or the value null. In the abstract discrete controller automaton, these valuations simply
map to either the actions brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j, or the value null, respectively.
The start states for the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi and DCj are the
states in which sendj = null. These are mapped to each other according to the mapping
discussed above.
Furthermore, since the trajectories in both discrete controller automata are identical, we
need only consider their discrete transitions. We analyze the actions of the implementation
by cases, letting p denote any complete state of the VEHICLES automaton that corresponds
to y, i.e., p E VALID and p[YvEHICLES = Y.
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1. The snapshot(y)j action of the implementation sets sendj to brake, or unbrake. In
order to show that the behavior of the implementation is allowed by the specification,
we must show that the input action snapshot(y)j of the implementation sets the
value of the sendj variable in such a way that the subsequently enabled action 7r of
the implementation (i) guarantees that for all p',p" E Ri such that p' E futurei(p, 0)
and p' -A- p", it is the case that p" E delay-safei(d), if p E safes, and (ii) is an arbitrary
output action of the implementation, otherwise.
First, consider the case in which p E safei. Since Corollary 6.2.10 implies that p E Wi,
the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi sets the variable sendj according
to whether the state p is in Ti(d), or not.
On one hand, if p 0 Ti(d) then the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi
sets the variable sendj to brake and the brake(i)j action is enabled. However, since
p E Wi, Lemma 6.2.7 implies that p' E Wi. Moreover, since the brake(i)j action affects
neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any of the collided variables, it follows
that p" E Ri, p" E Gi, and p"..+i = P'.di. Therefore, Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies
that p".Oi C p'.Oi. From the above conditions and the non-negative constraint on the
vehicle velocities, it follows that p" E Wi. Moreover, since the brake(i)j action sets
the brake-req(i,j) variable to True, it follows that p" E V4. Finally, from Lemma 6.2.6
it follows that p" E delay-safei(d), as needed.
On the other hand, if p E Ti(d) then the discrete controller automaton of the protector
CL-PROT-SOLOi sets the variable sendj to unbrake and the unbrake(i)j action is
enabled. However, since p E Ti(d), Lemma 6.2.13 implies that p' E Ti(d). Since the
unbrake(i)j action affects neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any of the
collided variables, it follows that p" E Ri, p" E Gi, and p".di = p'.di. Therefore,
Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, implies that p".Ci(d) C p'.Ci(d). From the above conditions
and the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities, it follows that p" E Ti(d).
Finally, from Lemma 6.2.14 it follows that p" E delay-safei(d), as needed.
Next, consider the case in which p 0 safe1 . In this case, the snapshot(y)j action of
the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi sets the variable sendj to either
brake or unbrake and, subsequently, enables either the action brake(i)j, or the action
unbrake(i)j. However, when p 0 safe;, the DCj automaton sets the variable sendj
arbitrarily and, subsequently, enables an arbitrary output action. Therefore, the
behavior of the discrete controller automaton of CL-PROT-SOLOi is allowed by that of
the DCj automaton.
Therefore, the effects of the snapshot(y)j action of the implementation are allowed
by its specification.
2. The brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j actions have identical effects in both discrete controller
automata. When the sendj variable matches the label brake or unbrake or the action
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brake(i)j and unbrake(i),, respectively, the respective action is performed and the
send1 variable is set to null in both discrete controller automata.
3. The environment action in both discrete controller automata is stuttering. It fol-
lows that the mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of
CL-PROT-SOLOi and the DCj automaton prior to and succeeding the execution of the
environment action remains the same.
Corollary 6.2.16 The protector CL-PROT-SOLOi guarantees Gi in the VEHICLES automaton
starting from Si given Ri.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 6.2.15 and Theorem 3.2.9. U
6.3 Protection System CL-PROT
We now define the collision protector CL-PROT. While considering the CL-PROT automa-
ton, we restrict the states of the VEHICLES automaton to the set Pnot-overspeed as defined in
Section 4.2, i.e., RCL-PROT = Pnot-overspeed. Let GCL-PROT and SCL-PROT be the intersection of
Gi and Si, for all i E I, respectively, and CL-PROT be the composition of the protectors
CL-PROT-SOLO i , for all i E I. The protector CL-PROT guarantees that the VEHICLES au-
tomaton remains within GCL-PROT starting from SCL-PROT given RCL-PROT. For reference, the
formal definitions of the CL-PROT automaton and the sets GCL-PROT, SCL-PROT, and RCL-PROT
are shown in Table 6.2.
Lemma 6.3.1 The protector CL-PROT guarantees GCL-PROT in the VEHICLES automaton
starting from SCL-PROT given RCL-PROT.
In the following proof, we show that all the states of an execution of PPx CL-PROT starting
from SCL-PROT given RCL-PRoT are in GCL-PROT. This is done by applying Theorem 3.1.8 and
showing that the second condition of the theorem does not hold.
Proof: Let a be any execution of the system PPx CL-PROT starting from a state in SL-PROT
and in which all states are in RCL-PROT.
From Theorem 3.1.8, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in GCL-PROT = ni Gi-.
2. a can be written as al ^ a 2, where
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Table 6.2 Formal definitions of CL-PROT, GCL-PROT, SCL-PROT, and RCL-PROT-
CL-PROT E- CL-PROT-SOLOi
iEI
GcL-PROT =l Gi
iEl
SCLPROT f Si
iEI
RCL-PROT Pnot-overspeed
(a) All state occurrences in al except possibly the last state occurrence are in the
set GcL-aoT = n i• Gi.
(b) If the last state occurrence in ae is in Gi, for some i E I, then there exists
i' E I, i' $ i, such that the last state occurrence in a1 is in Gi,.
(c) All state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first state occurrence are in the
set fi EN past(Gi, a), for some N C I, where INI > 2.
We proceed by showing that it is not possible to decompose a as al ^  a 2 while satisfying
the three aforementioned conditions.
The violation of N il Gi can only occur through the violation of at least one of the
conditions Gi, where i E I. Moreover, each of these conditions are violated only through
the execution of a colliding-pair action. Without loss of generality, suppose that the first
condition that is violated in a is the condition Gi, for some i E I, and that such a violation
has resulted through a colliding-pair(i, i') action, for some i' E I, i' j i. Let p and p' be
the states of the VEHICLES automaton prior to and succeeding this colliding-pair(i, i')
action, i.e., p,p' E Rc•LvPOT such that p --- p', where r = colliding-pair(i, i'). Since
the colliding-pair(i, i') action only sets the collided(i, i') variable to True, it follows that
p E Gin i(,, E i,,,;i Gi, .Now, we attempt to decompose a as a1 ^ a 2 :
1. Suppose we split a at any state preceding the state p. Then the state p is in a 2. Since
p' is the first state in which one of the conditions Git, for i" E I, is violated, it is the
case that p E nil,, I Gilt and there does not exist N C I such that INI _ 2 and p E
Ni E N past(Gi, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this decomposition
of a is not valid.
109
2. Suppose we split a at the state p. Then the state p' is in a 2. Since p' is the first
state in which one of the conditions Gill, for i" E I, is violated and since the state
p' is in Gi n (ni,,, I,i"~ Gi), it follows that there does not exist N C I such that
INI _ 2 and p' E fi E past(G, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and
this decomposition of a is not valid.
3. Suppose we split a at the state p'. Then p' is the last state of al and the first state of
a 2. However, p' E Gi (n il, E I,i,,i Gi,, Therefore, the second condition is violated
and this decomposition of a is not valid.
4. Suppose we split a at any state succeeding pt. Then the state p' is in al. Since
p' e n (n ,,, E I,,, Gil,), it is the case that p' ni,, E I Gi,,. Therefore, the first
condition is violated and this decomposition of a is not valid.
Therefore, the execution a cannot be decomposed into any such al and a 2. It follows
that the first clause of Theorem 3.1.8 must hold; that is, every state in a is in GCL-PROT.
This implies that the protector CL-PROT guarantees GCL-PROT in the VEHICLES automaton
starting from SCL-PROT given RCL-PROT. *
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Chapter 7
Example 3:
Collision Avoidance on Merging
Tracks
This chapter treats collision avoidance among vehicles that are traveling on a track involving
a binary merge. We first augment the model of the PRT 20 00TM to involve a track topology
consisting of two merging tracks - the new model is referred to as the MERGE-VEHICLES
automaton. Then we define the protector MERGE-PROT that guarantees that none of the
vehicles of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton collide, assuming that they are all abiding
by the speed limit. The MERGE-PROT protector is defined as the composition of n(n -
1)/2 separate copies of another protector called MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}, one copy for each
unordered pair {i, i'} of vehicles of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton, for i, i' E I, i $ i'.
Each of these MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} protectors, for i, i' E I, i $ i', is an implementation of
a particular instantiation of the abstract protector automaton of Section 3.2 and guarantees
that the vehicles i and i' do not collide into each other.
7.1 Augmented Physical Plant: MERGE-VEHICLES
In this section we augment the model for the system of n vehicles to involve a merge of two
sections of track. We replace the position component of a vehicle's state with a location
component - a component that specifies the track on which the vehicle is traveling and
the vehicle's position with respect to the merge point - and update the definitions of
the discrete steps and the trajectories of the VEHICLES automaton to handle the location
variables. We replace the brake and unbrake input actions of the VEHICLES automaton
with protect input actions which allow single protectors to instruct multiple vehicles to
apply their "emergency" brakes. Finally, we augment the definitions of the discrete actions
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pertaining to vehicle collisions such that the blame for a particular collision is assigned to
either only the trailing vehicle, if one vehicle collides into the other vehicle from behind, or
both vehicles, if the vehicles collide sideways while merging.
The set of track locations in the VEHICLES automaton was a line. In the case of a binary
merge, the set of locations is a Y-shaped track - two incoming branches and one outgoing
branch. We define the set of locations L as follows:
L = ({left, right} x R<o) U ({out} x R> )
Each location 1, for 1 E L, is comprised of two components; the first component represents
the branch of the track on which the vehicle is traveling and the second component represents
the position of the vehicle with respect to the merge point. The locations on the top branch
of the merge have the label left and a negative real number as their respective components.
Similarly, the locations on the bottom branch of the merge have the label right and a
negative real number as their respective components. The locations on the merged section
of the track are specified by the label out and a non-negative real number. The point
(out, 0) is the first point on the merged section of the track that no two vehicles can occupy
simultaneously. For notational brevity, we use l.b and l.x to denote the branch and the
position components of the location 1, respectively.
We define a partial order on L, as follows. If (bi, xl) and (b2, x 2) are locations in L then
(bi,xi) <• (b2,x 2) if and only if x, < z2 and either bl = b2 , or b2 = out. In other words,
two locations are incomparable if one specifies a location on the left branch and the other
specifies a location on the right branch; otherwise, they are comparable and their order is
given by the ordering on their real component.
A closed interval in L is specified with an ordered pair of locations that are comparable,
e.g., [(left, -1), (out, 2.5)], and contains all locations between them. Addition with non-
negative scalars on L is defined as follows: if (b, x) is a location in L and y E R >O, then
(b, x) + y is equal to (b, x + y) if x + y is negative, and (out, x + y) otherwise. It is important
to note that for all y E R >0 , (b, x) + y exists and (b,x) • ((b, z) + y).
The automaton MERGE-VEHICLES of Figure 7.1 models a physical system of n vehicles
traveling on a track involving a Y-shaped merge. The MERGE-VEHICLES automaton is the
result of augmenting the VEHICLES automaton of Chapter 4 to allow for the Y-shaped track
topology.
In the new model, each of the position components xi of the state of the VEHICLES automaton
is replaced with the corresponding location component li. This entails simply replacing the
occurrences of xi with li.x. The derived variables stop-disti, max-rangei(t), and maz-veli(t),
for i E I and t E Ro0 , defined for the VEHICLES automaton in Section 4.3, carry over
unchanged to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton. The derived variables Ei, Oi, and Ci(t),
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Figure 7.1 The MERGE-VEHICLES automaton.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action (stuttering)
protect(C)i, for all C E P(I),j E J
Internal:
colliding-pair(i, i'), for all i, i' E I, i' 6 i
collision-effects(i), for all i E I
brick-wall(i), for all i E I
Discrete Transitions:
protect(C)j
Eft: for all i E C
brake-req(i, j) := True
if -ibrake(i) then
brake(i) := True
if ii = 0 then ii := 0
else Zi := Cbrake
for all i E I - C
brake-req(i, j) := False
if brake(i) A (-" Vk E J brake-req(i, k)) then
brake(i) := False
ii :E [Emin, Omax]
Variables
Internal:
ii E R, for all i E I, initially ii E R
brake(i) E Bool, for all i E I,
initially False
brake-req(i, j) E Bool, for all i E I, j E J,
initially False
Output:
li E L, for all i E I, initially li E L
ii E R, for all i E I, initially ii E R
collided(i, i') E Bool, for all i, i' E I, i' 5 i,
initially False
subject to VALID
colliding-pair(i, i')
Pre: -'collided(i, i')
A(E n E,, # 8)
A(li < min(Ei n Ei,))
Eft: collided(i, i') := True
if (1i.b # l,,.b)
A(li.b # out) A (li,.b $ out)
then
collided(i', i) := True
collision-effects(i)
Pre: collided(*, i, ,)
Eft: ii :E R >O
ii :E R
brick-wall(i)
Pre: True
Ef: ii := 0
if brake(i) then ii := 0
else :i :E [0, Zmax]
Trajectories:
for all i, i' E I, i # i', collided(i, i') is constant throughout w
for all i E I and j E J, brake(i) and brake-reg(i, j) are constant throughout w
for all i, i' E I, i #i'
the function w.ii is integrable
for all t E Tr
w(t).ii = w(0).ki + fo w(s).ii ds
w(t).1i.x = w(0).l,.x + fo0 w(s).i' ds
if --w. collided i, i')
A(w(t).Ei n w(t).E,, # : )
A(w(t).li < min(w(t).Ei n w(t).Ei,))
then
t = w.ltime
subject to VALID
113
for i E I and t E R -> O, defined for the VEHICLES automaton in Sections 4.1 and 4.3, extend
to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton by replacing the position variables with their location
counterparts.
In the VEHICLES automaton, a collision between two vehicles is recorded solely by the
trailing vehicle - as if it is the only vehicle blamed for the collision. The rationale behind
this approach is that the trailing vehicle is the only vehicle that is capable of preventing a
collision through braking; that is, the trailing vehicle is liable for the collision. This rationale
carries over to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton with the exception that in the MERGE-
VEHICLES automaton it is possible for two vehicles to collide sideways while merging. In such
situations, it is not clear which vehicle is liable for the collision and, therefore, the collision is
recorded by both vehicles involved in the collision. This is done by augmenting the effects of
the colliding-pair(i, i') actions, for i, i' E I, i $ i', so that a colliding-pair(i, i') action
sets both the variables collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) to True when the vehicles i and i' are
colliding sideways while merging. If indeed the vehicles i and i' are colliding sideways while
merging, although both of the actions colliding-pair(i, i') and colliding-pair(i', i) are
enabled, only one of them is actually executed and neither of them is enabled thereafter.
The interpretation of the collided(i, i') variables, for i, i' E I, i ý i', still remains the same;
that is, each of the variables collided(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i f i', denotes whether the vehicle i
has collided into the vehicle i'. However, if collided(i, i') = True and collided(i', i) = False,
then it follows that the vehicle i has collided into the vehicle i' from behind, where as, if
collided(i, i') = True and collided(i', i) = True, then it follows that the vehicles i and i' have
collided sideways while merging.
The brake(i)j and unbrake(i)j actions of the VEHICLES automaton, for i E I and j E J,
are replaced by the protect(C)j actions, for C E P(I) and j E J. These actions enable a
protector j to instruct each of the vehicles in the set of vehicles C to apply its "emergency"
brakes. If a vehicle i is a member of C then it is requested to brake by the protector j,
emulating a brake(i)j action of the VEHICLES automaton; otherwise, any previous request
of the protector j to brake the vehicle i is revoked, emulating an unbrake(i)j action of the
VEHICLES automaton.
As in the case of the VEHICLES automaton, the set of input actions of the MERGE-VEHICLES
automaton includes the actions protect(C)j, for C E P(I) and j E J; that is, the MERGE-
VEHICLES automaton allows each protector j, for j E J, to brake any subset of the vehicles.
However, it is often the case that a protector j, for some j E J, need not schedule but a
subset of the actions protect(C)j , for C E P(I). In such cases, the protector j is specified
as having only the output actions that it is capable of scheduling and the remaining input
actions of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton on port j are ignored.
The remaining state variables and discrete actions of the VEHICLES automaton as well as the
notational shorthand collided(i, *), collided(*, i), and collided(*, i, *), for all i E I, defined
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for the VEHICLES automaton in Section 4.1, carry over to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton
unchanged.
In the case of the trajectories of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton, it is important to note
that due to the nature of the set of locations L, as the vehicles travel past the merge point,
the branch component of their location variables changes from either left, or right to out.
Finally, we redefine the set VALID to account for the new track topology.
The MERGE-VEHICLES automaton complies with the assumptions made about the PP au-
tomaton in Section 3.2.1. The MERGE-VEHICLES automaton has neither input variables,
nor output actions, on any of its ports (Axioms 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively). Moreover,
each of the actions protect(Cj)j, for j E J and Cj = {i I brake-req(i, j) = True}, is a no-op
input action on port j for any R C VALID. Therefore, the set of no-op input actions on
each port j E J and any R C VALID is non-empty (Axiom 3.2.3).
Henceforth, we assume that the sets disjoint-extents(i, i'), disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), and
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t), for i, i' E I, i $ i' and t E R 0o, defined for the VEHICLES
automaton in Section 4.3, have been extended to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton to in-
corporate the redefinitions of the derived variables used in their definitions. Moreover, we
assume that the Lemmas 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, and 4.4.5 extend to the MERGE-VEHICLES
automaton in the obvious way.
7.2 Auxiliary Sets for the MERGE-VEHICLES Automaton
This section presents several auxiliary sets for the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton that are
comprised of states that satisfy particular properties. While their formal definitions appear
in Table 7.1, their informal descriptions follow.
comparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i $ i', is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in which
the locations of the vehicles i and i' are comparable.
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VALID C stateS(MERGE-VEHICLES), defined as the set of states of the MERGE-VEHICLES
automaton that satisfy the following conditions:
1. ý i, i' E I, i $ i', such that the set Ei n Ei, is a positive length closed interval
of L.
2. ii > 0, for all i E I.
3. If --collided(*, i, ,) then ii E [Fmin, ýima,], for all i E I.
4. If -ncollided(*, i, *) A brake(i) then if ~i = 0 then 3i = 0 else Ii = ibrak,, for all
i I.
incomparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i ý i', is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in
which the locations of the vehicles i and i' are not comparable.
yield-comparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i ý i', is the subset of comparable(i, i') comprised of
the states in which, in the case of a claim overlap between the vehicles i and i', the
vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i'. When the locations of the vehicles i and i' are
comparable, the vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i' if the location of the vehicle i is
strictly less than the location of the vehicle i'.
yield-incomparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i ý i', is the subset of incomparable(i, i') comprised of
the states in which, in the case of a claim overlap between the vehicles i and i', the
vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i'. When the locations of the vehicles i and i' are
not comparable, the vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i' if either only the vehicle i'
owns the merge point, or the vehicle i is traveling on the left branch and neither or
both vehicles own the merge point.
yield(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i ý i', is the subset of VALID comprised of the states in which, in
the case of a claim overlap between the vehicles i and i', the vehicle i must yield to
the vehicle i' in order to prevent a potential collision between the vehicles i and i'.
Since the above definitions only depend on the output variables of the MERGE-VEHICLES au-
tomaton, we often use the above sets to classify states of the output state set YMERGE-VEHICLES*
The following lemma describes some properties of the sets defined above.
Lemma 7.2.1 For all i, i' E I, i $ i', the following hold:
1. VALID = comparable(i, i') U incomparable(i, i').
2. comparable(i, i') = yield-comparable(i, i') U yield-comparable(i', i).
3. yield-comparable(i, i') n yield-comparable(i', i) = 0.
4. incomparable(i, i') = yield-incomparable(i, i') U yield-incomparable(i', i).
5. yield-incomparable(i, i') n yield-incomparable(i', i) = 0.
Proof: We prove each of the conditions separately:
1. This follows directly from the definition of comparable(i, i') and incomparable(i, i'), for
i, i' E I, i • i'.
2. For all i, i' E I, i 5 i', the sets yield-comparable(i, i') and yield-comparable(i', i) are
both subsets of the set comparable(i, i'). Therefore, it suffices to show that any
state p in the set comparable(i, i'), for some i, i' E I,i 5 i', is either in the set
yield-comparable(i, i'), or in the set yield-comparable(i', i).
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Table 7.1 Auxiliary sets for the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton.
comparable(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i A i', defined by
comparable(i, i') = {p E VALID I (p.li.b = p.li,.b) V (p.li.b = out) V (p.li,.b = out)}
incomparable(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
incomparable(i, i') = VALID - comparable(i, i')
yield-comparable(i, i') C comparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
yield-comparable(i, i') = {p E comparable(i, i') I p.li < p.li,}
yield-incomparable(i, i') C incomparable(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i A i', defined by
yield-incomparable(i, i') = {p E incomparable(i, i') I ((out, 0) V p.Oi A (out, 0) E p.Oi,)
V ((out, 0) E p.O A (out, 0) E p.Oi,
A p.li.b = left)
V ((out, 0) V p.O A (out, 0) 4 p.O0,
A p.li.b = left)}
yield(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
yield(i, i') = yield-comparable(i, i') U yield-incomparable(i, i')
Let the state p be any state in comparable(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i i'. Since
comparable(i, i') C VALID, it is the case that p E VALID. Therefore, the sections of
the track occupied by the vehicles i and i' do not have a positive length closed interval
overlap. It follows that it is not possible for their locations to coincide; that is, for any
p E comparable(i, i'), it is the case that p.1i $ p.li4. Therefore, regarding the ordering
of the locations of the vehicles i and i', there are only two viable cases:
(a) p.1i < p.li'. In this case, p E yield-comparable(i, i').
(b) p.1i, < p.1j. In this case, p E yield-comparable(i', i).
3. If p E yield-comparable(i, i') then it is the case that p.;l < p.li4. It follows that
p 0 yield-comparable(i', i). Similarly, if p E yield-comparable(i', i) then it is the case
that p.li, < p.4l. It follows that p 0 yield-comparable(i, i'). This suffices.
4. For all i, i' E I, i $ i', the sets yield-incomparable(i, i') and yield-incomparable(i', i)
are both subsets of the set incomparable(i, i'). Therefore, it suffices to show that any
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state p in the set incomparable(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i : i', is either in the set
yield-incomparable(i, i'), or in the set yield-incomparable(i', i).
Let the state p be any state in incomparable(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i : i', and without
loss of generality let the vehicle i be the vehicle traveling on the left incoming edge.
Regarding the ownership of the merge point by each of the vehicles, there are four
cases:
(a) (out, 0) E p.Oi A (out, 0) E p.Oi,. In this case, p E yield-incomparable(i, i') and
p ý yield-incomparable(i', i).
(b) (out, 0) ý p.Oi A (out, 0) ý p.Oi,. Similarly to above, p E yield-incomparable(i, i')
and p ý yield-incomparable(i', i).
(c) (out, 0) ' p.Oi A (out, 0) E p.O,,. In this case, p E yield-incomparable(i, i') and
p ' yield-incomparable(i', i).
(d) (out, 0) E p.Oi A (out, 0) V p.Oi,. In this case, p V yield-incomparable(i, i') and
p E yield-incomparable(i', i).
5. This condition follows from the analysis in the proof of condition 4.
7.3 Protection System MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i}i
Each MERGE-PROT-PAIR{ii'} automaton, for i, i' E I, i $ i', is a vehicle-pair collision pro-
tector and guarantees that the vehicles i and i' do not collide into each other, provided
that all the vehicles are abiding by the speed limit and the vehicles of all other vehicle
pairs do not collide between themselves. Each of the MERGE-PROT-PAIR {i,i} protectors, for
i, i' E I, i $ i', is an implementation of the abstract protector of Section 3.2 specialized to
particular definitions of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d.
The physical plant automaton, PP, is defined to be the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton of
Figure 7.1. The port j and the sampling period d are defined to be the port and sampling
period with which the protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} communicates with the MERGE-
VEHICLES automaton. They are assumed arbitrary and are fixed for the rest of the chap-
ter. The set of "good" states G is defined to be the set of states in which the vehicles i
and i' have not collided into each other, i.e., G = VALID - Pcollided(i,i') - Pcollided(i',i)"
In this chapter, we use the notation G{(i,i) to denote the definition of G that is spe-
cific to the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} protector. The set R is defined to be the set R =
Pnot-overspeed F ini'. e I ,i,,i"'{',i",'}{i,i'} Gi,,,,,,)). This definition restricts the states of
the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton to states in which all the vehicles are abiding by the
speed limit and in which the vehicles of all other vehicle pairs {i", i"'}, for i", i"' E I, i" 5
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i"', {i, i ij} $ {i, i'}, have not collided into each other. The set S is defined to be the set
safe as defined in Section 3.2.1; that is, the set of states of the PP automaton for which
a single input action of PP on port j can guarantee that, provided no new input actions
on port j are allowed, all subsequently R-reachable states will be in G. Once again, the
definition of the set safe is specialized to the above definitions of the automaton PP, the
sets R and G, and the port j. In this chapter, we use the notation R{i,i,} and S,,i, ) to refer
to the above definitions of the sets R and S.
The MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,it} protector automaton is an implementation of the abstract pro-
tector automaton Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, Sp i,i,, R{i,i,}, G i,i'), j, d). More precisely, as is the
case for the abstract protector Absj, we define the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} automaton to be
the composition of a sensor and a discrete controller automaton. These automata are im-
plementations of their abstract equivalents of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 specialized, however, to
the above definitions of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d. The sensor automaton is
precisely the specialization of the sensor automaton of Figure 3.2 to the above definitions
of the parameters PP, etc. The discrete controller automaton is defined in Figure 7.2.
The braking strategy of the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i)} protector is as follows. The protector
is allowed to brake the vehicles i and i' only if the sections of the track they claim in time d
overlap. Given that the vehicles i and i' are indeed involved in such a claim overlap, there
are two possible scenarios depending on whether the locations of the vehicles i and i' are
comparable, or not. If their locations are comparable, then the vehicle i is instructed to
brake if it trails the vehicle i'; otherwise, the vehicle i' is instructed to brake. On the other
hand, if the vehicle locations are not comparable, the vehicle i is instructed to brake either
if only the vehicle i' owns the merge point, or if both or neither vehicles own the merge
point and the vehicle i is traveling on the left branch; otherwise, the vehicle i' is instructed
to brake. In the latter case, we choose to brake the vehicle traveling on the left branch for
no particular reason. In fact, it is plausible to brake either or both of the vehicles involved
in the claim overlap. However, if both of the vehicles were instructed to brake, it would
be possible to reach a bottleneck state - a state in which both of the incoming vehicles
involved in the claim overlap are instructed to brake thereafter and, subsequently, none of
the trailing incoming vehicles would be capable of proceeding.
The braking strategy considers the case in which both the vehicles i and i' own the merge
point. Although this situation is a valid state of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton, in the
following section it is shown that such states are excluded from the reachable state set
of the composition of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton and all the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'}
protectors, for i, i' E I, i 5 i'. It is also important to note that, according to the braking
strategy and provided that the sections of track owned by the vehicles i and i' are disjoint,
if the locations of the vehicles i and i' are not comparable, then the section of the track
owned by the vehicle to be braked is entirely upstream of the merge point.
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Figure 7.2 Discrete controller automaton for the protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}.
Actions: Input: e, the environment action (stuttering)
snapshot(y)j, for each valuation y of YMERGE-VEHICLES
Output: protect(C)j , for C E P({i, i'})
Variables: Internal: sendj E P({i, i'}) U null, initially null
Discrete Transitions:
snapshot(y)j
Eff: if y 0 disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', d) then
if y E yield(i, i') then
sendj := {i}
else
sendj := {i'}
else
send3 := 0
protect(C)j
Pre: sendj = C
Eff: sendj := null
Trajectories:
w.sendj = null
It is important to note that the abstract protector automaton Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,i,},
R{i,i,}, Gi,q, j, , d) complies with the assumptions made about the abstract protector in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. In particular, since the vehicle location variables, the vehicle velocity variables,
and the collided variables are output variables of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton, the set
safe is YMERG•VEHICLES-determinable and actions that guarantee safety can be determined
from the output variables of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton (Axioms 3.2.4 and 3.2.5,
respectively). Moreover, the sets R{ii,) and G{i,i,) are YMERGFVEHICLES-determinable (Ax-
ioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7, respectively) and the set of start states Si,i,) is a subset of the set
safe (Axiom 3.2.8), since S{i,i) is defined to be the set safe.
In Section 3.1 it was shown that the abstract protector Absj guarantees that the physical
plant PP remains within G starting from S given R. Similarly, the MERGE-PROT-PAIR {,i,}
automaton guarantees that the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton remains within Gi,i,) starting
from S{i,i) given Ri,i},. This is shown in the following section.
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7.4 Correctness of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}
The main result to be shown is that MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,it} • Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,i,},
Rf,j,j, G4f,j,,j, d). Since both MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} and Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, Sli,i,,
R{i,i,}, G {i,i}, j, d) involve the composition of the same sensor automaton with distinct dis-
crete controller automata, Theorem 2.7.4 applies. Therefore, it suffices to show that the
discrete controller automaton of the protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{fi,i} of Figure 7.2 im-
plements the discrete controller automaton DC(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,i,}, Rf{,i,j, G{i,,l), j, d)
of Figure 3.3. From Theorem 2.6.1, this follows by showing that there exists a simu-
lation relation between the states of the discrete controller automaton of the protector
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i}, and the discrete controller automaton DC(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,1 },
Rfi,i,, Gf{i,i 1, j, d). We first give some set definitions, then prove some lemmas, and finally
show the existence of such a simulation relation.
In this section, we use the notation futurefj, ,}, safej,1,7), very-safe{i,ii,, and delay-safefi,i,)
to denote the specialization of the function future, the sets safe and very-safe, and the
function delay-safe, which are defined in Section 3.2.1, to the automaton MERGE-VEHICLES,
the sets Rfj,j,} and Gji,i,), and the the port j of the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} protector.
Moreover, since the environment action of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton is stuttering,
its consideration is omitted in all inductive proofs involving the PP automaton.
We proceed by defining several sets that are used in the correctness proof of the protector
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}. For reference, their formal definitions appear in Table 7.2.
Let W{i,i,} be the subset of R {i,i} n Gf ,I) comprised of the states in which the section of the
track owned by the vehicle i does not overlap the section of track owned by the vehicle i';
that is, W{i,,i} = R(f,l, n G,}ii, n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Let V(ii,) be the subset of W{i,i,} comprised of the states in which the vehicle i is being
instructed to brake by the protector j and either the locations of the vehicles i and i' are
comparable and li < li,, i.e., the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i', or the locations of the
vehicles i and i' are incomparable and the section of the track owned by the vehicle i is
entirely upstream of the merge point (out, 0). Moreover, let V(i,i,} be defined as VI,,) =
Let T{i,i,)(t), where t E Ro> , be the subset of Rfj,i) n G{i,i,) comprised of the states in
which the section of the track claimed in time t by the vehicle i does not overlap the
section of the track claimed in time t by the vehicle i'; that is, Tf,i,)(t) = RIf,I, } n G4fl,) n
disjoint-claimed- tracks(i, i', t).
The following lemma defines the relation among the sets Gf{,,i), Wf{,i,}, V{i,i)}, and T i@;,,(t),
for t E R > ° .
Lemma 7.4.1 For all t, t' E R >o , t < t', the following hold:
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Table 7.2 Sets used in the correctness proof of MERGE-PROT-PAIR {i
,
i,}.
W{i,i,) C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
W{i,i), = R{i,i, )n Gf{ji,i n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i')
V(i,i,) C VALID, for i, i' E I,i i', defined by
V(i,i,) = {p E W{i,i}) n PB,j I (p E comparable(i, i') A p.1i < p.l,,)
V (p C incomparable(i, i') A max(p.Oi) < (out, O))}
i,i,) ~ VALID, for i, i' E I, i f i', defined by
Vfi,i,} = V(i,i,) U yw, 0
T{#}(t, ) C VALID, for i, i' e I, i 0 i', and t e RC I , defined by
Tfii, (t) = Rf{i,,} n Gfli, n disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t)
1. Ti,ji}(t) C Wfj,j, C GjV,i,}.
4. TVi,i}(O) = W{i,i,}.
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of the sets Vti,i,), W{i,i/I, and Tj,j,}(7-), where
T E RŽ0o, and Lemma 4.4.2. N
In the following three lemmas, we show that any state R {,,/)-reachable from a state in V(,i')
through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in Wf{,j,}. In the
first lemma, we show that if the final state of such an execution fragment is in Gfj,j,} and the
section of track owned by the vehicle i has not grown since the beginning of the execution
fragment, then the final state of the execution fragment is in Wfj,i,). In the second lemma,
we show that the final state of any such execution fragment is in G{;,j,) and the section of
track owned by the vehicle i does not grow throughout the execution fragment. Finally, the
third lemma combines these two results and states formally the desired property.
Lemma 7.4.2 Let p E V(,i,i) and p' E future{i,i; (p, ]R>o). If p' E G{i,4i, and p'.Oi C p.Oi,
then p' E W{,i,'}.
Proof: We need to show that p' E W{i,i,); that is, we need to show that the state p' is in the
set R{,i,} n G{,,}l n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). By assumption, it is the case that p' E Gi,i} ).
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Therefore, it remains to be shown that p' E R{1i,i} and p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). We
consider these two conditions by cases:
1. p1 E R{i,i,'.
This is the case because the function future{i,i,} (p, Ro0 ) only considers R{i,ii-reachable
states.
2. p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Since p E V(i,i,), there are two possible cases: (i) p E comparable(i, i') and p.li < p.li,,
and (ii) p E incomparable(i, i') and max(p.0i) < (out, 0).
In the first case, it is as if the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i' on a single track. Since
p E V(i,i,) C Wi,i,}, the sections of the track owned by the vehicles i and i' in state
p are disjoint. Since p E comparable(i, i') and p.li < p.•i,, it follows that max(p.Oi) <
min(p.Oi,). Moreover, Lemma 4.4.2, part 2, implies that max(p.Oi) < p.li,. Therefore,
because of the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities and the assumption
that p'.Oi C p.Oi, it follows that p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
In the second case, since max(p.Oi) < (out, 0), the section of the track owned by
the vehicle i in state p is strictly within the incoming directed edge p.1i.e. Since
p'.Oi C p.Oi, the same is true for the section of track owned by the vehicle i in
state p'. Therefore, since the vehicle i' is traveling on the adjacent incoming branch,
it follows that p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Lemma 7.4.3 If p E V(i,i,) and p' E future i,i, (p, Ro), then p' E Gji,i, and p'.Oi C p.Oi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton of n steps and
trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in V(i,i,), is only comprised of states in
Rfi,i,, and involves no input actions on port j. Letting pinit and Pfinal be the initial and
final states of a, respectively, we must show that Pfinal E G{i,i, and Pfinal.Oi C pini.Oi. The
proof is by induction on the length n of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and therefore, Pfinal = Pinit.
From Lemma 7.4.1, part 2, and the fact that pini E V(i,i,) _ V{i,i,}, it follows that pfi•• E
G{i,i,}. Moreover, the fact that Pfina,,.Oi p,•it.Oi is trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1, for
some k E N, then Pfina E Gi,iq, and Pfialt.Oi _ Pi,it.Oi. Let a' be the part of the execution
fragment a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves
the assertion that if p wit and p'inal are the initial and final states of a', respectively, then
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it is the case that pnal E Gi,i,) and pnal.Oi 9 pIait"Oi. Moreover, from Lemma 7.4.2 it
follows that p'final E W{i,i,}. Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of a'
by a single step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible
steps and trajectories leading from p;,l to Pfnal.
In the case of a step, we consider all possible actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)j, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and does not affect
the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p;ial E G{i,iq,. Therefore, since the
brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that Pfinal E G{i,i,).
Moreover, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case
that Pfinal-• i <5 p,, 1 .+i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that Pfinl.Oi g p'••al.Oi.
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that pna*.Oi C_ pA,.oi. There-
fore, since Pinit = Pjit, it follows that Pfna.OiOi pini.Oi, as needed.
3. the actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' : j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" i, affect neither the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and
collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that ptnal E G{i,i)}. Therefore, since
the actions protect(C)ji, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' f j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" 0 i, do not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it follows that
Pfinal E G{i,i,}.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I, i" $ i, do not affect the velocity of the
vehicle i, it is the case that Pfinal.ii = Pýnal.ii. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows
that Pfinal.Oi C p~,,t.Oi. However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that
pina•l.Oi C pni.Oi. Therefore, since paiit = pIait, it follows that Pf,,al.Oi C Pinit.Oi, as
needed.
4. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i"'), for i", i"' E I, i" 0 i"', and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i"'), for i"' E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in Rji,iq, and P•~l E W{i,i').
Since Pinit E V(i,i,) g PBi and the execution fragment leading from pi~ai to pl involves no
input actions on port j, it follows that pal E PB13 . Therefore, in the case of a trajectory
from ,,l to Pfial, Lemma 4.4.4, part 1, implies that Pfinal•O.Oi P'ial.Oi. However, from the
induction hypothesis it is the case that pnal.Oi C_ ini.Oi. Therefore, since pinit = P nit it
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follows that Pfj,i.Oi C pinit.0 i. Moreover, since p~,,l a GEi,i,} and the variables collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) remain constant throughout the trajectory, it follows that pfinal E Gfi,i'),
as needed. U
Lemma 7.4.4 futurefi,iq(V(i4,, ,Ro ) C WRi,,0).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 7.4.2 and 7.4.3. U
In the following lemma, we extend the result of Lemma 7.4.4 to the set Vi,i;;).
Lemma 7.4.5 future{i,i,)(V{i,i,},R20)  W{ii') .
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 7.4.4 and the fact that VTi,i,} = V(Y,I,) U V(i,,",
In the following two lemmas, we use Lemma 7.4.5 to show that V C,;i, g very-safe i,i} and
Vfi,i,) C delay-safeli,,i)(t), for any t E R - O, respectively.
Lemma 7.4.6 Vfi,it, C very-safe{i,i'}
.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 7.4.5 and Lemma 7.4.1, part 1. U
Lemma 7.4.7 For any t E R °O, it is the case that Vfi,i, Cg delay-safef{,iX,(t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 7.4.6 and Lemma 3.2.5, part 1. U
In the next three lemmas and the subsequent corollary, we show that the sets W{i,i) and
safe{i,i,j are equal. First, we show that any state that is R{i,i/,-reachable from a state p in
W{i,;,) through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j and has a
limit time equal to zero, is in the set W{i,i,q. Then, we show that Wi,i, C_ safe{i,i,} and
safe{,i} C_ W{i,i,}. Finally, the subsequent corollary states that Wfi,p} = safe{i,i,}.
Lemma 7.4.8 futurefi,iq,(W{i,i,}, O) C WC ,i,).
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton of n steps,
where n E N, that: starts in a state in W{ii,i,, is only comprised of states in Rfi,i,}, involves
no input actions on port j, and has a limit time equal to zero. Let Pij,it and pfinal be the
initial and final states of a, respectively. By induction on the length n of the execution
fragment a, we show that pfinal E W{i,i,}.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of no steps and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit. Since pinit E Wfi,i,,
it follows that Pfinal E Wfi,i,}.
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The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k+l1, for
some k E N, then Pfinl, E W{i,i,}. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if p'inal is the final
state of a', then it is the case that pai, E W{i,i,}. Since the final state of a is reached from
the final state of a' by a single step, the inductive step involves the consideration of all
possible steps leading from pil to Pfinal.
To complete the induction, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)j, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that P'[inal E Wi, i,} C G{i,ji,. There-
fore, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfial E G{i,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal.i P',nali. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the veloc-
ity of the vehicle i', it is the case that pfinal-.i, = pil.it. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
it follows that pfial.Oi •,.Oi and Pfia,.Oi, C p'I,,.Oi,. Therefore, since P'.ina E
Wf,i,) C_ disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i,}, it follows
that pfinal E W{i,i,}.
3. the brick-wall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p~,al E Wi,i'} C_ G{i,i'}. Therefore,
since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfial E G{i,i,).
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinalb.ii < Pnal•it.i Moreover, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the ve-
locity of the vehicle i, it is the case that Pfinal-i• = p'na,•.i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
it follows that pfina.Oi' p,,~.Oi, and Pfinal.Oi _ p,,al.Oi. Therefore, since p,,a E
Wfj,jq C disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i}, it follows
that Pfinal E W{i,i'}.
4. the actions protect(C)j,, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' - j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, affect neither the velocities of the vehicles i and i', nor the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables.
126
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that pal E W{i,i,} C G i,i,}. Therefore,
since the actions protect(C)jI, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"),
for i" E I- {i, i'}, do not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it follows
that Pfinal E Gfi,i'}.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' j j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I - {i, i'}, do not affect the velocities
of the vehicles i and i', it is the case that Pfinal-.i = P'•inati and Pfial-ii' = P~tialXi,.
From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that Pfinal.Oi C p;a.Oi and Pfinal.Oi, _ PCnat.Oi'.
Therefore, since Pna,, E W{i,i'} C disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it is the case that Pfinal E
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i,}, it follows
that Pfinal E WEi,i,}.
5. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i'"), for i", i"' E I, i" : i"', and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i""), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in R{i,il} and pajl E W{i,i,}.
Lemma 7.4.9 Wfi,i, C safe{i,i}) .
Proof: From the definition of safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that any state p E WE i,i,}
satisfies: (i) future{i,i,i(p, 0) 9 Gfi,i,, and (ii) there exists some input action r on port j
such that for every p',p" E Rp iiE,} satisfying p' E future{ ii,}(p, 0) and p' - p", it is the case
that p" E very-safe{i,ji,.
(i) Since p E W{i,i,}, the first condition follows from Lemma 7.4.8 and Lemma 7.4.1, part 1.
(ii) For the second condition, let r be the action protect(C)j, where C = {i}, if p E
yield(i, i'), and C = {i'}, otherwise. Without loss of generality, let p E yield(i, i') and
C= {i}.
Throughout the execution fragment from p to p', the actions colliding-pair(i", i"'), for
i", i"' E I, i" l  i"', and collision-effects(i""), for i"" E I, are not enabled. Therefore,
since none of the other discrete actions of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton can increase
the velocities of the vehicles i and i', Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies that p'.Oi C p.O2 and
p'.Oi, C p.Oi,. Moreover, since the protect({i})j action does not affect the velocity of
the vehicle i, Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies that p".Oi C p.Oi. Since p".Oi C p.O and
p E yield(i, i'), it is the case that in the state p" either the locations of the vehicles i and i'
are comparable and the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i', or the locations of the vehicles i
and i' are not comparable and the section of track owned by the vehicle i is entirely upstream
of the merge point (out, 0).
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Moreover, considering the step from p' to p", the protect({i})j action affects neither the
velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any of the collided variables. Therefore, since Lemma 7.4.8
implies that p' E Wfi,i,), it follows that p" E R{i,i) and p" E GEii,). In addition, since the
protect({i})j action does not affect the velocities of the vehicles i and i', Lemma 4.4.3,
part 1, implies that p".Oi C p'.Oi and p".Oi, C p'.Oi,. Therefore, since p' E Wfi,i)}, it
follows that p" E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). From the above conditions, it follows that
p" E WE i,i,).
In addition, since the protect({i})j action sets the variable brake-req(i, j) to True, it is
also the case that p" E PBi,.
Thus, since p" E W{i,i)}, p" E PBij, and either the locations of the vehicles i and i' in the
state p" are comparable and the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i', or the locations of the
vehicles i and i' in the state p" are not comparable and the section of track owned by the
vehicle i is entirely upstream of the merge point (out, 0), it follows that p" E V(i,i,) 9 V ii,).
Finally, Lemma 7.4.6 implies that p" E very-safe{i,i}, as needed. U
Lemma 7.4.10 For any p E R{i,i,}, if p E safe{i,i,} then p E W{i,i,}.
Proof: We show the contrapositive; that is, for any p E R({i,i}, if p ý W{i,i,} then p
safe{i,i,}. Since Wfi,i, = Rf{, i, n Gi,i,} n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') and p E R{i,i'}, we
consider the conditions p ý Gi,i,} and p . disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') separately.
1. p G(ii}.
From Lemma 3.2.4, part 1, it is the case that safe{i,i,} C G{i,iq,. Since p 0 Gi,i ,, it
follows that p 0 safe(i,ii,.
2. p 0 disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
We must show that p 0 safe{i,i,}. In order for the state p E R{i,i,} to be in the
set safe{i,i,} there must exist some input action r on port j such that for every
p',p" E R{ i,i} satisfying p' E future{ ,i,i(p,0) and p' -') p", it is the case that p" E
very-safe{i,i,}. Therefore, it suffices to show that for any input action r on port j,
there exist p',p" E R{i,i,} satisfying p' E future{i,i,)(p,O) and p'f- p", such that
p" € very-safe(ip,s).
Without loss of generality, suppose that the vehicles i and i' are traveling on adjacent
branches in the state p, i.e., p E incomparable(i, i'), and let r = protect({i, i'})j.
Since Lemma 3.2.1, part 3, implies that p E future{i,i},(p, 0), consider the case where
p' = p. Since p' = p and the input action protect({i, i'})j affects neither the lo-
cation, nor the velocity of the vehicles i and i', it follows that p".1; = p'.li = p.li,
P ".i = p'.xi = p.ii, p".1i, = p'.li, = p.li,, and p".+i' = p'.diy = p.ii'. Therefore,
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since the section of track owned by any vehicle depends only on its location and
its velocity, it is the case that p".Oi = p'.O; = p.Oi and p".Oi, = p'.Oi, = p.O1i.
Therefore, since p ý disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), p".Oi = p.Oi, and p".Oi, = p.Oi,,
it follows that p" V disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). Moreover, since the vehicles i and
i' are traveling on adjacent branches in state p, p".li = p.1i, p".li' = p.l1,, and
p" V disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that (out, 0) E p".Oi and (out, 0) E p".Oi,.
Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the vehicle i' is the first of the vehicles i
and i' to reach the merge point (out, 0) and that the vehicles i and i' have not collided
up until the point in time when the vehicle i' reaches the merge point. Moreover,
consider the evolution of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton following the state p" in
which a brick-wall(i') action is executed at the exact instant in time when the
location of the vehicle i' equals the merge point (out, 0) and the vehicles i and i'
move forward and remain stationary thereafter, respectively. Since (out, 0) E p".Oi,
it follows that at some state of such an evolution the action colliding-pair(i, i') is
enabled and, subsequently, executed. The state of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton
following the execution of the action colliding-pair(i, i') would, therefore, not be
in G{, i,}. It follows that p" 0 very-safe{i,i,} which implies that p V safe(i,i,}.
Using similar analyses, it can be shown that for any p E Rei,i,) and any input action
nr on port j, there exist p',p" E R {i,i) satisfying p' E future{i,)t (p, 0) and p' ' p",
such that p" V very-safe{i,iq,. It follows that p ý safe{i,,i}, as needed.
Corollary 7.4.11 W{i,i, = safe{i,i,).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 7.4.9 and 7.4.10. U
In the next few lemmas, we show that any state p in the set T{i,i,)(t), for any t E R >o, is
in the set delay-safe{i,i,)(t); that is, any state R{i,it,-reachable from p within an amount of
time t through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set
Gfi,ij and any state R{i,i,)-reachable from the state p in exactly an amount of time t through
an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set safe{i,,i) .
Lemma 7.4.12 Letp E T{i,i},(r), where -r E R>o, andp' E future{i,i}(p, t), where t E [0, 7].
If p' E G{i,i,}, p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r), and p'.Ci,(r - t) C p.Cir(7), then p' E Tfi,i,}(r - t).
Proof: We need to show that p' E R i,i,) n G fi,il) n disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r - t). Since
p' E G(i,i,}, it remains to be shown that p' E Rei,i,} and p' E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r -
t). We consider these two conditions by cases:
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1. p' E R{i,i'}.
This is the case because the function future4i,i,(p, t) only considers R{i,i,}-reachable
states.
2. p' E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', 7 - t).
Since p E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r), p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r), and p'.Ci,(r - t) C
p.Ci,(r), it follows that p' E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r - t), as needed.
Lemma 7.4.13 For all p E Tfilif(r), where r E R >o, and p' E future{i,,i,(p,t), where
t E [0, 7], it is the case that p' E Gi,iq,, p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r), and p'.Cit(r - t) C p.Ci_(r).
Proof: Let r E R>O and a be an execution fragment of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton of
n steps and trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in T{i,i,}(r), is only comprised
of states in Rjii,}, involves no input actions on port j, and has a limit time t that lies in
the interval [0, r]. Letting pi,it and Pf;,,t be the initial and final states of a, respectively, we
must show that Pfin.a E G i,i,}, Pfina•tCi(T-t) _ Pinit-Ci (r), and Pfnalt-Ci'(r-t) _ Pinit-Ci'(T)-
The proof is by induction on the length n of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfina = Pinit
and a.ltime = 0, i.e., t = 0. From Lemma 7.4.1, part 1, and the fact that Pinit E T{i,i'}(r), it
follows that Pfinal E G{i,i,}. Moreover, since t = 0, the conditions pf•,.alCi(T-t) C pi,it.Ci(r)
and Pfinal.Ci'(r - t) C Pinit-Ci,(r) are trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, with a.ltime = t, where t E [0, r], then Pfi,nl E G i,iq, Pfinal-Ci(r - t) _
Pinit.Ci(r), and Pfinal.Ci'(r - t) C Pinit-Ci,(r). Let a' be the part of the execution fragment
a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories and let a'.ltime = t', where t' E [0, t]. The
induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if pin and P'final are the initial and final
states of a', respectively, then it is the case that Pial E G , P 1 .Ci(r -t')
and pnal.Ci'(r - t') n_ pit.Ci'(r). Moreover, from Lemma 7.4.12 it follows that P',nal E
T{i,i'}(r - t'). Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of a' by a single
step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible steps and
trajectories leading from 'p'l to Pfinal.
In the case of a step, keeping in mind that the limit times of a' and a are equal, i.e., t' = t,
we consider all possible actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)j , for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
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2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p~nal E G{i,i,}. Therefore, since the
brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that Pfil E GEi,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal.-i < Pinal.Xi. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the veloc-
ity of the vehicle i', it is the case that Pfinal-i' = P'ail.dij. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2,
it follows that Pfinal.Ci(T - t) P ~nal-Ci(7 - t') and Pfinal.Ci'(T - t) 0 PCnal.Ci'(T - t').
However, from the induction hypothesis we have p(~T-.Ci(r - t') _ pi,.Ci(r) and
Ptinal.Ci,(r - t') C pnit.Ci'(r). Therefore, since pinit = P nit, it follows that final.Ci(T -
t) C piifit.C(r) and pfial.Ci,(T - t) C pi;nt.Ci,(r), as needed.
3. the brick-wall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p•Pal E Gj,j,q. Therefore, since the
brick-wall(i') action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that Pfinal E GE ,,).
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal.xi' _ P~,inalt.iI. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the ve-
locity of the vehicle i, it is the case that Pfinal-Xi = P'txli. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2,
it follows that PJinal.Ci(- -t) 0 P'inal.Ci(r - t') and pfinal.Ci',( - t) _ P~nal-Ci',( - t').
However, from the induction hypothesis we have ptnalCi(r - t') pnit.Ci(r) and
pfinaI.Ci,(r - t') C9 p& it (7). Therefore, since Pinit = Pnit, it follows that PfinalCi(T -
t) C Pinit.Ci(r) and Pfinal-Ci'(T - t) C pinit-Ci(r), as needed.
4. the actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, affect neither the velocities of the vehicles i and i', nor the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that P'thal E G{i,j,). Therefore, since
the actions protect(C)j,, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' 5 j, and brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, do not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it follows
that Pfial E GEi,i/,.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C),', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I - {i, i'}, do not affect the velocities
of the vehicles i and i', it is the case that Pfinal-i = P'tia and pfina/li, = Pltinai-,.
From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, it follows that pfinal-Ci(T - t) 'na.lCi(T - t') and
final.Ci'(r - t) C pfnal.Ci,(T - t'). However, from the induction hypothesis we have
PIlnal.Ci(r-t') C pnCi(r) and pi[fal-Ci'(r-t') pC nit.Ci,(r). Therefore, since pi,it =
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Piit, it follows that pfinaltCi(T - t) C Pinit.Ci(r) and Pfin.alCi'(T - t) C Pinit.Ci,(r), as
needed.
5. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i"), for i", i"' E I, i" 5 i"', and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i'""), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in Rii,} and p l C T,(r - t').
In the case of a trajectory, Lemma 4.4.4, part 2, applies and it follows that Pfilna.Ci(T - t) C
Pnal.Ci(7--t') and pfinaltCi'(T-t) _ Pnal.Cii(r-t'). However, from the induction hypothesis
it is the case that P-inat.Ci(T - t') p•nit.Ci(T) and p•nal.Ci'( - t') _ pit.Ci(7r). Therefore,
since pi,it = pinit, it follows that pfin•t.Ci(T-t) C pinit.Ci(r) and Pfinal-Ci'(T-t) _ pinit.Ci'(7)-
Moreover, since Pf•al E GE ,i,} and the collided(i, i') and collided(i',i) variables remain
constant throughout the trajectory, it follows that pfial E GCi,iq,, as needed. U
Lemma 7.4.14 For r E R 0o and t E [0, r], it is the case that future{i,i,}(T{i,i,}(r), t) _
T{ii'}(7 - t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 7.4.12 and 7.4.13. U
Corollary 7.4.15 For any t E R > o, it is the case that future{i,i,}(Ti,i,}(t), 0) C Tfi,il,(t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 7.4.14. U
Lemma 7.4.16 For any t E Ro> , it is the case that T{i,i}(t) C delay-safe{i,i},(t).
Proof: From the definition of delay-safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that:
1. future{i,i, (T{i,i, (t), [0, t]) C G{i, ), and
2. future i,i,1(Tfi,iq,(t),t) C safe(i,il,
.
The first condition follows directly from Lemma 7.4.14 and Lemma 7.4.1, part 1. More-
over, Lemma 7.4.14 and Lemma 7.4.1, part 4, imply that future{i,i,}(T{i,',i(t),t) C W ,ip).
Therefore, the second condition follows from Lemma 7.4.9. U
In the following lemma, we show that the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} protector implements the
Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,i,, R{.i,i,}j, ,i }, G d) protector. Since the protector automata
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} and Absj involve the composition of the same sensor automaton
with distinct controller automata, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automa-
ton of the protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} implements the discrete controller automaton
DC(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{,1, R, G{i,i ,}, j, d).
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Lemma 7.4.17 MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i} •< Abs(MERGE-VEHICLES, S{i,ip), R{i,i'), G(i,i), j, d).
Proof: Both the MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} and the Absj protectors involve the composition
of the same sensor automaton with distinct controller automata. From Theorem 2.7.4,
it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} im-
plements DCj. This is shown by a simulation from the discrete controller automaton of
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i }i to DCj.
The mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of the protector
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,ip} and DCj is almost the identity. In the discrete controller automaton
of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,pi}, the variable sendj is equal to either a member of P({i, i'}), or the
value null. In DCj, these valuations simply map to either the actions protect(C)j , where
C is the member of P({i, i'}) that corresponds to the valuation of the variable sendj of the
discrete controller automaton of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,ii}, or the value null, respectively.
The start states for the discrete controller automaton of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} and DCj
are the states in which sendj = null. These are related to each other according to the
mapping discussed above.
Furthermore, since the trajectories in both discrete controller automata are identical, we
need only consider their discrete transitions. We analyze the actions of the implementation
by cases, letting p denote any complete state of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton that
corresponds to the output state y, i.e., p E VALID and PrYMERGE-VEHICLES = Y.
1. The snapshot(y)j action of the implementation sets sendj to an element of P({i, i'}).
In order to show that the behavior of the implementation is allowed by the specifica-
tion, we must show that the input action snapshot(y)j of the implementation sets the
value of the sendj variable in such a way that the subsequently enabled action ir of the
implementation (i) guarantees that for all p', p" E Rfi,i, such that p' E future{i,i,}(p, 0)
and p' -) p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe{i,i,}(d), if p E safe{i,i}, and (ii) is an
arbitrary output action of the implementation, otherwise.
First, consider the case in which p E safe{i,i,}. Since Corollary 7.4.11 implies that p E
W{i,i,}, the discrete controller automaton of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} sets the variable
sendj according to whether the state p is in T{ii, 1(d), or not.
On one hand, if p _ T{i,;i}(d) then the discrete controller automaton of the pro-
tector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,iq} sets the variable sendj to either {i}, or {i'} accord-
ing to the strategy described in Section 7.3. Therefore, the snapshot(y)j action
enables either the protect({i})j action, or the protect({i'})j action. Since p E
W{i,i,}, Lemma 7.4.8 implies that p' E W{i,i,). Moreover, since the protect({i})j
and protect({i'})j actions affect neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any
of the collided variables, it follows that p" E Ri,ei,, p" E Giip), p".di = p'.i,
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and p".it, = p'.ii,. Therefore, since p' E W{i,i1), Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies
that p" E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). From the above conditions, it follows that
p" E W{i,i,). Moreover, since the protect({i})i and protect({i'})j actions set
the brake-req(i,j) and brake-req(i',j) variables, respectively, to True, it follows that
p" E V{i,i)}. Finally, Lemma 7.4.7 implies that p" E delay-safe{i,i)}(d), as needed.
On the other hand, if p E T{i,i,)(d) then the discrete controller automaton of the pro-
tector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,) sets the variable sendj to 0 and the protect(0)j action
is enabled. Since p E T{i,i,)(d), Corollary 7.4.15 implies that p' E T{i,i})(d). Moreover,
since the protect(0)j action affects neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor
any of the collided variables, it follows that p" E R{i,i,), p" E G(i,i,), p".ij = p'..i,
and p".ii = p'.+i,. Therefore, since p' E T{i,i,}(d), Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, implies
that p" E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', d). From the above conditions, it follows that
p" E T{i,i)}(d). Finally, Lemma 7.4.16 implies that p" E delay-safeli,i,)(d), as needed.
Next, consider the case in which p ý safe{i,i,}. In this case, the snapshot(y)j action
of the discrete controller automaton of MERGE- PROT- PAIR {i,i' sets the variable sendj
to either {i}, {i'}, or 0 and, subsequently, enables either the protect({i})j action,
the protect({i'})j action, or the protect(0)j action, respectively. However, when
p 0 safe{i,i,}, the DCj automaton sets the variable sendi arbitrarily and, subsequently,
enables an arbitrary output action. Therefore, the behavior of the discrete controller
automaton of the protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} is allowed by that of the DCj
automaton.
Therefore, the effects of the snapshot(y)j action of the implementation are allowed
by its specification.
2. The protect(C)i actions, for C E P({i, i'}), have identical effects in both discrete
controller automata. When the sendj variable matches either the set C, or the
protect(C)j action, respectively, the action protect(C)j is executed and the sendj
variable is set to null in both discrete controller automata.
3. The environment action in both discrete controller automata is stuttering. It fol-
lows that the mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of
MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} and the DCj automaton prior to and succeeding the execu-
tion of the environment action remains the same.
Corollary 7.4.18 The protector MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i, } guarantees that the automaton
MERGE-VEHICLES remains within G{i,il) starting from S{i,i,) given R{i,i,).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 7.4.17 and Theorem 3.2.9. U
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Table 7.3 Formal definitions of MERGE-PROT, GMERGE-PROT, SMERGE-PROT, and RMERGE-PROT.
MERGE-PROT E-- MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i, i ' }
ii I,ifi'
GMERGE-PROT -- G{i ,i l}
i,i' E I,i i'
SMERGE-PROT - S{ii'
i,i' E I,iAi'
RMERGE-PROT = Pnot-overspeed
7.5 Protection System MERGE-PROT
We now define the collision protector MERGE-PROT. While considering the automaton
MERGE-PROT, we restrict the states of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton to Pnot-overspeed as
defined in Section 4.2, i.e., RMERGE-PROT = Pnot-overspeed. Let GMERGEPROT and SMERGE-PROT
be the intersection of Gpi,,J and S{i,i,}, for all {i,i'}, where i,i' E I,i $ i', respec-
tively, and MERGE-PROT be the composition of MERGE-PROT-PAIR{i,i'}, for all {i, i'}, where
i,i' E I,i i i'. The protector MERGE-PROT guarantees that MERGE-VEHICLES remains
within GMERGE-PROT starting from SMERGEPROT given RMERGE-PROT. For reference, the for-
mal definitions of the MERGE-PROT automaton and the sets GMERGE-PROT, S MERGEPROT, and
RMERGE.PROT are shown in Table 7.3.
Lemma 7.5.1 The protector MERGE-PROT guarantees that the MERGE-VEHICLES automa-
ton remains within GMERGE-PROT from SMERGFPROT given RMERGE-PROT.
In the following proof, we show that all the states of an execution of PP X MERGE-PROT
starting from SMERGEPROT given RMERGE-PROT are in GMERGE-PROT. This is done by applying
Theorem 3.1.8 and showing that the second condition of the theorem does not hold.
Proof: Let a be any execution of the system PP X MERGE-PROT starting from a state in
SMERGE-PROT and in which all states are in RMERGE-PROT.
From Theorem 3.1.8, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in GMERGE-PROT = niE IiAi' G(i,i}).
2. a can be written as al ^  a 2, where
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(a) All state occurrences in at except possibly the last state occurrence are in the
set GMERGE-PROT = Ni' EI ,ii, G i,i,).
(b) If the last state occurrence in at is in G{i,i,), for some i, i' E I, i $ i', then there
exists i", i"' E I, i" # i"', {i", i"'} $ {i, i'}, such that the last state occurrence in
a1 is in G{i,,i,,}.
(c) All state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first state occurrence are in the
set nfl ,,i,,)E N past(G{i",i'}, a), for some N C {{i, i'} i, i' E I, i # i'}, where
INI 22.
We proceed by showing that it is not possible to decompose a as al ^  a 2 while satisfying
the three aforementioned conditions.
The violation of niI, a ,ii, G i,pi, can only occur through the violation of at least one
of the conditions G{i,ii,, where i,i' E I, i Z i'. Moreover, each of these conditions are
violated only through the execution of a colliding-pair action. Without loss of generality,
suppose that the first condition that is violated in a is the condition Gfi,i,}, for some
i, i' E I, i : i', and that such a violation has resulted through a colliding-pair(i, i')
action. Let p and p' be the states of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton prior to and succeeding
this colliding-pair(i, i') action, i.e., p,p' E RMERGE-PROT such that p --. p', where r =
colliding-pair(i, i'). Since the colliding-pair(i, i') action only sets the collided(i, i')
variable to True, it follows that p' E G{,i,} N (n fl ,i e i$i,{ii} g{i,} Gi,i}) . Now,
we attempt to decompose a as al "- a 2:
1. Suppose we split a at any state preceding the state p. Then the state p is in
a 2. Since p' is the first state in which one of the conditions Gfi, ,il,) for i", i"' E
I, i" 5 i"', is violated, it is the case that p E n i,,i,i, I,i"~ , G{i",im} and there
does not exist N C {{i", i"'} I i", i" E I, i" i'"} such that INI > 2 and p E
n {ji,i,,} EN past(G{,,,i,,7}, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this de-
composition of a is not valid.
2. Suppose we split a at the state p. Then the state p' is in a 2. Since p' is the first
state in which one of the conditions Gfji,,,i,}, for i", i" E I, i" i" i,s violated and
since the state p' is in G{i,i,} (N i",i'l E Ii"i"'{,i"i"'}{ii'} Gfi",ilm)), it follows that
there does not exist N C {{i", i"'} i", i" E I, i" i"} such that INI 2 2 and
p' E N {i,,i,"} E N past(G{ ii,ng,, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this
decomposition of a is not valid.
3. Suppose we split a at the state p'. Then p' is the last state of at and the first state
of a 2. However, p' E G fi,i (n Ni,,il,,,ll i,,i"i,,,,"i,,,,,, ii Gii  ) Therefore, the
second condition is violated and this decomposition of a is not valid.
4. Suppose we split a at any state succeeding p'. Then the state p' is in al. Since
Ep' E G,, n (n E I,1i1i,1' ,i "i'ii ' G.[,,,i,,, it follows that the state p' is not
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in the set f i,im E I,i"i"'" G ,{i",im}. Therefore, the first condition is violated and this
decomposition of a is not valid.
Therefore, the execution a cannot be decomposed into any such al and a2. It follows that
the first clause of Theorem 3.1.8 must hold; that is, every state in a is in GMERGE-PROT. This
implies that the protector MERGE-PROT guarantees GMERGE-PROT in the MERGE-VEHICLES
automaton starting from SMERGEPROT given RMER;GEPROT*.
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Chapter 8
Example 4:
Collision Avoidance on a General
Graph of Tracks
In this chapter, we consider a general track topology involving binary merges and diverges.
We first augment the model of the PRT 2 000TM to involve a track topology consisting of
multiple branches interconnected by Y-shaped merges and diverges - the new model is
referred to as the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton. Then we define the protector GRAPH-PROT
that guarantees that none of the vehicles of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton collide, assum-
ing that they are all abiding by the speed limit. The GRAPH-PROT protector is defined as the
composition of n(n- 1)/2 separate copies of another protector called GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii},
one copy for each unordered pair {i, i'} of vehicles of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton, for
i, i' E I, i 0 i'. Each of these GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,it} protectors, for i, i' E I, i i', is an im-
plementation of a particular instantiation of the abstract protector automaton of Section 3.2
and guarantees that the vehicles i and i' do not collide into each other.
8.1 Augmented Physical Plant: GRAPH-VEHICLES
In this section we augment the model for the system of n vehicles to involve a track topology
involving binary merges and diverges. This is done by extending the definition of the
location of a vehicle to support a graph of tracks and by introducing an additional internal
discrete action which is used to update the location variables of the vehicles as they cross
the junction points in the track topology.
The track topology is represented by a directed graph G = (V, E), where V and E denote
the sets of vertices and edges of the graph G, respectively. The vertices and edges of the
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graph G correspond, respectively, to the junctions and branches of the track topology. Any
edge e of the graph G is specified by an ordered pair of vertices that denote the initial and
the final vertices of the directed edge e, i.e., e = (visit, vfia.l). We use the notation e.vinit
and e.vfinal to denote the initial and final vertices of the edge e, respectively. The function
length : E --+ Ro maps an edge to its length. Moreover, the functions in(v), out(v), and
e(v) map the vertex v of the graph G to its sets of incoming edges, outgoing edges, and
both incoming and outgoing edges, respectively; that is, in : V -+ P(E), out : V -- P(E),
and e : V - 7P(E), with e(v) = in(v) U out(v), for all v E V.
The graph G, as defined above, is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
* All the edges of the graph G are of sufficient length to rule out collisions among vehicles
that are neither on identical, nor on contiguous edges; that is, if dma, is the maximum
sampling period of all the protectors under consideration, the length of each edge
in the graph G is greater than Axmaz = ýmaxdmax - imax/2ibrake - the maximum
distance a vehicle can travel if left free for dm,, time units and instructed to brake
thereafter, under the assumption that the vehicle does not collide and is abiding by the
speed limit. This restriction rules out the possibility of a vehicle having a dm,, time
unit claim overlap with a vehicle that is more than one edge upstream or downstream.
* All the merges and diverges of the graph G are Y-shaped; that is, for each vertex v
in the graph G, it is the case that (Iin(v)J, Iout(v)l) E {(1, 1), (2,1), (1, 2)}.
* All cycles must contain at least three edges. This condition ensures that the ordering
of the locations of vehicles traveling on successive branches of the track topology is
well defined.
Any point on the graph G is represented by a pair consisting of the directed edge of the
graph G and the distance of the particular point from the initial vertex of the directed edge.
The formal definition of the set L of locations is as follows:
L = {(e, x) I e E E and x E [0, length(e)]}
The set of locations is constrained by the length of the edges of the graph G; that is, for
l E L and I = (e,x), it is the case that x E [O, length(e)]. We use the notation I.e and l.x
to denote the edge and position components of the location 1, respectively. It is important
to note that, in this representation scheme, the vertices of the graph G have non-unique
representations; that is, for all edges e, e' E E, with e.vf,,al = e'.vinit, it is the case that
the location I = (e, length(e)) is identical to the location 1' = (e', 0). Finally, two locations
in L are comparable if they are locations either on identical, or on successive edges, i.e.,
the locations 1, ' E L are comparable only if either L.e = l'.e, or l.e.vi,,al = l'.e.visit or
l.e.viit = l'.e.vfinal.
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Addition of a non-negative scalar y to a location 1 E L, where 1 = (e, x), maps the location
1 to the set of locations that can be reached from the location 1 by traveling a distance
y downstream. The set (e, z) + y always exists and is defined to be either the singleton
{(e, a + y)}, if a + y < length(e), or the set Ue Eout(e.vfi,,) ((E,0) + (x + y - length(e))),
otherwise. This definition handles the cases in which the locations (e, z) + y extend past a
single split or merge, or even multiple splits and/or merges in the track topology.
It is important to note that addition of a location I with a non-negative scalar that is
bounded by the minimum distance from the location I to the closest second junction down-
stream results in a set of locations in which each location 1' is comparable to the loca-
tion I and satisfies the inequality 1 < 1'; that is, for all I E L, where 1 = (e, x), and
y E [0, length(e) - a + min Eout(e.fi,,) length(E)], the location I is comparable to all loca-
tions in I + y and, moreover, I < 1', for all 1' E 1 + y. In particular, since the length of each
edge of the graph G is assumed to be greater than Axzma, addition of a location I with
a non-negative scalar y < Am,,, results in a set of locations in which each location 1' is
comparable to the location I and satisfies the inequality 1 < 1'.
A closed interval in L is specified with an ordered pair of comparable locations and contains
all locations between them, e.g., [(el, xa), (e2, z 2)]. The partial ordering on comparable
locations in L is as follows: (el,zi) • (e2 ,X 2) if and only if either ,l 5 X2 and el = e2, or
el.vfinal = e2.vinit*
Due to the fact that the extent of a vehicle may extend beyond a split in the track topology,
we redefine the notion of the section of the track occupied by a particular vehicle as the
union of the intervals extending from the current position of the vehicle to a point on the
track that is a distance cme downstream; that is, the extent of a vehicle i E I is the set
Ei = U 1 E ,i+cle [li, r1].
In view of breaking the right-of-way symmetry when vehicles approach a merge in the track
topology, we must define a prioritization scheme. In Chapter 7, the prioritization was based
on the configuration of the merge; namely, the vehicle traveling on the right branch of the
merge had priority over a vehicle traveling on the left branch. In the case of the graph
of tracks, the notion of either left, or right is not well defined. Therefore, we associate
a unique priority index to each edge of the graph and give priority to vehicles traveling on
the edge whose priority index is greater. Let the function priority be an injection from the
set of edges E of the graph G, to the set of natural numbers N; that is, priority : E -- N,
where for any e, e' E E, e 5 e', it is the case that priority(e) $ priority(e').
The new model of the physical system, called GRAPH-VEHICLES, is presented in Figure 8.1.
The GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton is the result of augmenting the MERGE-VEHICLES automa-
ton of Chapter 7 so as to involve a general track topology consisting of Y-shaped merges and
diverges. Each of the reset-location(i) actions, for i E I, is enabled when the vehicle i
has reached the final point of the directed edge on which it is traveling, i.e., the vehicle i
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Figure 8.1 The GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action (stuttering)
protect(C)j, for all C E P(I), j E J
Internal:
colliding-pair(i, i'), for all i, i' E I, i' : i
collision-effects(i), for all i E I
brick-wall(i), for all i E I
reset-location(i), for all i E I
Discrete Transitions:
protect(C)j
Eff: for all i E C
brake-req(i, j) := True
if -brake(i) then
brake(i) := True
if i = 0O then i := 0
else fi := Cbrake
for all i E I- C
brake-req(i, j) := False
if brake(i) A (- Vk E j brake-req(i, k)) then
brake(i) := False
Si :E [Zmin, rmax]
reset-location(i)
Pre: li.x = length(li.e)
Eff: li.e :E out(l0.e)
li.x := 0
Variables
Internal:
i, E R, for all i E I, initially ii E R
brake(i) E Bool, for all i E I,
initially False
brake-req(i, j) E Bool, for all i E I, j E J,
initially False
Output:
li E L, for all i E I, initially li E L
ii E R, for all i E I, initially ii E R
collided(i, i') E Bool, for all i, i' E I, i' i,
initially False
subject to VALID
colliding-pair(i, i')
Pre: -collided(i, i')
A(E, n Ei, # :)
A(li < min(Ei n Ei,))
Eff: collided(i, i') := True
if (li.e # li'.e)
A(li.e.vfinal = li' .e.final)
then
collided(i', i) := True
collision-effects(i)
Pre: collided(*, i, *)
Eff: ii :E RŽO
xi :E IR
brick-wall(i)
Pre: True
Eff: ii := 0
if brake(i) then Xi := 0
else fi :E [0, max]
Trajectories:
for all i, i' E I, i $ i', collided(i, i') is constant throughout w
for all i E I and j E J, brake(i) and brake-req(i, j) are constant throughout w
for all i, i' E I, i i'
the function w.ii is integrable
for all t E T,
subject
w(t).ii = w(O).ii + f' w(s).~i ds
w(t).li.x = w(O).1i.x + fo w(s).ii ds
if -w. collided(i, i')
A(w(t).Ei n w(t).Ei, # 0)
A(w(t).li < min(w(t).Ei n w(t).Ei,))
then
t = w.ltime
if w(t).li.x = length(w(t).li.e) then
t = w.ltime
to VALID
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is located on a vertex of the graph G. At that point in time, its location is nondetermin-
istically set to the initial point of an arbitrary outgoing edge of the vertex on which the
vehicle i is located.
The remaining state variables, derived variables, and discrete actions of either the VEHICLES
automaton of Chapter 4, or the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton of Chapter 7 as well as the
notational shorthand collided(i, *), collided(*, i), and collided(*, i, *), for all i E I, defined
for the VEHICLES automaton in Section 4.1, carry over to the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton
unchanged.
As in the case of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton, the set of input actions of the GRAPH-
VEHICLES automaton includes the actions protect(C)j , for C E P(I) and j E J; that is,
the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton allows each protector j, for j E J, to brake any subset
of the vehicles. However, it is often the case that a protector j, for some j E J, need
not schedule but a subset of the actions protect(C)j, for C E P(I). In such cases, the
protector j is specified as having only the output actions that it is capable of scheduling
and the remaining input actions of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton on port j are ignored.
The VALID set of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton is the redefinition of the VALID set of
the VEHICLES automaton to account for the new track topology representation.
The GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton complies with the assumptions made about the PP au-
tomaton in Section 3.2.1. The GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton has neither input variables, nor
output actions, on any of its ports (Axioms 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively). Moreover, each
of the actions protect(Cj)j, for j E J and Cj = {i I brake-req(i,j) = True}, is a no-op
input action on port j for any R C VALID. Therefore, the set of no-op input actions on
each port j E J and any R C VALID is non-empty (Axiom 3.2.3).
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VALID C states(GRAPH-VEHICLES), defined as the set of states of the GRAPH-VEHICLES
automaton that satisfy the following conditions:
1. ý i, i' E I, i ý i', such that the set Ei n Ei, contains a positive length closed
interval of L.
2. ii > 0, for all i E I.
3. If --,collided(*, i, 7) then ii E [Emin, ,max], for all i E I.
4. If -'collided(s, i, ) A brake(i) then if ii = 0 then ii = 0 else ii = Ebrae, for all
i E I.
8.2 Auxiliary Derived Variables and Auxiliary Sets for the
GRAPH-VEHICLES Automaton
In this section, we define auxiliary derived variables and sets for the GRAPH-VEHICLES
automaton. Most of these variables and sets carry over from either the VEHICLES, or the
MERGE-VEHICLES automata. In such cases, the variables and sets are redefined only when
their extension to the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton is not obvious.
As in Chapter 7, we assume that the variables stop-disti, max-rangei(t), and max-veli(t),
defined for the VEHICLES automaton in Section 4.3, extend to involve location instead of
position variables in the obvious way.
As in the case of the extents of the vehicles of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton, we redefine
the sections of track owned and claimed by the vehicles in the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton.
While their formal definitions appear in Table 8.1, their informal interpretations follow.
Oi, for i E I, is the section of track that the vehicle i "owns". A vehicle i owns all
track intervals that extend from the current position of the vehicle i to the points on
the track that the vehicle i can reach even if it is braked immediately. Due to the
possibility of such track intervals extending beyond a split in the track topology, the
variable Oi is the union of all the intervals that the vehicle i owns.
Ci(t), for i E I and t E RŽ0 , is the section of track that the vehicle i "claims" within t time
units. A vehicle i claims within t time units all track intervals that extend from the
current position of the vehicle i to the points on the track that the vehicle i can reach
if braked after t time units and assuming worst-case vehicle behavior up to the point
in time when it is braked. Due to the possibility of such track intervals extending
beyond a split in the track topology, the variable Ci(t) is the union of all the intervals
that the vehicle i claims within t time units.
Henceforth, we assume that the sets disjoint-extents(i, i'), disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), and
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i',t), for i, i' E I, i $ i' and t E RŽo0 , defined for the VEHICLES
automaton in Section 4.3, have been extended to the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton to in-
corporate the redefinitions of the derived variables used in their definitions. Moreover, we
assume that the Lemmas 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, and 4.4.5 extend to the GRAPH-VEHICLES
automaton in the obvious way.
Several auxiliary sets for the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton are described below. Their formal
definitions appear in Table 8.2.
successive(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i $ i', is the subset of VALID that consists of the states
in which the vehicles i and i' are traveling in succession either on the same, or on
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Table 8.1 Auxiliary derived variables for the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton.
Oi C L, for all i E I, defined by
Oi = U [l, 
lI E li+(stop-disti+clen )
Ci(t) C L, for all i E I and t E • 0o, defined by
C(t) = U [,,l
I E i,+(-ma,-ragei(t)-ma,-ve4(t(2/(2ý,.,,,)+C,,n)
successive directed edges; that is, states in which either the vehicle i is downstream
of the vehicle i', or the vehicle i' is downstream of the vehicle i.
adjacent(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i # i', is the subset of VALID that consists of the states in which
the vehicles i and i' are traveling on different tracks that lead to the same junction;
that is, the edges on which the vehicles i and i' are traveling are distinct and have the
same final vertex.
proximate(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 5 i', is the subset of VALID that consists of the states in
which the vehicles i and i' are traveling either in succession as defined by the set
successive(i, i'), or on adjacent tracks as defined by the set adjacent(i, i').
remote(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i $ i', is the subset of VALID that consists of the states in
which the vehicles i and i' are traveling neither in succession as defined by the set
successive(i, i'), nor on adjacent tracks as defined by the set adjacent(i, i').
yield-successive(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 0 i', is the subset of successive(i, i') that consists of the
states in which, in the case of a claim overlap among the vehicles i and i', the vehicle i
must yield to the vehicle i'. When the vehicles i and i' are traveling in succession,
the vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i' if the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i'. The
vehicle i is said to be trailing the vehicle i' if the location of the vehicle i is strictly
less than the location of the vehicle i'.
yield-adjacent(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i 0 i', is the subset of adjacent(i, i') that consists of the
states in which, in the case of a claim overlap among the vehicles i and i', the vehicle i
must yield to the vehicle i'. When the vehicles i and i' are traveling on adjacent
incoming tracks, the vehicle i must yield to the vehicle i' if either only the vehicle i'
owns the upcoming merge point, or the vehicle i' has priority and neither or both
vehicles own the merge point.
yield(i, i'), for i, i' E I, i # i', is the subset of VALID that consists of the states in which,
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Table 8.2 Auxiliary sets for the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton.
successive(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
successive(i, i') = {p E VALID I (p.li.e = p.li,.e)
V (p.li.e.Vfinal = p.li,.e.vinit)
V (p.li,.e.vfinal = p.li.e.vi,it)}
adjacent(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
adjacent(i, i') = {p E VALID I (p.li.e 5 p.li,.e) A (p.li.e.vfinal = p.li,.e.vfina)}
proximate(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i : i', defined by
proximate(i, i') = successive(i, i') U adjacent(i, i')
remote(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
remote(i, i') = VALID - proximate(i, i')
yield-successive(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
yield-successive(i, i') = {p E successive(i, i') I p.li < p.li }
yield-adjacent(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i : i', defined by
yield-adjacent(i, i') = {p E adjacent(i, i') I ((p.li.e, length(p.li.e)) V p.Oi
A (p.li,.e, length(p.li,.e)) E p.O,)
V ((p.li.e, length(p.li.e)) E p.Oi
A (p.4li.e, length(p.li,.e)) E p.Oi,
A priority(p.l.e) < priority(p.lir.e))
V ((p.li.e, length(p.li.e)) V p.Oi
A (p.4li.e, length(p.li,.e)) V p.Oi,
A priority(p.li.e) < priority(p.4li.e))}
yield(i, i') C VALID, for i, i' E I, i : i', defined by
yield(i, i') = yield-successive(i, i') U yield-adjacent(i, i')
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in the case of a claim overlap among the vehicles i and i', the vehicle i must yield to
the vehicle i' in order to prevent a potential collision between the vehicles i and i'.
The following lemma describes some properties of the sets defined above.
Lemma 8.2.1 For all i, i' E I, i 0 i', the following hold:
1. VALID = proximate(i, i') U remote(i, i').
2. proximate(i, i') n remote(i, i') = 0.
3. successive(i, i') = yield-successive(i, i') U yield-successive(i', i).
4. yield-successive(i, i') n yield-successive(i', i) = 0.
5. adjacent(i, i') = yield-adjacent(i, i') U yield-adjacent(i', i).
6. yield-adjacent(i, i') n yield-adjacent(i', i) = 0.
Proof: We prove each of the conditions separately:
1. The condition that VALID = proximate(i, i') U remote(i, i'), for each i, i' E I, i i',
follows from the definition of the sets proximate(i, i') and remote(i, i').
2. As for the first condition, the condition that proximate(i, i') n remote(i, i') = 0, for each
i, i' E I, i 5 i', follows from the definition of the sets proximate(i, i') and remote(i, i').
3. For all i, i' E I, i 5 i', the sets yield-successive(i, i') and yield-successive(i', i) are both
subsets of the set successive(i, i'). Therefore, it suffices to show that any state p in the
set successive(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i $ i', is either in the set yield-successive(i, i'),
or in the set yield-successive(i', i).
Let the state p be any state in successive(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i # i'. Since
successive(i, i') C VALID, it is the case that p E VALID. Therefore, the sections
of the track occupied by the vehicles i and i' do not have a positive length closed
interval overlap. It follows that it is not possible for their locations to coincide; that
is, for any p E successive(i, i'), it is the case that p.li 0 p.li4. Therefore, regarding the
ordering of the locations of the vehicles i and i', there are only two viable cases:
(a) p.li < p.li,. In this case, p E yield-successive(i, i').
(b) p.lit < p.li. In this case, p E yield-successive(i', i).
4. If p E yield-successive(i, i') then it is the case that p.li < p.li,. It follows that p g
yield-successive(i', i). Similarly, if p E yield-successive(i', i) then it is the case that
p.lit < p.1i. It follows that p . yield-successive(i, i'). This suffices.
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5. For all i, i' E I, i # i', the sets yield-adjacent(i, i') and yield-adjacent(i', i) are both
subsets of the set adjacent(i, i'). Therefore, it suffices to show that any state p in the
set adjacent(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i $ i', is either in the set yield-adjacent(i, i'), or
in the set yield-adjacent(i', i).
Let the state p be any state in adjacent(i, i'), for some i, i' E I, i : i', and without loss
of generality let the vehicle i' be the vehicle traveling on the incoming edge of greater
priority, i.e., priority(p.li.e) < priority(p.li,.e). Regarding the ownership of the merge
point by each of the vehicles, there are four cases:
(a) (out, 0) E p.Oi A (out, 0) E p.Oi,. In this case, p E yield-adjacent(i,i') and
p € yield-adjacent(i', i).
(b) (out, 0) 0 p.Oi A (out, 0) 0 p.Oi,. Similarly to above, p E yield-adjacent(i, i') and
p € yield-adjacent(i', i).
(c) (out, 0) 0 p.Oi A (out, 0) E p.Oi,. In this case, p E yield-adjacent(i, i') and
p € yield-adjacent(i', i).
(d) (out,0) E p.Oi A (out,0) 0 p.Oi,. In this case, p . yield-adjacent(i,i') and
p E yield-adjacent(i', i).
6. This condition follows from the analysis in the proof of condition 5.
8.3 Protection System GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ji}
The GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} automata, for i, i' E I, i : i', are vehicle-pair collision protectors
and guarantee that the vehicles i and i' do not collide into each other, provided that all the
vehicles are abiding by the speed limit and the vehicles of all other vehicle pairs do not collide
between themselves. Each of the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii protectors, for i, i' E I, i $ i', is an
implementation of the abstract protector of Section 3.2 specialized to particular definitions
of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d.
The physical plant automaton, PP, is defined to be the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton of
Figure 8.1. The port j and the sampling period d are defined to be the port and sampling
period with which the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} communicates with the GRAPH-
VEHICLES automaton. While the port j is assumed arbitrary, the sampling period d is
restricted to the set (0, dmax], where dmax is the maximum protector sampling period pre-
sented in Section 8.1. The set of "good" states G is defined to be the set of states in which
the vehicles i and i' have not collided into each other, i.e., G = VALID - Pcollided(i,i') -
Pcollided(i',i). In this chapter, we use the notation G{i,i,) to denote the definition of G
that is specific to the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii protector. The set R is defined to be the
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set R = Pnot-overspeed n (ni",i"' E I,il"i"',{i",i"'}${ii'} G{i,,im)). This definition restricts the
states of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton to states in which all the vehicles are abid-
ing by the speed limit and in which the vehicles of all other vehicle pairs {i", i'"}, for
i", i"' E I, i" ý i"', {i", 'im} 0 {i, i'}, have not collided into each other. The set S is defined
to be the set safe defined in Section 3.2.1; that is, the set of states of the PP automaton
for which a single input action of PP on port j can guarantee that, provided no new input
actions on port j are allowed, all subsequently R-reachable states will be in G. Once again,
the definition of the set safe is specialized to the above definitions of the automaton PP,
the sets R and G, and the port j. In this chapter, we use the notation Rfi,i,} and Sfi,i,} to
refer to the above definitions of the sets R and S.
The GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} protector automaton is an implementation of the abstract pro-
tector automaton Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Sip,i,), R{i,ii,, Gfi,ij, ,j, d). More precisely, as is the
case for the abstract protector Absj, we define the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} automaton to
be the composition of a sensor and a discrete controller automaton. These automata are
implementations of their abstract equivalents of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 specialized, however,
to the above definitions of the parameters PP, S, R, G, j, and d. The sensor automaton is
precisely the specialization of the sensor automaton of Figure 3.2 to the above definitions
of the parameters PP, etc. The discrete controller automaton is defined in Figure 8.2.
The braking strategy of the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR {i,i,} protector is as follows. The protector is
allowed to brake the vehicles i and i' only if the sections of the track they claim in d time
units overlap. Given that the vehicles i and i' are indeed involved in such a claim overlap,
there are two possible scenarios depending on whether the vehicles i and i' are traveling
in succession, or on adjacent tracks. If the vehicles are traveling in succession, then the
vehicle i is instructed to brake if it trails the vehicle i'; otherwise, the vehicle i' is instructed
to brake. On the other hand, if the vehicles i and i' are traveling on adjacent edges, the
vehicle i is instructed to brake either if only the vehicle i' owns the merge point, or if both
or neither vehicles own the merge point and the vehicle i' is traveling on the edge of greater
priority; otherwise, the vehicle i' is instructed to brake.
It is important to note that the abstract protector automaton Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, S{i,i}),
R{i,i,}, G{i,i,}, j, d) complies with the assumptions made about the abstract protector in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. In particular, since the vehicle location variables, the vehicle velocity variables,
and the collided variables are output variables of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton, the set
safe is YGRAPH-VEHICLES-determinable and actions that guarantee safety can be determined
from the output variables of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton (Axioms 3.2.4 and 3.2.5,
respectively). Moreover, the sets Rfi,i,) and G{i,i,} are YGRAPH-VEHICLES•-determinable (Ax-
ioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7, respectively) and the set of start states S{i,i,} is a subset of the set
safe (Axiom 3.2.8), since S{i,i,} is defined to be the set safe.
In Section 3.1 it was shown that the abstract protector Absj guarantees that the physical
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Figure 8.2 Discrete controller automaton for the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i}).
Actions: Input: e, the environment action (stuttering)
snapshot(y)j, for each valuation y of YGRPH-VEHICLES
Output: protect(C)j, for C E P({i, i'))
Variables: Internal: sendj E P({i, i'}) U null, initially null
Discrete Transitions:
snapshot(y)j
Eff: if y _ disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', d) then
if y E yield(i, i') then
sendi := {i}
else
send3 := {i'}
else
sendj := 0
protect(C)j
Pre: sendj = C
Eff: sendj := null
Trajectories:
w.sendj _ null
plant PP remains within G starting from S given R. Similarly, the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,iq}
automaton guarantees that the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton remains within G{i,i,} starting
from S{i,i, given R{i,i,). This is shown in the following section.
8.4 Correctness of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}
The main result to be shown is that GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii} • Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Sf{,i;),
R{i,i), G{i,i),j, d). Since both GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} and Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Sip,i},
R{i,i,), Gfil,,), j, d) involve the composition of the same sensor automaton with distinct dis-
crete controller automata, Theorem 2.7.4 applies. Therefore, it suffices to show that the
discrete controller automaton of the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} of Figure 8.2 imple-
ments the discrete controller automaton DC(GRAPH-VEHICLES, S{i,iq}, R{i,i}, G{i,i,}, j, d) of
Figure 3.3. From Theorem 2.6.1, this follows by showing that there exists a simulation
relation between the states of the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'}
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Table 8.3 Sets used in the correctness proof of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'}.
Wi,i,} C_ VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', defined by
f i,i} = R i,i, nl G{,i, l n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i')
Bfi,i' C_ VALID, for i, i' E I, i A i', defined by
B{i,i'} = Wi,i'} n PBii n PBi,.
V(i,i,) C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
V(ii,) = {p E Wiil,) n P.,1 I(P E successive(i, i') A p.li < p.lil)
V (p E adjacent(i, i') A p.Oi C [p.li, (p.li.e, length(p.li.e))])}
Vf i,i, C VALID, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', defined by
VW ,i,} = V(i,i,) U V(ii )
Tli,i,}(t) C VALID, for i, i' E I, i $ i', and t E R -o, defined by
T{ i', (t) = R{•,ig n G f , l,} n disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t)
and the discrete controller automaton DC(GRAPH-VEHICLES, S{i,i,), R{i,i,), G{i,i, )j, d). We
first give some set definitions, then prove some lemmas, and finally show the existence of
such a simulation relation.
In this section, we use the notation future{i,i,), safe{i,il), very-safe{i,i, , and delay-safe{i,i,}
to denote the specialization of the function future, the sets safe and very-safe, and the
function delay-safe, which are defined in Section 3.2.1, to the automaton GRAPH-VEHICLES,
the sets Rli,i,} and G4ii',, and the the port j of the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii) protector.
Moreover, since the environment action of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton is stuttering,
its consideration is omitted in all inductive proofs involving the PP automaton.
We proceed by defining several sets that are used in the correctness proof of the protector
GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii). For reference, their formal definitions appear in Table 8.3.
Let W{i,i,) be the subset of R fi,il, n G{i,i) comprised of the states in which the section of the
track owned by the vehicle i does not overlap the section of track owned by the vehicle i';
that is, W{i,i,) = R{i,i) n G{i,if) n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Let B{i,il) be the subset of of W{i,i,} comprised of the states in which the vehicles i and i'
are both being instructed to brake by the protector j; that is, B{i,i,} = W ,ij}n PBij n PB,,,.
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Let V(i,i,) be the subset of W{i,i,) comprised of the states in which the vehicle i is being
instructed to brake by the protector j and either the vehicles i and i' are traveling in
succession and li < lit, i.e., the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i', or the vehicles i and i'
are adjacent and the section of the track owned by the vehicle i is entirely upstream of the
merge point (out, 0). Moreover, let Vfi,iq, be defined as V{i,i,} = V(i,i,) U V(i,,i).
Let T{i,il,(t), where t E R 0o, be the subset of R{i,i)} n G(i,i,) comprised of the states in
which the section of the track claimed in time t by the vehicle i does not overlap the
section of the track claimed in time t by the vehicle i'; that is, T{i,i,}(t) = R{i,i,) n Gfil,,} n
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', t).
The following lemma defines the relation among the sets G{i,i,}, W{i,i'}, Bf i,i,, V{i,i,), and
T ,il} (t), for t E R .
Lemma 8.4.1 For all t, t' E R >0 , t < t', the following hold:
1. f, c_() W , C G,.
2. Vfi,i) C W{i,i, _C G{i,i,).
3. B i,i, 
_ W i,i, 
_ Gfi,iq,.
5. Tf,,x(0) = W4Jill.
Proof: Follow directly from the definitions of the sets Wi,ij,, B{i,i,), Vi,i,}, and Tfi,i,)(r),
where 7 E Ro0 , and Lemma 4.4.2. N
In the next two lemmas, we show that any state p in the set Bfi,i,} is in the set very-safe{i,i,);
that is, any state Rf,}i,}-reachable from p through an execution fragment that involves no
input actions on port j, is in the set Gfi,i,). In the first lemma, we show that any state that
is R{i,i,}-reachable from p through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on
port j, is in the set W{i,i,}. In the second lemma, we show that Bfi,i) Cg very-safe{i,i,}.
Lemma 8.4.2 future{i,i,)(B{i,i,},R>o) C Wyipi,
.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton of n steps and
trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in Bfi,i), is only comprised of states in
R{i,i,), and involves no input actions on port j. Let pirni and Pfi,,l be the initial and final
states of a, respectively. By induction on the length n of the execution fragment a, we
show that Pfinal E W{i,i')}
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit.
Since Pinit E B{i,i,}, Lemma 8.4.1, part 3, implies that Pfal E WE i,i,).
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The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1, for
some k E N, then Pfina• E Wi,iq,}. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if
p'fin, is the final state of a', then it is the case that Pnal E W{i,i,}. Since the final state
of a is reached from the final state of a' by a single step, the inductive step involves the
consideration of all possible steps and trajectories leading from Pal to Pfinal.
In the case of a step, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)j, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p;nal E Wi,i ,} G i,i,. There-
fore, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfil E G{i,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal,.i • P,,nal.'i. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the veloc-
ity of the vehicle i', it is the case that Pfial-,i, = P~•nal.•i,. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
it follows that Pfinal.Oi C p14 a.Oi and Pfinal•Oi', pCn,,a.Oi,. Therefore, since P'na1 E
Wfi,i,} g disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i,}, it follows
that Pfi,,l E WEi,i,.
3. the brick-wall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that P'ina E W{ii} C G{i,i,}. Therefore,
since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfinal E G{i,i'}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal Xi' P~inal*iti. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the ve-
locity of the vehicle i, it is the case that Pfinal-.i = pinal••i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
it follows that Pfinal.Oi' C pnal.Oi' and Pfinal.Oi p'~in,a.Oi. Therefore, since Pi•l E
Wfi,,} C disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that Pfinat E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,il,, it follows
that Pfinal E WEi,i,}.
4. the actions protect(C)j3 , for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' : j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I - {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, affect neither the velocities of
the vehicles i and i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
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From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that Pnal E W{i,i,') Gfi,i,). Therefore,
since the actions protect(C)jl, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' i j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I - {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, do not affect the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables, it follows that Pj,al E Gii,}.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I - {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'),
for i"' E I, do not affect the velocities of the vehicles i and i', it is the case that
PfinaliXi = P_,znal-ii and Pfin••i.i', = P'n,•rltii,. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows
that pfi,,aOi p•~i t.Oi and Pfinal.Oi C_ pP,,.Oii. Therefore, since P,•, E Wy,i, C
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it is the case that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i,), it follows
that Pfinal E W{i,i'}.
5. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i"'), for i", i"' E I, i" $ i'", and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i"'), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in Rfi,i,} and p,, E Wfi,i,).
Since, pin•t E B(i,it) C PBi* n PB,j and the execution fragment leading from pinit to Pnal
involves no input actions on port j, it follows that P',,nal E PBs n PBs,j. Therefore, in the
case of a trajectory from p,,l to pfinal, Lemma 4.4.4, part 1, implies that pfia,,l.Oi P;nal.Oi
and Pfi•,t.Oi, C p', I.Oi,. Therefore, since P~n E W{(i,i} disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it
follows that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). Moreover, since p~al E W{i,i,) 9 G(i,i,} and
the variables collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) remain constant throughout the trajectory, it
follows that Pfia,, E G(i,i,). Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the
set R(i,i,), it follows that Pfinal E W{i,iq}, as needed. U
Lemma 8.4.3 Bi,i;} 9 very-safe{i,i,}.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 8.4.2, Lemma 8.4.1, part 3, and the definition of
very-safe in Section 3.2.1. N
In the next three lemmas and the subsequent corollary, we show that the sets Wii,} and
safefi,iq are equal. First, we show that any state that is R{i,i,}-reachable from a state p in
W{i,i,) through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j and has a
limit time equal to zero, is in the set W{i,i,. Then, we show that Wfi,i, C_ safe{i,i,} and
safe(i,i} C Wfi,p,. Finally, the subsequent corollary states that Wfii,} = safe(i,i,}.
Lemma 8.4.4 future(i,i,)(Wi,i,), O) ( Wfi,i,0.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton of n steps,
where n E N, that: starts in a state in W{i,i), is only comprised of states in R(i,iq, involves
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no input actions on port j, and has a limit time equal to zero. Let pini and Pafit be the
initial and final states of a, respectively. By induction on the length n of the execution
fragment a, we show that Pfi,,a E WE i,i,}
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of no steps and, therefore, Pfina = Pi,it. Since piit E Wfi,iE,,
it follows that Pfial E W{ii,}.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k+1, for
some k E N, then Pfin•, E W{i,i,i. Let a' be the part of the execution fragment a comprised
of the first k steps. The induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if p'inal is the final
state of a', then it is the case that pnal E W(i,i'}. Since the final state of a is reached from
the. final state of a' by a single step, the inductive step involves the consideration of all
possible steps leading from p~,a to Pfinal.
To complete the induction, we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)j, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that plal E W{i,i} C_ G{i,i,}. There-
fore, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfinal E GEi,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal-•.i 5 P,,avti. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the veloc-
ity of the vehicle i', it is the case that Pfinal-i, = Pnal.ii. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
it follows that Pfinal.Oi C p'•,.Oi and Pfinalt.Oi pi,,na.Oi,. Therefore, since Pnal E
W{i,i,} C disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that Pfi,,•a E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set R{i,i,}, it follows
that Pfinal E W{i,i}
3. the brick-wall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that Pf'nai E W{i,i} C Gpi,i,}. Therefore,
since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i)
variables, it follows that Pfinal E G{i,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinal-.fi, _ IP• nati'. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the ve-
locity of the vehicle i, it is the case that fi,,nal-i = /p -.+i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1,
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it follows that pjinal.Oi' C P',ia.Oi, and pft.Oi POt.Oi. Therefore, since Pn,' E
Wfi,i,} g disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it follows that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set Ri,il,, it follows
that Pfinal E W{i,i,).
4. the actions protect(C)ji, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' : j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, affect neither the velocities of
the vehicles i and i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that pyal E W{ii} G{i,i,}. Therefore,
since the actions protect(C)j,, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' # j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, do not affect the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables, it follows that Pfi,,a E Gfi,,.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)ji, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' f j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I - {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'),
for i"' E I, do not affect the velocities of the vehicles i and i', it is the case that
Pfinal-ii = P••al-i and Pfinal-.i' = pýinal•t.i. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows
that Pfinal.Oi C P'n a.Oi and Pfinal.Oi, C p'~nal.Oi'. Therefore, since Ptina E W{i,i'}
disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'), it is the case that Pfinal E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Finally, since all states in a are, by definition, restricted to the set Rfj,,}, it follows
that Pfinal E W{i,i,}.
5. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i"'), for i", i"' E I, i" $ i'", and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i""), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in R{i,il) andP;al E W{ii'}.
Lemma 8.4.5 W{i,i,) C safe(i,i,) .
Proof: From the definition of safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that any state p E W{i,i,)
satisfies: (i) future{i,i, (p, 0) C G{i,i,}, and (ii) there exists some input action r on port j
such that for every p',p" E R{ii,i} satisfying p' E future{i,i,)(p, 0) and p' -'- p", it is the case
that p" E very-safe{i,i,}.
(i) Since p E Wf{,j,), the first condition follows from Lemma 8.4.4 and Lemma 8.4.1, part 1.
(ii) For the second condition, let r be the action protect({i, i'})j.
From Lemma 8.4.4, it follows that p' E W{i,il}. Now, considering the step from p' to p", since
the protect({i, i'})j action affects neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any of the
collided variables, it follows that p" E Rfi,il,, p" E G{i,i,}, p".fi = p'. ii, and p".dii, = P'.ii'.
Therefore, Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies that p".Oi C p'.Oi and p".Oi, C p'.Opi. Since
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p' E W{ii'), it follows that p" E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). From the above conditions, it
follows that p" E W{ii,l.
Moreover, since the protect({i, i'})j action sets the internal variables brake-req(i, j) and
brake-req(i', j) to True, it is the case that p" E PB,, n PB,,,. Since p" E W{i,i,}, it follows
that p" E B{i,i,).
Finally, Lemma 8.4.3 implies that p" E very-safe{,i,i), as needed. I
Lemma 8.4.6 For any p E R{i,i,), if p E safe{i,i,) then p E Wfii,).
Proof: We show the contrapositive; that is, for any p E R{i,i,), if p V W{i,i,) then p 4
safe{i,i,) . Since W ,ji,) = R{i,i ,)n Gf{i,i) n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') and p E R{i,i)}, we
consider the conditions p ý G{i,i,) and p . disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i') separately.
1. p V Gp i,,).
From Lemma 3.2.4, part 1, it is the case that safe{i,i,} C Gfi,i,}. Since p 0 G{i,i,}, it
follows that p V safe{i,i,}.
2. p ý disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
We must show that p ý safe(i,i,}. In order for the state p E Rjii,} to be in the
set safe{i,,i, there must exist some input action r on port j such that for every
p', p" E R{i,ji, satisfying p' E future{i,it,(p, 0) and p' -~ p", it is the case that p" E
very-safe{i,i,). Therefore, it suffices to show that for any input action r on port j,
there exist p',p" E Rfi,il satisfying p' E future{i,i,)(p,O) and p' -) p", such that
p" . very-safef{i,i}.
Using similar analyses to those presented in the proofs of Lemmas 6.2.9 and 7.4.10,
it can be shown that for any p E R {i,i} and any input action r on port j, there
exist p',p" E Rf{i,i, satisfying p' E future{i,i,}(p,0) and p' - p", such that p" &
very-safe{i,i,) . It follows that p V safe{i,i,), as needed.
Corollary 8.4.7 W{ii') = safe{,i',}.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 8.4.5 and 8.4.6. I
In the following three lemmas, we show that any state R{i,i,}-reachable from a state in V(i,i,)
through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j and has a limit time
that lies in the interval [0, dmax], is in the set W(i,i,}. In the first lemma, we show that if the
final state of such an execution fragment is in G{i,i,) and the section of track owned by the
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vehicle i has not grown since the beginning of the execution fragment, then the final state
of the execution fragment is in Wfi,i,). In the second lemma, we show that the final state
of any such execution fragment is in Gfi,i,} and the section of track owned by the vehicle
i does not grow throughout the execution fragment. The third lemma states the desired
property which follows directly from the first two lemmas.
Lemma 8.4.8 Let p E V(i,i, ) and p' E future{i,i,)(p, [0, dmaxl). If p' E G{i,i}, and p'.Oi C
p.Oi, then p' E W{,i,i}.
Proof: We need to show that p' E Wfi,iq,; that is, we need to show that the state p' is in the
set R fii,) n G fil,,} n disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). Since p' E GI, i,), by assumption, it remains
to be shown that p' E R{i,i) and p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). We consider these two
conditions by cases:
1. p1 E RCi,i,) .
This is the case because the function future{i,iq, (p, R >O) only considers R{i,i,)-reachable
states.
2. p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Since p E V(i,i,), there are two possible scenarios: (i) p E successive(i, i') and p.li <
p.l,4, (ii) p E adjacent(i, i') and p.Oi g [p.li, (p.li.e, length(p.li.e))].
In the first case, it is as if the vehicle i is trailing the vehicle i' on a single track. Since
p E V(i,i,) C W{i,i}, the sections of the track owned by the vehicles i and i' in state
p are disjoint. Now, consider the section of track owned by the vehicle i in the state
p'. Since p'.Oi C p.Oi, it follows that p.1i = min(p.0O) <_ p'.14 = min(p'.Oi) and there
exist locations in p.Oi that are at least as downstream as any of the locations in p'.Oi.
Next, consider the section of track owned by the vehicle i' in the state p'. Because
of the non-negative constraint on the vehicle velocities it follows that the location
p'.li, = min(p'.Oi,) is either equal to, or downstream of the location p.li, = min(p.Oi).
Moreover, the sections of track owned by the vehicle i' in state p' could only range
from the location p'.1i, up to the locations that are a distance AXmax downstream
from the location p.li,. Therefore, because of the constraint on the length of the edges
in the track topology and the constraint on the minimum number of edges comprising
a cycle in the track topology, it follows that p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
In the second case, since p.Oi C [p.14, (p.li.e, length(p.li.e))], the section of the track
owned by the vehicle i in state p is strictly within the incoming directed edge p.1i.e.
Since p'.Oi 9 p.O0, the same is true for the section of track owned by the vehicle i
in state p'. Similarly to above, because of the non-negative constraint on the vehicle
velocities it follows that the location p'.1i, = min(p'.Oi,) is either equal to, or down-
stream of the location p.4li = min(p.Oi,). Moreover, the sections of track owned by
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the vehicle i' in state p' could only range from the location p'.li up to the locations
that are a distance Axm,, downstream from the location p.li,. Therefore, because
of the constraint on the length of the edges in the track topology, the constraint on
the minimum number of edges comprising a cycle in the track topology, the fact that
the vehicles are traveling on adjacent tracks in state p, and the fact that the section
of track owned by the vehicle i remains within the incoming branch, it follows that
p' E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i').
Lemma 8.4.9 If p E V(i,i,) and p' E future{i,i,}(p, [0, dmax]), then it is the case that p' E
Gf i,i, and p'.Oi C p.Oi.
Proof: Let a be an execution fragment of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton of n steps and
trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in V(i,ii), is only comprised of states in
Rfi,iq,, involves no input actions on port j, and has a limit time that lies in the interval
[0, dmax]. Letting Pinit and pfinl be the initial and final states of a, respectively, we must
show that Pfi•l E GCi,i,} and Pfinal.Oi C init.Oi. The proof is by induction on the length n
of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit.
From Lemma 8.4.1, part 2, and the fact that Pinit E V(ii,) 9 V{i,i,}, it follows that Pfinal E
G{ 1i,iq. Moreover, the fact that Pfinal.Oi C Pinit.Oi is trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k+1, for
some k E N, then Pfi•l E G{i,i'} and Pfinal.Oi C Pinit.Oi. Let a' be the part of the execution
fragment a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories. The induction hypothesis involves
the assertion that if pinit and P inal are the initial and final states of a', respectively, then
it is the case that pal E G{i,i,} and pna•.Oi C pit,.Oi. Moreover, from Lemma 8.4.8 it
follows that p;nal W{i,i}. Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of a'
by a single step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible
steps and trajectories leading from Pil to Pfinal.
In the case of a step, we consider all possible actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)i, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and does not affect
the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p•nal E G{i,i}. Therefore, since the
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brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that p,,al E G{i,i,).
Moreover, since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case
that Pfial.-i < P1inal ii. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that PfinalOi C p,,Oi.
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that p'aIal.Oi _ Pit.Oi. There-
fore, since Pinit = APnit, it follows that PfinaltOi C Pinit.Oi, as needed.
3. the actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' f j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" 5 i, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, affect neither the velocity of the
vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p;inal E Gi,iq,}. Therefore, since
the actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I, i" $ i, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, do not affect the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables, it follows that Pfinal E G i,ii,.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)j,, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I,i" i i and reset-location(i"'), for
i"' E I, do not affect the velocity of the vehicle i, it is the case that p•,it.i = Ps,,l.i.
From Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, it follows that Pfinal.Oi _ p,,al.Oi. However, from the
induction hypothesis it is the case that p,,Pt.Oi C p•,i.Oi. Therefore, since pinit =
pnit, it follows that Pfinal.Oi C pini.i, as needed.
4. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i'"), for i", i"' E I, i" j i"', and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i""), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in R(i,i, and P~nal E W{i,i'}
Since pAfn E V(i,i,) _ PBis and the execution fragment leading from p ,it to ~,,l involves no
input actions on port j, it follows that p•,l E PB,,. Therefore, in the case of a trajectory
from Py,, to Pfinal, Lemma 4.4.4, part 1, implies that Pfinal.Oi 9 p';al.Oi. However, from
the induction hypothesis it is the case that p•,,nalOi _ pnit.Oi. Since pi,it = pjit, it follows
that Pfinal.Oi C Pinit.Oi. Moreover, since P,,nal E G{i,i,) and the variables collided(i, i') and
collided(i', i) remain constant throughout the trajectory, it follows that Pfinal E G i,i'), as
needed. I
Lemma 8.4.10 future{i,i,}(V(i,i,), [0, dmax]) 9 W{i,i'}.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 8.4.8 and 8.4.9. I
In the following lemma, we extend the result of Lemma 8.4.10 to the set Vfi,i,}.
Lemma 8.4.11 future(i,i,)(V{i,i'}, [0, dmax]) C W{i,i}
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Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 8.4.10 and the fact that V{i,i, = V(i,i,) U V(io,i).
The following lemma states that any state p in the set Vfi,i,j is in the set delay-safe{i,i},(d);
that is, any state R{i,i,}-reachable from p within an amount of time d through an execution
fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set G{i,i,} and any state Rfi,if,-
reachable from p in exactly an amount of time d through an execution fragment that involves
no input actions on port j, is in the set safe{i,i,}.
Lemma 8.4.12 Vfi,, _ delay-safe{i,i,}(d).
Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.2.4, part 1, Lemma 8.4.11, Corollary 8.4.7, and the fact that
d < dmax. U
In the next few lemmas, we show that any state p in the set T, 1i,i}(t), for any t E R -O0 , is
in the set delay-safe{i,i,}(t); that is, any state Rf{,I,t-reachable from p within an amount of
time t through an execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the
set G{i,i,} and any state R{i,i}-reachable from p in exactly an amount of time t through an
execution fragment that involves no input actions on port j, is in the set safe{i,i,) .
Lemma 8.4.13 Letp E Tfi,i,}(r), where r E R>0 , and p' E future(i,i,(p, t), where t E [0, r].
If p' E G(i,i,}, p'.Ci(T - t) g p.Ci (r), and p'.Ci,(r - t) g p.Ci,(r), then p' E T(i,i,}(r - t).
Proof: We need to show that p' E R{i,i,} n Gfi,l,} n disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r - t).
Since p' E G( i,i}, by assumption, it remains to be shown that p' E R{i,i,} and p' E
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r - t). We consider these two conditions by cases:
1. p' E R{i,i,}.
This is the case because the function future{i,i,}(p, t) only considers R{i,i,}-reachable
states.
2. p' E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', 7 - t).
Since p E T{(i,i,(r), it is the case that p E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r). There-
fore, since p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r) and p'.Cir(r - t) 9 p.Ci(r7), it follows that p' E
disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', r - t), as needed.
Lemma 8.4.14 For all p E T{i,i,}(r), where r E Ro0 , and p' E future{i,j,}(p, t), where
t E [0, r], it is the case that p' E G{i,i,}, p'.Ci(r - t) C p.Ci(r), and p'.Ci,(r - t) C p.Ci,(r).
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Proof: Let r E Ro and a be an execution fragment of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton of
n steps and trajectories, where n E N, that: starts in a state in T{i,il,(r), is only comprised
of states in Ri,i,}, involves no input actions on port j, and has a limit time t that lies in
the interval [0, r]. Letting pinit and pfial be the initial and final states of a, respectively, we
must show that Pfinl E Gi,i), PfinalCi(T-t) C pinif.Ci(r), and pfinal.Ci'(-t) _ Pinit-Ci'(T)-
The proof is by induction on the length n of the execution fragment a.
For the base case, consider the execution fragment a of length n = 0; that is, a is an
execution fragment that consists of a single point trajectory and, therefore, Pfinal = Pinit
and a.ltime = 0, i.e., t = 0. From Lemma 8.4.1, part 1, and the fact that Pinit E T{i,i'}(r), it
follows that PjfiA E G{i,i}). Moreover, since t = 0, the facts that pfinal-Ci(r - t) 0 Pinit-Ci(r)
and pfinat.Ci-(r - t) C. Pinit-Ci,(r) are trivially true.
The inductive step involves showing that if a is an execution fragment of length n = k + 1,
for some k E N, with a.1time = t, where t E [0, r], then Pfinal E G{i,it}, pfnal.Ci(r - t) _
pinit.Ci(r), and pfinal.Ci'(r - t) _ pinit.Ci,(r). Let a' be the part of the execution fragment
a comprised of the first k steps and trajectories and let a'.ltime = t', where t' E [0, t]. The
induction hypothesis involves the assertion that if p'nit and 'finl are the initial and final
states of a', respectively, then it is the case that p'•l E G{i,i'), P•ailCi(T - t') pit.Ci(r),
and p',al.Ci'(r - t') _ PnitiCi,(r). Moreover, from Lemma 8.4.13 it follows that P,'I'a E
T4,il,)(r - t'). Since the final state of a is reached from the final state of a' by a single
step or trajectory, the inductive step involves the consideration of all possible steps and
trajectories leading from P',,al to Pfinal-
In the case of a step, keeping in mind that the limit times of a' and a are equal, i.e., t' = t,
we consider all possible discrete actions by cases:
1. the actions protect(C)i, for C E P({i, i'}), are not enabled because a involves no
input actions on port j.
2. the brick-wall(i) action sets the velocity of the vehicle i to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p~tnTl E G{i,it,. Therefore, since the
brick-wall(i) action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that Pfint E G{i,i}.-
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
Pfinalt-i < P1finaltii. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i) action does not affect the veloc-
ity of the vehicle i', it is the case that Pfinal.Xi, =  Pnlt., From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2,
it follows that pfinal.Ci(T - t) C P'~alCi(r - t') and pfial-Ci'(T - t) _ p'ntaCi'(T - t').
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that pE . tCi( - ') C pinit.Ci(r)
and pnal.Ci,(r - t') _ PAnit.Ci,(r). Therefore, since pinit = Pinit, follows that
pfinal.Ci(r - t) C Pinit.Ci(r) and PfinatCi'(T - t) C Pinit.Ci'(r), as needed.
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3. the brick-wall(i') action sets the velocity of the vehicle i' to zero and affects neither
the velocity of the vehicle i, nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p•,nal E G{i,i,}. Therefore, since the
brick-wall(i') action does not affect the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables, it
follows that Pfi,,l E G{i,i,}.
Since the vehicle velocities are restricted to be non-negative, it is the case that
pfinaUli' _ p1,,al.-i,. Moreover, since the brick-wall(i') action does not affect the ve-
locity of the vehicle i, it is the case that Pfinal-i = P~~a.ii. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2,
it follows that Pfinal-Ci(T - t) C P'in•'Ci(r - t') and final.Ci'(T - t) _ pnal.Ci,(T - t').
However, from the induction hypothesis it is the case that p'.,•.Ci( - t') C pit.Ci(r)
and pal*.Ci,(r - t') pinit-Ci(r). Therefore, since Pinit = pij, it follows that
Pfinal.Ci(T - t) C pinit.Ci(r) and Pfinal-Ci(T - t) C pinit-.Ci(r), as needed.
4. the actions protect(C)i', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i"' E I, affect neither the velocities of
the vehicles i and i', nor the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables.
From the induction hypothesis, it is the case that p;'ial E Gli,i,. Therefore, since
the actions protect(C)j', for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, brick-wall(i"), for
i" E I- {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'), for i" E I, do not affect the collided(i, i')
and collided(i', i) variables, it follows that Pfi,,l E G{i,i,}.
Moreover, since the input actions protect(C)j,, for C E P(I) and j' E J,j' $ j, and
the internal actions brick-wall(i"), for i" E I - {i, i'}, and reset-location(i"'),
for i"' E I, do not affect the velocities of the vehicles i and i', it is the case that
Pfinalt.i = P'1nalt.i and Pfinal-,i' = Pý,al'it.. From Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, it follows that
Pfinal.Ci(T - t) 1 P'inal.Ci(r - t') and pi.nal-Ci'(T - t) C P'inal.Ci(rT - t'). However,
from the induction hypothesis it is the case that p',•in.Ci(r - t') C pit.Ci(r) and
pnal,.Ci,(r - t') C Pnit-Ci'(r). Therefore, since Pinit = Pi,it, it follows that Pfinal-Ci(T -
t) 9 pinit.Ci(r) and Pfin,al.Ci'(T - t) _ pinit.Ci,(r), as needed.
5. the internal actions colliding-pair(i", i"'), for i", i"' E I, i" $ i"', and the inter-
nal actions collision-effects(i""), for i"" E I, are not enabled because a is only
comprised of states in R{i,i} and p•,,l E T{i,i,}(r - t').
In the case of a trajectory, Lemma 4.4.4, part 2, implies that Pfina,.Ci(r-t) Pal,.Ci(r-t')
and pfintl.Ci(r - t) C Pnal.Ci,(T - t'). However, from the induction hypothesis it is the
case that pfinal.Ci(r - t') C p•nit-Ci(r) and p'nal-Ci'(r - t') C p•iit.Ci,(r). Therefore, since
Piit = PiAit, it follows that Pfinal-Ci(T - t) C Pi,it.Ci(r) and Pfinal-Ci'(T - t) C pinit.Ci,(r).
Moreover, since p;,,al E G {i,i} and the collided(i, i') and collided(i', i) variables remain
constant throughout the trajectory, it follows that Pfinal E G{i,i,), as needed. U
163
Lemma 8.4.15 For r E R - o and t E [0, r], it is the case that future{,i,}(T{i,i,}(r), t) C
Tfi'i,}(r - t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 8.4.13 and 8.4.14. U
Corollary 8.4.16 For any t E R 0o, it is the case that future{i,i,}(T{,i,i}(t), 0) C Tfi,il,(t).
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 8.4.15. U
Lemma 8.4.17 For any t E R >o, it is the case that Tfi,i,}(t) C delay-safe{i,i,}(t).
Proof: From the definition of delay-safe in Section 3.2.1, we must show that:
1. future{i,i,}(T{i,i,}(t), [0, t]) G {i,i,, and
2. future i,i,}(T{i,i'}(t), t) C safei,,i,}.
The first condition follows directly from Lemma 8.4.15 and Lemma 8.4.1, part 1. More-
over, Lemma 8.4.15 and Lemma 8.4.1, part 5, imply that future{i,i,}(T{,i}(t),t)t )  Wii,.
Therefore, the second condition follows from Lemma 8.4.5. U
In the following lemma, we show that the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,il } implements the
protector Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Sli,i,}, R{i,i,1 , Gfi,i,, j, d). Since the protector automata
GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,il } and Absj involve the composition of the same sensor automaton
with distinct controller automata, it suffices to show that the discrete controller automa-
ton of the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,it} implements the discrete controller automaton
DC(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Si,i,}, Ri ,ij,j G{i,i), j, d).
Lemma 8.4.18 GRAPH-PROT-PAIRf{i ,i,} < Abs(GRAPH-VEHICLES, Sfi,i,, Rfi,il,, Gli,i,),j, d).
Proof: Both the GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} and the Absj protectors involve the composition
of the same sensor automaton with distinct controller automata. From Theorem 2.7.4,
it suffices to show that the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} im-
plements DCj. This is shown by a simulation from the discrete controller automaton of
GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} to DCj.
The mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of the protector
GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,il} and DCj is almost the identity. In the discrete controller automaton
of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,ii}, the variable sendj is equal to either a member of P({i, i'}), or the
value null. In DCj, these valuations simply map to either the actions protect(C)j, where
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C is the member of P({i, i'}) that corresponds to the the valuation of the variable sendj of
the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIRf{i,i'}, or the value null, respectively.
The start states for the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,il} and DCj
are the states in which sendj = null. These are related to each other according to the
mapping discussed above.
Furthermore, since the trajectories in both discrete controller automata are identical, we
need only consider their discrete transitions. We analyze the actions of the implementation
by cases, letting p denote any complete state of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton that
corresponds to the output state y, i.e., p E VALID and pYGRAPH-VEHICLES = y.
1. The snapshot(y)j action of the implementation sets sendj to an element of P({i, i'}).
In order to show that the behavior of the implementation is allowed by the specifica-
tion, we must show that the input action snapshot(y)j of the implementation sets the
value of the sendj variable in such a way that the subsequently enabled action 7r of the
implementation (i) guarantees that for all p', p" E R{i,i,} such that p' E future {i,i,)(p, 0)
and p' --, p", it is the case that p" E delay-safe{i,i,}(d), if p E safe{i,i,}, and (ii) is an
arbitrary output action of the implementation, otherwise.
First, consider the case in which p E safe{i,i,}. Since Corollary 8.4.7 implies that p E
Wfi,it,, the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{ii,} sets the variable
sendj according to whether the state p is in T{i,i,}(d), or not.
On one hand, if p ý T{(i,i,(d) then the discrete controller automaton of the pro-
tector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} sets the variable sendj to either {i}, or {i'} accord-
ing to the strategy described in Section 8.3. Therefore, the snapshot(y)j action
enables either the protect({i})j action, or the protect({i'})j action. Since p E
Wji,it,, Lemma 8.4.4 implies that p' E W{i,i,}. Moreover, since the protect({i})j
and protect({i'})j actions affect neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor any
of the collided variables, it follows that p" E R{i,i,}, p" E Gi,i,), p".i, = p'.ii,
and p".di, = p'.is. Therefore, since p' E Wfi,i,), Lemma 4.4.3, part 1, implies
that p" E disjoint-owned-tracks(i, i'). From the above conditions, it follows that
p" E W{i,i,t. Moreover, since the protect({i})j and protect({i'})j actions set
the brake-req(i,j) and brake-req(i',j) variables, respectively, to True, it follows that
p" E Vfi,i'}. Finally, Lemma 8.4.12 implies that p" E delay-safe{i,ii,(d), as needed.
On the other hand, if p E T{i,i,}(d) then the discrete controller automaton of the pro-
tector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} sets the variable sendj to 0 and the protect(0)j action
is enabled. Since p E T{i,i'}(d), Corollary 8.4.16 implies that p' E Tpi,i,}(d). Moreover,
since the protect(0)j action affects neither the velocity of any of the vehicles, nor
any of the collided variables, it follows that p" E R{i,i,}, p" E G{i,i), p".di = P'.4i,
and p".ii, = p'.ri,. Therefore, since p' E T{ii'}(d), Lemma 4.4.3, part 2, implies
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that p" E disjoint-claimed-tracks(i, i', d). From the above conditions, it follows that
p" E T{i,i,}(d). Finally, Lemma 8.4.17 implies that p" E delay-safe{i,i,}(d), as needed.
Next, consider the case in which p ý safef{i,i,. In this case, the snapshot(y)j action
of the discrete controller automaton of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} sets the variable sendj
to either {i}, {i'}, or 0 and, subsequently, enables either the protect({i})j action,
the protect({i'})j action, or the protect(0)j action, respectively. However, when
p 0 safe{i,i,}, the DCj automaton sets the variable sendj arbitrarily and, subsequently,
enables an arbitrary output action. Therefore, the behavior of the discrete controller
automaton of the protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,} is allowed by that of the DCj
automaton.
Therefore, the effects of the snapshot(y)j action of the implementation are allowed
by its specification.
2. The protect(C)j actions, for C E P({i, i'}), have identical effects in both discrete
controller automata. When the sendj variable matches either the set C, or the
protect(C)j action, the action protect(C)j is executed and the sendj variable is
set to null in both discrete controller automata.
3. The environment action in both discrete controller automata is stuttering. It fol-
lows that the mapping between the states of the discrete controller automaton of
GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{ii,} and the DCi automaton prior to and succeeding the execu-
tion of the environment action remains the same.
Corollary 8.4.19 The protector GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'} guarantees that the automaton
GRAPH-VEHICLES remains within G{i,i,} starting from S{i,i,} given R{i,i,}.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 8.4.18 and Theorem 3.2.9. U
8.5 Protection System GRAPH-PROT
We now define the collision protector GRAPH-PROT. While considering the automaton
GRAPH-PROT, we restrict the states of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton to Pnot-overspeed as
defined in Section 4.2, i.e., RGRAPH-PROT - Pnot-overspeed. Let GGRAPH-PROT and SGRAPH-PROT
be the intersection of Gfi,ii, and S{i,i,1 , for all {i,i'}, where i,i' E I,i $ i', respec-
tively, and GRAPH-PROT be the composition of GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i'}, for all {i, i'}, where
i,i' E I,i f i'. The protector GRAPH-PROT guarantees that GRAPH-VEHICLES remains
within GGRAPH-PROT starting from SGRAPH-PROT given RGRAPH-PROT. For reference, the for-
mal definitions of the GRAPH-PROT automaton and the sets GGRAPH-PROT, SGRAPH-PROT, and
RGRAPH-PROT are shown in Table 8.4.
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Table 8.4 Formal definitions of GRAPH-PROT, GGRAPH-PROT, SGRAPH-PROT, and RGRAPH-PROT.
GRAPH-PROT [j GRAPH-PROT-PAIR{i,i,}
i,i'E I,4i'
GGRAPH-PROT f G{i,ji'
i,i E I,ifi'
SGRAPH-PROT n Sf i'i }
i,i' E I,iAi'
RGRAPH-PROT Pnot-overspeed
Lemma 8.5.1 The protector GRAPH-PROT guarantees that the GRAPH-VEHICLES automa-
ton remains within GGRAPH-PROT starting from SGRAPH-PROT given RGRAPH-PROT.
In the following proof, we show that all the states of an execution of PP X GRAPH-PROT
starting from SGRAPH-PROT given RGRAPH-PROT are in GGRAPH-PROT. This is done by applying
Theorem 3.1.8 and showing that the second condition of the theorem does not hold.
Proof: Let a be any execution of the system PP X GRAPH-PROT starting from a state in
SGRAPH-PROT and in which all states are in RGRAPH-PROT.
From Theorem 3.1.8, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in GGRAPH-PROT = i, E l,ii' G= i,i,.
2. a can be written as al ^ a 2, where
(a) All state occurrences in al except possibly the last state occurrence are in the
set GGRAPH-PROT = ni,i' E l,iji' G i,i}.
(b) If the last state occurrence in a1 is in Gfi,i,}, for some i,i' E I, i 5 i', then there
exists i", i"' E I, i" $ i"', {i", i"'} $ {i, i'}, such that the last state occurrence in
a, is in Gi,,i,,,}.
(c) All state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first state occurrence are in the
set f i",i'} E N past(Gi,",,,"'}, a), for some N C {{i, i'} I i, i' E I, i $ i'}, where
INI > 2.
We proceed by showing that it is not possible to decompose a as al ^  a 2 while satisfying
the three aforementioned conditions.
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The violation of fii,i' I,i:i  G{i,i'} can only occur through the violation of at least one of
the conditions G{i,i,}, where i, i' E I, i $ i'. Moreover, each of these conditions are violated
only through the execution of a colliding-pair action. Without loss of generality, suppose
that the first condition that is violated in a is the condition Gi,ji,}, for some i, i' E I, i / i',
and that such a violation has resulted through a colliding-pair(i, i') action. Let p and
p' be the states of the system prior to and succeeding this colliding-pair(i, i') action,
i.e., p,p' E RGRAPH-PROT such that p - p', where r = colliding-pair(i, i'). Since the
colliding-pair(i, i') action only sets the collided(i, i') variable to True, it follows that the
state p' is in the set Gi,i,} n (Ai i,,,l ,E , P i', i,,,il,4,{, i,i Gi,,,i,,i}) . Now, we attempt to
decompose a as al ^  a 2:
1. Suppose we split a at any state preceding the state p. Then the state p is in
a 2. Since p' is the first state in which one of the conditions Gf{i,,i,,l}, for i", i"' E
I, i" # i", is violated, it is the case that p E ni,,2,"il, I,i,,Ai,,, Git,,i,,, and there
does not exist N C {{i", i"'} I i", i"' E I, i" $ i'"} such that INI 2 2 and p E
S{i,",i"'} E N past(Gii,,,i,,,m, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this de-
composition of a is not valid.
2. Suppose we split a at the state p. Then the state p' is in a2. Since p' is the first
state in which one of the conditions G,,i,,,iI}, for i", i"' E I, i"l i', is violated and
since the state p' is in G{i,i,} i (A i,,i E,,, I i,,i,,,,i,,,i,,,}ii,} G {i,,i,, ) , it follows that
there does not exist N C {{i", i"'} I i", i"' e I,i" 5 i"'} such that INI > 2 and
P' E A {i",i"'} eN past(G{i,,i,, , l a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this
decomposition of a is not valid.
3. Suppose we split a at the state p'. Then p' is the last state of al and the first state
of a 2. However, p' E G {i,i' (n i,,i- E I,i,'i, '{ii"*')}{i,i'} G'{i,,,ii}). Therefore, the
second condition is violated and this decomposition of a is not valid.
4. Suppose we split a at any state succeeding p'. Then the state p' is in al. Since
p' e G Ai,i (n i",l E I ,,i"i",{i",Ii"}{i,ji} G{i,,,i,,,), it follows that the state p' is not
in the set f i,,,,,,, ~ , i"i'" Gi,,,i,,,. Therefore, the first condition is violated and this
decomposition of a is not valid.
Therefore, the execution a cannot be decomposed into any such al and a2. It follows that
the first clause of Theorem 3.1.8 must hold; that is, every state in a is in GGRAPH-PROT. This
implies that the protector GRAPH-PROT guarantees GGRAPH-PROT in the GRAPH-VEHICLES
automaton starting from SGRAPH-PROT given RGRAPH-PROT. N
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Chapter 9
Composing the Overspeed and
Collision Avoidance Protection
Systems
In the previous chapters, we presented example protectors whose correct operation required
that the physical plant automaton at hand satisfied particular properties. For instance,
in the case of the VEHICLES automaton of Chapter 4, the overspeed protector OS-PROT of
Chapter 5 assumes that none of the vehicles collide among themselves and the collision
protector CL-PROT of Chapter 6 assumes that none of the vehicles exceed the speed limit.
Similarly, the MERGE-PROT protector of Chapter 7 and the GRAPH-PROT protector of Chap-
ter 8 guarantee that none of the vehicles collide among themselves in the MERGE-VEHICLES
and GRAPH-VEHICLES automata, respectively, provided that all the vehicles are abiding by
the speed limit. In this chapter, we compose the overspeed and collision protectors for the
VEHICLES automaton and show that the resulting protector guarantees that the vehicles in
the VEHICLES automaton neither exceed the speed limit, nor collide among themselves. We
extend these results to the MERGE-VEHICLES and GRAPH-VEHICLES automata after assum-
ing that the overspeed protector OS-PROT of Chapter 5 extends, virtually unchanged, to
the MERGE-VEHICLES and GRAPH-VEHICLES automata.
9.1 Overspeed and Collision Avoidance for the VEHICLES
Automaton
In the following lemma, we show that the composition of the protectors OS-PROT and CL-
PROT guarantees that the vehicles in the VEHICLES automaton neither exceed the speed
limit, nor collide among themselves.
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Lemma 9.1.1 The composition of OS-PROT and CL-PROT is a protector that guarantees
Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT in the VEHICLES automaton starting from SOS-PROT n SCL-PROT.
In the following proof, we show that all the states of an execution of PPx OS-PROT X CL-PROT
starting from Sos-PRow n SCL-PROT are in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT. This is done by applying
Theorem 3.1.7 and showing that the second condition of the theorem does not hold.
Proof: Let a be any execution of the system PP x OS-PROT X CL-PROT starting from a
state in SOS-PROT n SCL-PROT.
From Theorem 3.1.7, one of the following holds:
1. Every state in a is in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT.
2. a can be written as al ^ - a 2, where
(a) All state occurrences in al except possibly the last are in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT.
(b) The last state occurrence in al is in Gi, for some i E {OS-PROT, CL-PROT}, if
and only it is in Gi,, for i' E {OS-PROT, CL-PROT}, i' $ i.
(c) All state occurrences in a 2 except possibly the first state occurrence of a 2 are in
past(Gos-PRT, a) n past(GCLPROT, a).
We proceed by showing that it is not possible to decompose a into al and a 2 as proposed
by the second clause of Theorem 3.1.7. Then it trivially follows that the first clause of
Theorem 3.1.7 holds; that is, for any such a, all states are in Gos-PROTw n GCL-PROT.
The violation of GOS-PROT n GcL-PRow can occur through the violation of either GOS-PROT, or
GCL-PROT. On one hand, provided that no collisions have occurred, the violation of GOS-PROT
can only occur within a trajectory of the VEHICLES automaton. On the other hand, the
violation of GCLPROT can only occur through the execution of a colliding-pair(i, i') action,
for some i, i' E I, i' $ i. We analyze each of these cases separately.
1. In the first case, the key point is that the violation of the speed limit by any of the
vehicles in the VEHICLES automaton can only occur within a trajectory and that a
collision can not be recorded within a trajectory. Therefore, the fact that the speed
limit is violated prior to the occurrence of any vehicle collisions would imply that the
OS-PROT protector is not working correctly; that is, Corollary 5.3.1 is false.
Let w be the first trajectory in a containing a state occurrence in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT.
Suppose that w is a T,-trajectory and let TI be the subset of T, consisting of all t such
that (i, t, w(t)) E past(GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT, a). Then TI is a non-empty subinterval of
TI that is "upward-closed", i.e., if t E Tl, t' E TI, and t < t', then t' E TI. Since T1 is
an interval of reals, it has a left endpoint t which might or might not itself be in TJ. It
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is important to note that since the collided(i, i') variables, for i, i' E I, i 0 i', remain
constant throughout any trajectory of the VEHICLES automaton, it is only possible to
violate the GOS-PROT condition within the trajectory w; that is, all the states in w are
in the set GCL-PROT. Therefore, letting s = w(t), all state occurrences in a that precede
the state occurrence (i, t, s) are in the set GOS-PROT n GCL,-POT. Now, we attempt to
decompose a into al and a2 .
(a) Suppose we split a at any state preceding the state (i, t, s). Then the state
(i, t, s) is in a2. Since (i,t, s) is in GCL-PROT and all states that precede the state
(i, t, s) are in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT, it is the case that (i, t, s) 0 past(GOSPROT, a) n
past(GCL-PROT, a). Since the state (i, t, 8s) is not the first state in a 2, the third
condition is violated. Therefore, this decomposition of a is not valid.
(b) Suppose we split a at the state (i, t, 8s) and suppose that the state (i, t, 8) is not
the last state of w. Then any state of the trajectory w that succeeds the state
(i, t, s) is in a2 . Moreover, since all of the states in w are in GCL-PROT, none of
the states in w that succeed (i, t, s) are in past(Gos-PROT, a) n past(GCL-PROT, a).
Therefore, the third condition is violated and this decomposition of a is not valid.
(c) Suppose we split a at the state (i,t, s) and suppose that the state (i, t, s) is the
last state of w. Then since w is the first trajectory in a containing an occurrence
of a state in GOS-PROT GCL-PROT, it follows that (i,t, 8s) E Gos-PROT n GcL-PROT.
Moreover, since all the states in w are in GCL-PROT, it is the case that (i, t, s) E
Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT. Therefore, the second condition is violated and this decom-
position of a is not valid.
(d) Suppose we split a at a state s" that succeeds the state (i, t, s). Let (i, t', s') be
a state of the trajectory w that succeeds the state (i, t, s) and precedes the state
s". The state (i, t', s') is in al. By definition of TI, it is the case that (i, t', s') is
in past(Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT, a). Therefore, the first condition is violated and this
decomposition of a is not valid.
2. In the second case, the key point is that a collision can only be recorded by an action
and that such an action can not cause the velocity of a vehicle to exceed the speed
limit. Therefore, the fact that a collision among the vehicles occurs prior to the
violation of the speed limit would imply that the CL-PROT protector is not working
correctly, i.e., Lemma 6.3.1 is false.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the GCL-PROT condition is violated through a
colliding-pair(i, i') action, for some i, i' E I, i' 4 i. Let p and p' be the states of the
system prior to and succeeding this colliding-pair(i, i') action, i.e., p, p' E VALID
such that p -- p', where r = colliding-pair(i, i'). Since the colliding-pair(i, i')
action only sets the collided(i, i') variable to True, it follows that the state p' is in the
set GOS-PROT f GCL-PROT. Now, we attempt to decompose a into al and a 2.
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(a) Suppose we split a at any state preceding the state p. Then the state p is
in a 2. Since p' is the first state in Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT, it is the case that all
the states of a preceding p' are in the set GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT; that is, p ý
past(GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT, a) and p V past(Gos-PROT, a) n past(GCL-PROT, a). Since
p is not the first state in a 2, the third condition is violated. Therefore, this
decomposition of a is not valid.
(b) Suppose we split a at the state p. Then the state p' is in a 2. Since p' is the first
state in Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT, it is the case that all the states of a preceding p'
are in the set GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT; that is, p _ past(Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT, a) and,
moreover, p V past(Gos-PROT, a) n past(GCL-PROT, a). Since p' follows from p in a
single step and p' E Gos-PROT n GCL-PROT, it is the case that p' ý past(Gos-PROT, a) n
past(GCL-PROT, a). Therefore, the third condition is violated and this decomposi-
tion of a is not valid.
(c) Suppose we split a at the state p'. Then p' is the last state of al and the first
state of a 2. Since p' E GOS-PROT GCL-PROT, the second condition is violated.
Therefore, this decomposition of a is not valid.
(d) Suppose we split a at any state succeeding p'. Then the state p' is in al. Since
p' E Gos-PROT f GcL-PROT, the first condition is violated. Therefore, this decom-
position of a is not valid.
Therefore, the execution a cannot be decomposed into any such al and a 2. It follows that
the first clause of Theorem 3.1.7 must hold; that is, every state in a is in GOS-PROT n GCL-PROT.
This implies that the protector OS-PROT X CL-PROT guarantees Gos-PROT l GCL-PROT in the
VEHICLES automaton starting from SOS-PROT n SCL.PROT. U
9.2 Overspeed and Collision Avoidance for the
MERGE-VEHICLES Automaton
In the following lemma, we state that the composition of the protectors OS-PROT and
MERGE-PROT guarantees that the vehicles of the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton neither ex-
ceed the speed limit, nor collide among themselves. It is important to note that it is assumed
without proof that the protector OS-PROT and the Corollary 5.3.1 extend to the MERGE-
VEHICLES automaton. In fact, since the strategy of the OS-PROT protector defined for the
VEHICLES automaton in Chapter 5 does not depend on the nature of the track topology,
the OS-PROT protector of Chapter 5 extends to the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton virtually
unchanged.
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Lemma 9.2.1 The composition of OS-PROT and MERGE-PROT is a protector that guar-
antees GOS-PROT n GMERGE-PROT in the MERGE-VEHICLES automaton starting from SOSPROT n
SMERGE-PROT
Proof: This proof follows precisely the steps of the proof of Lemma 9.1.1. U
9.3 Overspeed and Collision Avoidance for the
GRAPH-VEHICLES Automaton
In the following lemma, we state that the composition of the protectors OS-PROT and
GRAPH-PROT guarantees that the vehicles of the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton neither ex-
ceed the speed limit, nor collide among themselves. It is important to note that it is assumed
without proof that the protector OS-PROT and the Corollary 5.3.1 extend to the GRAPH-
VEHICLES automaton. In fact, since the strategy of the OS-PROT protector defined for the
VEHICLES automaton in Chapter 5 does not depend on the nature of the track topology,
the OS-PROT protector of Chapter 5 extends to the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton virtually
unchanged.
Lemma 9.3.1 The composition of OS-PROT and GRAPH-PROT is a protector that guar-
antees Gos-PROT n GGRAPH-PROT in the GRAPH-VEHICLES automaton starting from SOS-PROT
SGRAPH-PROT*
Proof: This proof follows precisely the steps of the proof of Lemma 9.1.1. U
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis investigates how the formal modeling and verification techniques of computer
science can be used for the analysis of hybrid systems. The motivation behind such research
lies in the inherent similarity of the hierarchical and decentralized control strategies of
hybrid systems and the formal techniques used for the verification of distributed systems in
computer science. The thesis focuses on the development of techniques that use hybrid I/O
automata to model automated transportation systems and to verify that their protection
subsystems enforce the desired safety properties. The long-term goal of such research is
to develop a simple and scalable framework for modeling complex hybrid systems with
stringent safety and performance requirements.
10.1 Summary
The thesis is split into two major parts. First, we develop an abstract model of a physical
plant that is interacting with several protectors. Second, we specialize the abstract models
of the physical system and the protectors to simplified versions of the PRT 2 000TM and its
overspeed and collision protection subsystems.
As indicated above, the first part of the thesis is devoted to the development of an abstract
model of a physical plant and a number of protectors that guarantee particular safety or
performance properties. Both the physical plant and the protectors are modeled as hybrid
I/O automata. The protector automata communicate with the physical plant automaton
through shared variables and discrete actions. If S, R, and G are subsets of the states of
the physical plant, then a protector automaton A for the physical plant PP guarantees G
from S given R provided that every finite execution of the composition PP x A starting in
a state in S that only involves states in R ends in a state in G. It is shown that if two or
more protectors do not rely on the correct operation of each other, i.e., if the protectors
are independent, then their composition guarantees the properties guaranteed by each of
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the protectors being composed. On the other hand, if the protectors rely on the correct
operation of each other, their composition guarantees the properties guaranteed by each of
the protectors being composed only under certain conditions.
The abstract protector is parameterized in terms of the physical plant PP, the start states
S, the sets of guarantee G and reliance R, the port j through which it communicates with
the physical plant automaton, and the sampling period d. It is defined as the composition
of a sensor and a discrete controller, both modeled as hybrid I/O automata. The sensor
automaton samples the output variables of the physical plant at intervals of d time units and
the discrete controller automaton issues protective actions so as to ensure that the physical
plant exhibits the desired safety properties. The correctness of the abstract protector re-
duces the correctness proof of a protector implementation to a simulation proof among the
states of the implementation and the particular instantiation of the abstract protector.
The second part of the thesis involves the proof of correctness of overspeed and collision
protectors for a simple model of an automated transportation system involving n vehicles.
The overspeed and collision protectors are redefined for three types of track topology: a
single track, a track involving a Y-shaped merge, and a general track topology comprised
of Y-shaped merges and diverges.
In the case of a single track, the overspeed protector is defined as the composition of n
protectors, each of which guarantees that a particular vehicle does not exceed the speed
limit, provided that none of the vehicles collide among themselves. Conversely, the collision
protector is defined as the composition of n protectors, each of which guarantees that a
particular vehicle does not collide into any of the vehicles it trails, provided that none of
the vehicles exceed the speed limit and that none of the other vehicles collide into any of
the vehicles they respectively trail.
In the cases of the more complicated track topologies, although the overspeed protector
remains unchanged, the collision protectors are restructured. They involve the composition
of n(n - 1)/2 protectors, each of which guarantees that a particular unordered pair of
vehicles do not collide between themselves, provided that none of the vehicles exceed the
speed limit and that the vehicles of all other unordered pairs of vehicles do not collide
between themselves.
Due to the correctness proof of the parameterized abstract protector, the proofs of correct-
ness of the overspeed protectors for the individual vehicles and of the collision protectors for
either individual, or unordered pairs of vehicles, are straightforward. They simply involve
demonstrating the existence of a simulation relation among the states of the particular
protector implementations and the particular instantiations of the parameterized abstract
protector.
The composition of the overspeed protectors is straightforward due to their independence.
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The proof of correctness of the overspeed protection subsystem involves the application of
the aforementioned composition theorems for independent protectors. In the case of the
collision protectors, since the individual collision protectors rely on the correct operation of
each other, the proof of correctness of their composition is more involved. It relies on the
careful decomposition of the collision protection subsystem so that the failure of multiple
collision protectors at the same instant in time is prohibited. Similarly, the correct operation
of the composition of the overspeed and collision protection subsystems relies on the fact
that the overspeed protectors and the collision protectors can only fail through trajectories
and discrete actions, respectively.
10.2 Evaluation
The contributions of this thesis are twofold. First, we develop an abstract model of an
automated transportation system comprised of a physical plant and an arbitrary number of
protectors. Second, we specialize the abstract model so as to analyze and verify a particular
automated transportation system and its overspeed and collision protection systems.
The abstract models that are developed include the physical plant and a number of pro-
tectors. The abstract protector is parameterized in terms of the physical system, its start
states, its sets of guarantee and reliance, the port with which it communicates with the
physical plant and the sampling period. Therefore, the specification of a particular au-
tomated transportation system involves refinement of the abstract model. Moreover, the
proof of correctness of the abstract model leads to simple correctness proofs of the protector
implementations for particular instantiations of the abstract model. Finally, composition
of independent protectors is straightforward. The safety properties of the individual pro-
tectors are guaranteed by the composed protector. Such compositional assertions also hold
for dependent protectors under certain conditions. The use of abstraction, modular decom-
position, and composition is hoped to allow the scalability of the formal method analysis
and the verification of large and complex hybrid systems.
In this work, we demonstrate how hybrid I/O automaton techniques can be applied to
the specification and verification of a very general automated transportation problem. We
believe that the techniques developed in this thesis complement more traditional safety
analysis. For example, safety engineers typically perform a fault-tree analysis to identify
possible causes of each system hazard and related dependencies among system components.
In our work, we use composition of automata to formalize these dependencies: to yield a
speed limited system, we compose the physical plant with a set of overspeed protectors,
one for each vehicle, and assume that no collisions occur in the physical system; conversely,
to yield a collision free physical system, we compose the physical system with a set of
collision protectors, either one for each vehicle, or one for each unordered pair of vehicles,
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and assume that none of the vehicles exceed the speed limit. The composition of the
physical system in such ways formalizes the independence of the overspeed protectors, the
interdependence of the collision protectors and more importantly the interdependence of
the overspeed protectors and the collision protectors. We believe a more comprehensive
treatment in this style of all the protection subsystems would, as a by-product, yield a
significant subtree of the fault-tree.
10.3 Future Work
In this thesis, the treatment of automated transportation systems is a case study in the use
of hybrid I/O automata to formally model hybrid systems. The focus of the research is in the
use of abstraction, modularity, and composition to develop an abstract model of automated
transportation systems to be used in the analysis and verification of transportation systems
in use or under development. The long-term goal is to see how the formal methods of
computer science can be used to formally model hybrid systems in a modular and systematic
way and to verify their safety or performance characteristics. However, issues that have yet
to be addressed involve the topics of robustness, scalability, tractability, and the use of
formal methods as part of the system design process.
The work in this thesis assumes an ideal system; that is, the communication among the
various subsystems is assumed to be correct and reliable, and to occur in a timely fash-
ion. Moreover, the sampling of the state of the physical plant is assumed to be exact and
the effects of the protective actions are assumed to be precise. Since, these assumptions
are far from realistic, future research could involve the development of formal methods for
analyzing and verifying automated transportation systems that are robust with respect to
communication delays and uncertainty. For example, the treatment of automated trans-
portation systems of this thesis could be extended to allow delays in the communication
between the plant and the protectors and uncertainty either in the sampling of the state, or
in the effects of the protective actions. The treatment of automated transportation systems
could also be extended to allow fault tolerance; for example, allowing the track topology
to be dynamic so that vehicles are not allowed to travel on branches of the track that have
failed either structurally, or due to unexpected accidents.
In this thesis, we develop formal modeling techniques that are based on abstraction, mod-
ularity, and subsystem composition. The motivation behind this approach is the intent
to model and verify complex hybrid systems that involve hierarchical and decentralized
control schemes. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the scalability and tractability
characteristics of the formal modeling techniques developed. The success in modeling the
overspeed and collision protectors of an automated transportation system in this thesis in-
dicates that the modeling techniques that are based on hybrid I/O automata are scalable to
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larger and more complex systems. However, the study and formal analysis of more complex
systems remains to be done. In particular, it would be interesting to examine how complex
continuous-time dynamics affect the formal modeling tools developed in this thesis. More-
over, the lengthy correctness proofs, which were done by hand in this thesis, expose issues
of tractability concerning the analysis and verification of complex transportation systems.
In fact, they dictate that computer aided verification methods for hybrid I/O automata be
developed.
The formal modeling techniques developed in this thesis are techniques intended for the
analysis and verification of automated transportation systems. Future research could inves-
tigate the potential of using formal methods of computer science as an integral part of the
design of the hierarchical and decentralized control schemes of automated transportation
systems and of hybrid systems in general.
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